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Abstract 
 
Of all fields of historical enquiry, Germany’s Third Reich is perhaps the richest in sources 
and historiography. Therefore, it is logical to assume that this is where we see history done 
at its best. The chief interest of this dissertation is how historians select their sources and 
how they use the evidence they find in their sources. I have taken relations between Jewish 
Germans and non-Jewish Germans as a case study because of the enormous quantity of 
primary source material and because so many historians have commented on the issue. I do 
not attempt to make any claims about what happened between Jewish Germans and their 
non-Jewish compatriots nor do I make a moral assessment of behaviours and attitudes 
among the ‘ordinary’ people of Germany under the Third Reich. Rather, this is a technical 
exercise to examine how well the historians have done history in this particular area.  
 
My systematic review of the historians’ methodologies reveals that many either distort the 
evidence they cite or put forward arguments that go well beyond what the evidence 
warrants, perhaps because of pre-conceived theories which shape their approaches to the 
evidence. Moreover, they fail to make the best possible use of some types of source such as 
personal narratives. In order to ascertain whether these sources can be better used, I 
systematically analyse a selection of personal narratives which are sometimes quoted by 
historians, in particular the 1933-1945 diaries of Victor Klemperer. My question is: Do 
these testimonies really say what the historians claim they say about relations between 
Jewish and non-Jewish Germans? And if not, how can we analyse them to determine what 
they actually do say? 
 
The two kinds of problems which emerge are how to select a balanced range of sources 
and how to use them properly. My argument is that there are six methodological principles 
that should underpin good historical practice. Because historians are not scrupulous to 
apply these common-sense rules, their arguments are methodologically flawed and they do 
not use some sources to the full extent of their value. This raises the question of whether 
these problems are confined to this particular field or whether they are endemic to the 
history profession as a whole.   
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Introduction 
 
The chief interest of this dissertation is how historians use the evidence they find in their 
sources.  I question whether their use of the evidence is methodologically sound and if they 
have been careful to adhere to rigorous standards of good historical practice as they argue 
their conclusions. The case study I have chosen is relations between Jewish Germans and 
non-Jewish Germans in the Third Reich. This particular case study is suitable because of 
the enormous range of sources available to historians and because so many have 
commented on the issue, meaning there are plenty of examples available to consider. I 
have no intention of making any of my own claims about what happened between Jewish 
Germans and non-Jewish Germans or of making a moral assessment of behaviours and 
attitudes towards the Jewish people. This is a technical exercise to examine how well the 
historians have done history in this particular area. Because my focus is on the 
methodologies that historians employ, I question whether the historians have made 
adequate source selections and used the evidence they find in the sources appropriately. 
This includes an examination of how they use personal narratives, which they often find 
less useful than official regime sources. By means of a systematic approach to personal 
narratives, I try to ascertain if this kind of source is capable of revealing useful information 
to inform historians’ conclusions. In the case of historians who do use personal narratives, 
I question whether their conclusions are based on justifiable use of the evidence.  
 
In the first chapter of the dissertation, I examine the views of a number of prominent 
historians regarding the relationship between Jewish and non-Jewish Germans. I make no 
attempt to evaluate the degree to which the views of these historians are correct, or to 
prove or disprove their claims. Instead, I weigh their conclusions against the evidence they 
utilise to support their arguments. I am primarily concerned with two questions. Are the 
principles underlying their selection of evidence valid? Does the evidence they offer really 
support the claims they make on the basis of this evidence? I also explore some types of 
source that historians commonly do not utilise to see if they do have potential to be 
valuable. 
 
The second section investigates personal narratives. In general, historians use these sources 
in a limited way or even occasionally misuse the evidence in them. After examining firstly 
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what historians say about these types of sources and secondly how they use them, the 
chapter suggests how personal narratives could be better utilised. To test the assertions 
made by the historians about relations between Jewish and non-Jewish Germans, I carry 
out a preliminary exercise in systematic analysis of some narrative testimony to see if the 
information revealed in the sources reflects their claims.   
 
In the final section of the dissertation, I examine how some historians have utilised the 
much-discussed diaries of Victor Klemperer. These diaries are an extraordinary resource 
because of his ability comprehensively to record detailed information about his own life 
and those of people around him during a period when Jewish people were coming under 
increasing pressure from the Nazi regime. My key question is: Does Klemperer really say 
what these historians claim he says? To ascertain if Klemperer’s record does match the 
claims of the historians, I expand on the systematic analysis methods used in Chapter Two. 
My aim is to see if his testimony has potential to shed any light on the question of relations 
between Jewish Germans and non-Jewish Germans. I also compare the results of my 
analysis with the arguments of the historians I have scrutinized. When their claims are 
evaluated, it emerges that their arguments are misleading and their conclusions go well 
beyond what is warranted by the evidence that they cite. This raises the question of 
whether these types of problems are confined to the historiography of the Third Reich or 
whether they are endemic to the historical profession as a whole.  
 
This dissertation is confined by some parameters which are important to establish before 
the above issues can be examined. Although historians variously use terms such as 
‘Germans’, ‘Aryans’, ‘non-Jews’, or ‘ordinary people’, few of them define exactly who 
they mean when they refer to these groups.1 However, from the implications of their texts, 
the elements which comprise those groups basically appear to be the same. I have taken 
‘ordinary’ Germans to be those who did not belong to the power structures of the regime. 
They are the ‘masses’ referred to by writers such as Hannah Arendt. They held no 
positions of authority and did not become official representatives of the regime by joining 
the SA, the SS, or other elite Nazi organisations. For the most part, Jewish Germans had 
equal status with non-Jewish Germans until Nazi legislation removed the rights of the 
                                                 
1 To better reflect the general tenor of a particular historian’s argument or a narrator’s personal testimony, I 
have, in most instances, appropriated their terminology. This is why terms such as ‘Germans’ or ‘Aryans’ are 
occasionally inserted in the text. 
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Jewish people. Some of these ‘ordinary’ non-Jewish Germans were party members and 
some swore oaths of allegiance to Hitler. However, some Jewish Germans did the same as 
they felt themselves to come under pressure. Even the Jewish Professor Victor Klemperer 
swore the oath of allegiance as he sought a way to continue to maintain his quality of life.2  
Analysis of personal narratives demonstrates that some non-Jewish Germans who made 
significant gestures of support towards Jews like Klemperer were actually Nazi Party 
members. For this reason it is important to note that questions about support for Hitler and 
attitudes towards the Jewish population are not necessarily analogous. There is still much 
to be learned about the responses of the ‘ordinary’ Germans to all aspects of their lives 
under Hitler.  
 
When people tell their personal stories, we must remember that they can only convey their 
perceptions of their actual experiences. We cannot with any degree of certainty make 
claims about what actually happened or about how people behaved. Christopher Browning 
warns that human behaviour is a very complex phenomenon and that any historian who 
attempts to explain it is ‘indulging in a certain arrogance’.3 However, as I shall note 
throughout the dissertation, a number of historians do make bold and sweeping assertions 
which rest either on a faulty interpretation of the evidence or on the manipulation of 
evidence to fit pre-conceived theories.  
 
The terms personal narratives and personal testimonies are used interchangeably through 
the dissertation. I take these to mean any kind of recording of an individual’s eyewitness 
account of his or her experiences of life under the Third Reich. These stories are recorded 
in many different forms such as diaries, memoirs, oral histories, interviews, or surveys. 
There are other types of testimony possible, such as poetry, fictionalised accounts or other 
creative forms of expression but I have confined my discussion to the types of testimony to 
which historians generally refer when they discuss behaviours and attitudes toward Jewish 
people.  
 
                                                 
2 20 November 1934. Victor Klemperer, I Shall Bear Witness: The Diaries of Victor Klemperer 1933-41 
(London, 1998), p. 94. See also 16 May 1936, p. 158, as he reflects on this behaviour in himself and ‘Aryan 
fellow creatures’. 
3 Christopher Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland (New 
York, 1998), p. 188. 
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Even though my focus in the dissertation is to examine what historians have to say about 
attitudes toward the Germans who were also Jewish, it is important never to forget that 
they were not the only victims of the regime. Many other groups suffered varying degrees 
of persecution under the Nazis: Communists or other political groups, disabled and 
institutionalized people, Roma or Sinti communities, homosexuals, Catholics or members 
of religious minorities such as Jehovah’s Witnesses, black Germans, and others who were 
targeted as ‘asocial’ by the Nazis. The list of outcasts was very long. Unfortunately, the 
quantity of information available from some of these groups can be small. Some are almost 
invisible in the historiography.4 To my knowledge, no-one has attempted a systematic and 
detailed analysis of the attitudes of the ‘ordinary’ German people to outcasts belonging to 
groups other than the Jewish population. The historiography of the Third Reich pays most 
attention to the plight of the Jewish people, and it is from this group that the richest body 
of eyewitness testimony has come to us. Most, but not all, of the testimony referenced in 
this dissertation is from them. 
 
Throughout the dissertation I advocate six methodological principles which I have tried to 
follow in my own analysis of personal narratives. I note these principles at relevant points 
throughout the text but they do not appear in order of importance: 
? Historians should always take a critical approach to their sources, recognising and 
acknowledging their weaknesses and strengths. This includes balancing them with other 
sources and having a clear conception of what the sources are capable of revealing. 
? They must refrain from imposing their pre-existing theories on the evidence. Instead, 
they must genuinely seek to test their theories against the evidence. 
? Historians should draw on the knowledge available from other disciplines that can be 
useful to inform their interpretations of their evidence. 
? Historians need to recognise that the evidence from sources generated by the group 
under scrutiny is just as valuable as the evidence generated by groups not under scrutiny.  
? Sources must be approached with an open mind, recognising that they all have 
something to tell and should be ruled inadmissible only with very good reason.  
? Historians must approach their material as systematically as possible.  
 
                                                 
4 Sybil Milton, ‘Holocaust: The Gypsies’, in Century of Genocide: Critical Essays and Eyewitness Accounts, 
eds. Samuel Totten, et al (New York, 2004), p. 177. 
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These principles are not ground-breaking and are based mostly on common-sense. They 
should be intrinsic to good historical practice, but it appears that at least some well-known 
historians are not being entirely conscientious in their adherence to these basic rules. My 
ultimate assessment is that, if these principles are rigorously applied, we can go a long way 
toward diminishing the perceived problems of personal narratives. It follows that, provided 
they are used correctly, they can deservedly take their place among the credible sources of 
evidence that inform historians about the history of the Third Reich.
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Chapter One 
Historians: Their Sources and Use of Evidence 
 
For historians who examine the lives of ‘ordinary’ people under the Third Reich, one 
particular area of interest is relations between Jewish Germans and non-Jewish Germans. 
Historians have frequently commented on the question of how ‘ordinary Germans’ 
responded to the systematic isolation, exclusion and murder of their Jewish neighbours. 
The purpose of this chapter is to identify the views of key historians and to examine their 
selection and use of primary sources. The chapter identifies three major failings in the way 
historians have used evidence. They use unsound methodology when choosing their 
sources, they frequently over-generalise or misuse evidence to fit pre-conceived theories, 
and they fail to use other evidence which could make valuable contributions to the 
questions they are attempting to answer. The result is that their arguments are distorted by 
flawed methodology as they draw conclusions which step well beyond what the evidence 
warrants.  
 
For the most part, the trend among historians has been to take a critical view of the 
behaviour of the ‘ordinary’ German people during the Third Reich period. For example, 
Peter Hoffman writes: ‘On the whole, at all times from 1933 to 1945 the majority of 
German voters, indeed of the entire population, supported the government, albeit with 
varying degrees of willingness.’1 In regard to behaviour towards those persecuted by the 
regime, in particular the Jews, Hans Mommsen says: ‘Fellow travellers and opportunists 
were little concerned about the fate of their Jewish fellow citizens; anti-Semitism resulting 
from conformity and accommodation was indeed one of the worst phenomena of the 
time.’2 David Bankier discusses ‘a silence of tacit consent to the Nazi solution’3 and Ian 
Kershaw’s maxim ‘The road to Auschwitz was built by hate, but paved with indifference’ 
has become one of the most frequently quoted statements about the attitudes of ‘ordinary’ 
Germans to the anti-Semitic policies of the regime.4 Kershaw readily admits that the 
                                                 
1 Peter Hoffman, German Resistance to Hitler (Cambridge, Mass., 1988), p. 51.  
2 Hans Mommsen, ‘What Did the Germans Know about the Genocide of the Jews?’, in November 1938: 
From ‘Reichskristallnacht’ to Genocide, ed. Walter Pehle (New York, 1991), p. 194. 
3 David Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution: Public Opinion under Nazism (Oxford, 1992), p. 77. 
4 Ian Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent in the Third Reich: Bavaria 1933-1945 (Oxford, 
1983), p. 277. In the preface to the second edition (2005) Kershaw elaborates on and somewhat qualifies his 
meaning in writing these words without substantially changing his position (2005 ed., pp. xx-xxviii). 
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examination of attitudes and behaviours towards Jews in Bavaria that inspired his comment 
are a very minor aspect of his study.5 Nevertheless, numerous historians have both 
endorsed the general tenor of his epigram and applied it to the entire non-Jewish 
population of Germany. The general consensus among historians is that ‘ordinary’ 
Germans were largely indifferent to the plight of their Jewish compatriots. 
 
According to many historians, non-Jewish Germans were not only apathetic about the 
persecution of Jewish people in general, they also sought to distance themselves from those 
they actually knew, or even take personal advantage of the persecution that Jews faced. 
Moreover, the situation became worse as time progressed. For example, what historians 
have to say about the issue of relationship breakdown can be seen in their discussions of 
what happened in places of work.  Statistics show that Jewish people were more prominent 
in certain professions, particularly commerce, law, medicine, or academia.6 The positions 
taken by Claudia Koonz and Heide Gerstenberger are fairly typical of historians who 
address this issue. Koonz’s approach is to select individuals, Martin Heidegger, Carl 
Schmitt and Gerhard Kittel, to show how Germans from the intelligentsia appropriated 
Nazi doctrines along with the anti-Semitism that defined their behaviours.7  Their high 
public profiles meant that their endorsement of Hitler and the Nazi agenda gave intellectual 
support and credibility to the expulsion of Jews from their professional environments.8  
Her implication is that these individuals are representative of their community. 
Gerstenberger takes a more generalised approach in discussing the workplace experiences 
of Jews:  
 
There were social, and in particular professional groups whose members were convinced 
that Jews endangered or prevented them from becoming economically and socially 
successful. Since this is well known we usually do not seek further explanation for the fact 
that individuals belonging to these groups made use of the advantages that were offered to 
them through the persecution of Jews.9 
 
In short, historians generally find that, for reasons of personal advantage, Jewish Germans 
suffered rejection and abuse at the hands of their colleagues and clients, customers or 
patients. They substantiate their findings by drawing on examples such as diarist and 
                                                 
5 Kershaw, Popular Opinion, p. xxi. 
6 Sarah Gordon, Hitler, Germans, and the “Jewish Question” (Princeton, 1984), pp. 10-14. 
7 Claudia Koonz, The Nazi Conscience (Cambridge, Mass., 2003), pp. 46-68. 
8 Ibid. p. 48. 
9 Heide Gerstenberger, ‘Acquiescence?’, in Probing the Depths of German Antisemitism: German Society 
and the Persecution of the Jews 1933-1941, ed. David Bankier (New York, 2000), p. 26. 
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academic Victor Klemperer’s frequent invective against his colleagues at the Dresden 
Technical University.10 Klemperer’s growing determination to have nothing further to do 
with the colleagues who upset him provides, in the view of many historians, confirmation 
of how existing relationships disintegrated.  
 
Bankier, Kershaw, Frank Bajohr, Saul Friedländer, and others argue that seeking personal 
advantage, not just in the workplace, but also in general daily life, was a key motivator for 
mercenary or opportunistic responses to the victimisation of the Jewish population by the 
regime. Paradoxically, they claim people either took advantage of Nazi measures against 
Jews for their personal profit, or they protested against Nazi measures because it was 
costing them something personally. They say that purges by means of dismissals from 
universities and the public service, which opened opportunities for others, were not the 
only examples of where this kind of behaviour was exhibited.11 Historians frequently 
assert that the spoils of ‘Aryanisation’ became available to acquisitive Germans as 
businesses, homes and possessions came up for grabs when Jews were ousted by 
legislation or physical removal.12  In this way numerous ‘ordinary’ Germans became 
accomplices to robbery and murder.13 As he discusses deportations from Bavaria, Kershaw 
writes: ‘Where real interest [in what was happening to the Jews] was awakened on the part 
of the non-Jewish population it was less a product of human concern or moral principle 
                                                 
10 For example: ‘If one day the situation were reversed and the fate of the vanquished lay in my hands . . . I 
would have all the intellectuals strung up, and the professors three feet higher than the rest; they would be left 
hanging from the lamp posts for as long as was compatible with hygiene.’ 16 August 1936. Victor 
Klemperer, I Shall Bear Witness: The Diaries of Victor Klemperer 1933-41 (London, 1998), pp. 176-177. 
Omer Bartov, Germany’s War and the Holocaust: Disputed Histories (Ithaca, N.Y., 2003), p. 201; Hans 
Reiss, ‘Victor Klemperer (1881-1960): Reflections on His ‘Third Reich’ Diaries, German Life and Letters, 
51:1 (1998), p. 80; and Koonz, Nazi Conscience, p. 220, are just three who repeat this well-known quote. In 
this instance Klemperer was particularly angry at colleague Johannes Kühn, with whom he still had a social 
relationship but found frustrating because of his approval for some aspects of the Nazi programme. 
11 Bankier, Germans, p. 69. Also see Marion Kaplan, Between Dignity and Despair: Jewish Life in Nazi 
Germany (Oxford, 1998), pp. 25-26 and Michael Kater, Doctors under Hitler (Chapel Hill, 1989), p.184. 
12 Saul Friedländer, ‘The Wehrmacht, German Society, and the Knowledge of the Mass Extermination of the 
Jews’ in Crimes of War: Guilt and Denial in the Twentieth Century, eds. Omer Bartov et al (New York, 
2002), p. 28. Also see Frank Bajohr, ‘Aryanisation’ in Hamburg: The Economic Exclusion of Jews and the 
Confiscation of their Property in Nazi Germany (New York, 2002); Avraham Barkai, ‘The German 
Volksgemeinschaft from the Persecution of the Jews to the ‘Final Solution’’, in Confronting the Nazi Past: 
New Debates on Modern German History, ed. Michael Burleigh (New York, 1996), p. 91, and Michael 
Wildt, ‘Violence Against Jews in Germany, 1933-1939’ in Probing the Depths of German Antisemitism, ed. 
David Bankier (New York, 2000), pp. 204-208.  
13 Bajohr, ‘Aryanisation’, p. 281. 
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than self-interest and the hope of material advantage.’14 Moreover, the real motive behind 
denunciations with anti-Semitic content was pure self-interest.15  
 
On the other hand, some historians claim that those Germans who protested against anti-
Semitic policies did so, not for ethical reasons or out of solidarity with the Jews, but for 
reasons that were self-serving.16  According to Bankier, for example, ‘Aryan’ maids who 
worked for Jewish families protested against the Nuremberg Laws, not out of sympathy for 
their employers, but simply because the implementation of the Laws would force them out 
of their jobs.17 Bankier also argues that ‘Aryan’ farmers demanded the retention of Jewish 
stock-traders, not for moral or humanitarian reasons, but because they possessed superior 
skills and gave the farmers higher prices. In a similar vein, Bankier argues that tourist 
resorts were unhappy at the prospect of losing the custom of wealthy Jewish visitors.18 
Both Bankier and Richard Evans observe that many Germans were anxious that the anti-
Semitic policies of the Nazi regime would provoke a boycott of German goods in other 
countries.19 According to a number of historians, including Bankier, Avraham Barkai, 
Friedlander and Christopher Browning, criticisms of Reichskristallnacht were motivated, 
not by disapproval of what had been done to the Jews per se, but by repugnance at the 
wanton destruction of property and the breakdown of public order.20  
 
A further assertion that is commonly encountered in the secondary sources is that, over 
time, Jewish people faced more and more public hostility from non-Jewish Germans. 
According to Marion Kaplan, the situation became so bad that people could be attacked in 
public simply because they looked Jewish.21 Susanne Heim asserts that Klemperer’s 
experiences worsened over time as he ‘more and more frequently met Germans who not 
                                                 
14 Kershaw, Popular Opinion, p. 363. 
15 Christl Wickert, ‘Popular Attitudes to National Socialist Antisemitism: Denunciations for “Insidious 
Offenses” and “Racial Ignominy” in Probing the Depths of German Antisemitism, ed. David Bankier (New 
York, 2000), p. 295. See also Robert Gellately, Backing Hitler: Consent and Coercion in Nazi Germany 
(Oxford, 2001), pp. 136-137. 
16 Bankier, Germans, p. 73, and Detlev Peukert, Inside Nazi Germany: Conformity, Opposition and Racism 
in Everyday Life (London, 1993), p. 58. 
17 Bankier, Germans, p. 80. 
18 Bankier, Germans, p. 96. Also see Kershaw, Popular Opinion, p. 240. 
19 Bankier, Germans, p. 74, and Richard Evans, The Third Reich in Power: How the Nazis Won over the 
Hearts and Minds of a Nation (London, 2005), pp. 542, 548. 
20 See Barkai, ‘The German Volksgemeinschaft, p. 94. Also see Bankier, Germans, pp. 74, 75; Saul 
Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews, Volume 1: The Years of Persecution 1933-1939 (New York, 1997), 
p. 295; and Christopher Browning, The Origins of the Final Solution (Lincoln, 2004), p. 428.  
21 Marion Kaplan, ‘Keeping Calm and Weathering the Storm: Jewish Women’s Responses to Daily Life in 
Nazi Germany, 1933-1939’ in Women in the Holocaust, eds. Dalia Ofer and Lenore J. Weitzman (New 
Haven, 1998), p. 40. 
 14
only supported the policies toward the Jews, but felt a need to express their hatred of the 
Jews personally by openly attacking them.’22 In the view of Ulrich Herbert, ‘escalating 
indifference’ was the typical attitude towards Jews.23 Barkai attributes this phenomenon to 
years of fanatical indoctrination which isolated Jewish people and converted them, in the 
eyes of non-Jewish Germans, into a depersonalised mythical enemy stereotype.24  Other 
factors contributing to changing mindsets over time included letters home from the Front 
expressing animosity towards Jews and gradual internalization of government policies.25 
Browning believes the process of legalising discrimination against Jews led eventually to a 
widespread view among non-Jewish Germans that the time had arrived to end the role of 
Jewish people in German society.26 Otto Dov Kulka asserts that as the regime progressed, 
the most notable feature of public reaction to the plight of the Jews was increasing 
silence.27 His opinion is shared by many other historians.  
 
Kershaw claims that there is little more that can be said on the issue. As far as he is 
concerned, the nature of the available evidence places limits on how much historians can 
say about the attitudes of the population to the Nazi regime in general and to its anti-
Semitic policies in particular:  
 
We have to face the fact that there is no possibility of quantifying opinion on the basis of 
the surviving evidence. After 1933, when the curtain falls on free and open expression of 
opinion, the development of popular attitudes towards Nazism can only be reconstructed 
impressionistically.28  
 
                                                 
22 Susanne Heim, ‘The German-Jewish Relationship in the Diaries of Victor Klemperer’ in Probing the 
Depths of German Antisemitism, ed. D. Bankier (New York, 2000), p. 324. 
23 Ulrich Herbert, ‘Extermination Policy: New Answers and Questions about the History of the “Holocaust” 
in German Historiography’, in National Socialist Extermination Policies: Contemporary German 
Perspectives and Controversies, ed. U. Herbert (New York, 2000), p. 43. 
24 Barkai, ‘The German Volksgemeinschaft’, pp. 95-96. 
25 Michael Burleigh, ‘Introduction’, Confronting the Nazi Past, p. 20, and Otto Dov Kulka, ‘The German 
Population and the Jews: State of Research and New Perspectives’ in Probing the Depths of German 
Antisemitism, ed. D. Bankier (New York, 2000), pp. 277, 280. See also Bankier, Germans, pp. 108-109 and 
Friedländer, ‘Knowledge Mass Extermination’, pp. 21, 24.  For an extended discussion of soldiers, their 
attitudes and the news they conveyed home, see Omer Bartov, ‘The Distortion of Reality’ in Hitler’s Army: 
Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich (New York, 1991), pp. 106-178. 
26 Browning, Origins, p. 10. 
27 Kulka, ‘German Population’, pp. 275, 277. 
28 Kershaw, Popular Opinion, p. 6. This statement contains echoes of Eva Reichmann’s assertion that no 
single spoken or written word written after the Nazis came to power could give any direct indication of the 
feeling of the masses:  Eva Reichmann, Hostages of Civilisation (Westport, 1949), p. 190. Reichmann’s 
belief is contradicted by the argument in my next chapter.  
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The difficulty with Kershaw’s standpoint arises from the fact, which he admits, that no one 
has yet made a concerted effort to examine the evidence systematically.29 He has more to 
say in the introduction to Hitler, the Germans, and the Final Solution:  
 
I have the feeling, as I already did by the mid-eighties, that interpretations of the German 
population’s stance on the ‘Final Solution’ cannot be taken any further. Sometimes 
historians simply have to accept that they cannot find the hard and fast answers they seek 
in the inadequate remnants of the past with which they have to deal. New work will, I fear, 
be susceptible to the likelihood of diminishing returns.30 
 
This claim is not tenable until a reasonable attempt has been made to test the available 
evidence methodically and analytically. As I shall discuss throughout this dissertation, 
none of the above-mentioned historians have put all available sources through a rigorous 
and methodologically sound process of systematic investigation. Nonetheless, the 
prevailing viewpoint of the secondary sources stands mostly unchallenged. The assertions 
that historians make about indifference and opportunistic behaviours among non-Jewish 
Germans are widely accepted in the secondary literature. These assertions also serve to 
subtly advance the case made by historians, which claims that the German people were 
complicit with the regime in its actions against Jewish Germans.31  
 
The Problem of Source Selection 
To begin the process of tracing how historians arrive at their conclusions, we must first 
look at the decisions they make when they choose their sources. Historians face strategic 
problems when they select their sources because different sources will yield different 
information which can influence or even distort their conclusions. When studying modern 
history, especially the history of the Third Reich, the sheer volume of available resources 
means that no single historian can explore adequately the full range of archived sources, 
                                                 
29 Kershaw, Popular Opinion, p. 224. Although this comment was made over two decades ago, it appears it 
has yet to be contradicted by subsequent studies.  
30 Ian Kershaw, Hitler, the Germans, and the Final Solution (New Haven, 2008), p. 11. Hilberg expresses the 
same sort of idea when he rules out the possibility of any sharply new perspective being obtainable, even if 
we generate more testimony from oral history projects. Raul Hilberg, ‘I Was Not There’, in Writing and the 
Holocaust, ed. Berel Lang (New York, 1988), p. 20.   
31 Tony Kushner believes that Holocaust scholarship tends to divide Germans into neat categories of 
perpetrator-victim-bystander. See Tony Kushner, ‘‘Pissing in the Wind’? The Search for Nuance in the Study 
of Holocaust ‘Bystanders’’ in ‘Bystanders’ to the Holocaust: A Re-evaluation, ed. David Cesarini (London, 
2002), pp. 60, 64.  Bystanders are subsequently bracketed with perpetrators to make them complicit in regime 
crimes. Hence this perpetuates the notion of Germany as a ‘society of perpetrators’. See Gudrun Schwartz, 
‘“During Total War, We Girls Want to Be Where We Can Really Accomplish Something”’, in Crimes of 
War: Guilt and Denial in the Twentieth Century, eds. Omer Bartov et al (New York, 2002), p. 122. 
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personal testimonies, or the many other sources available. In this section I shall comment 
on the source decisions made by eleven historians who have to some degree discussed the 
question of how the Jewish population was treated by ‘ordinary’ non-Jewish Germans.32  
The problem which emerges is that their source decisions are methodologically unsound. 
This is because they rely too much on any one kind of source and do not follow closely a 
basic principle which should be adhered to when considering which sources to use.  
 
The first methodological principle advocated in this dissertation states that historians must 
always take a critical approach to their sources. This includes ensuring their sources are 
balanced with others and that the historians have a clear understanding of what the sources 
are capable of revealing. Historians must firstly recognise, and secondly acknowledge, the 
weaknesses and strengths of their sources. A transparently balanced assessment of sources 
is essential to ensure the value of each type of source is not overlooked, even as their 
limiting factors are taken into account. 
Regime reports 
The sources most often favoured by historians are those generated from a ‘top down’ view, 
not from a ‘bottom up’ view. The information in them is based on the impressions of 
regime representatives who observed and reported what they believed to be the responses 
of the people. These official sources are the reports compiled by district governors (such as 
Gauleiter or Kreisleiter), the Nazi Party, the Gestapo, and SD intelligence (SS security 
service).33 A proportionately smaller number of historians draw on personal narratives 
                                                 
32 David Bankier, Germans and the Final Solution: Public Opinion under Nazism (Oxford, 1992);  Omer 
Bartov, ‘Jews as Germans: Victor Klemperer Bears Witness’, Germany’s War and the Holocaust: Disputed 
Histories (Ithaca, N.Y., 2003), pp. 192-215;  Michael Burleigh, The Third Reich: A New History (London, 
2000); Saul Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews, Volume 1: The Years of Persecution 1933-1939 (New 
York, 1997), and The Years of Extermination: Nazi Germany and the Jews, 1939-1945 (New York, 2007); 
Robert Gellately, Backing Hitler: Consent and Coercion in Nazi Germany (Oxford, 2001); Susanne Heim, 
‘The German-Jewish Relationship in the Diaries of Victor Klemperer’ in Probing the Depths of German 
Antisemitism, ed. D. Bankier (New York, 2000), pp. 312-325; Eric Johnson, Nazi Terror: The Gestapo, Jews, 
and Ordinary Germans (New York, 2000); Marion Kaplan, Between Dignity and Despair: Jewish Life in 
Nazi Germany (Oxford, 1998); Ian Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent in the Third Reich: 
Bavaria 1933-1945 (Oxford, 1983); Otto Dov Kulka, ‘The German Population and the Jews: State of 
Research and New Perspectives’ in Probing the Depths of German Antisemitism, ed. D. Bankier (New York, 
2000), pp. 271-281; and Michael Wildt, ‘Violence Against Jews in Germany, 1933-1939’ in Probing the 
Depths of German Antisemitism, ed. David Bankier (New York, 2000), pp. 181-209. 
33 Historians also rely heavily on Sopade reports which were compiled by the exiled German Socialist Party. 
See Peukert, p. 49. They regard Sopade reports as complementary and relatively reliable sources because 
they generally corroborate Nazi documents, even though they too were compiled from a specific ideological 
and political perspective. However, they are potentially contaminated because they were based partially on 
information leaked from government sources. Furthermore, after 1938 they were undermined by the 
dwindling number of informants. See Gordon, p. 167. 
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such as diaries, memoirs or oral histories. Their use of these source types will be explored 
later in this dissertation. For now we shall examine the regime reports which are preferred 
by many to determine if their selections are justifiably appropriate for engaging with the 
issue of attitudes toward Jewish people. The first area to question is how they deal with the 
shortcomings of their sources.  
 
In general, historians seldom alert their readers to any problems arising from their use of 
their sources. Of the eleven examined here (Bankier, Bartov, Burleigh, Friedländer, 
Gellately, Heim, Johnson, Kaplan, Kershaw, Kulka, and Wildt), seven do not acknowledge 
any issues related to their selection of sources, two make only passing mention of some 
problems, and the remaining two, while they do draw attention to some of the issues, do so 
in the context of justifying their choice of sources.34  The seven who fail to tell us of any 
potential difficulties with the sources make only brief comments to justify their use. For 
example, Michael Wildt refers to his sources – regional archives and a memoir – only in 
footnotes. There he indicates his belief that they are representative of other regions, 
without saying how.35 Robert Gellately’s most commonly referenced sources are other 
historians, official Reich sources or newspapers. But he does not justify his choices other 
than to briefly defend his use of newspapers in the face of questions about censorship.36 
The remainder of these seven give no indication in their texts of any limitations or 
problems arising from their favoured sources.37 Their readers are clearly expected to accept 
each historian’s analysis without opportunity to weigh up whether the sources are reliable 
or comprehensive enough to support their arguments. The two who mention some issues in 
passing are Eric Johnson and Otto Dov Kulka.38 Johnson’s sources are his own interview 
data, archived court records, and biographical records of regime officials. His few 
comments on source deficiencies relate to the court records. Kulka confines his comments 
to the ‘sporadic and subjective character’ of personal narratives, effectively dismissing 
them as useful, while he endorses the uses of archived regime reports because he believes 
                                                 
34 Note that Hilberg admits that it took him fifty years of research before he gave thought to analyzing his 
sources. Raul Hilberg, Sources of Holocaust Research: An Analysis (Chicago, 2001), p. 7.   
35 See Wildt, ‘Violence’, p. 183, footnote 8, which lists the regional archives he uses. His sole memoir source 
(Moritz Mayer) is also referenced in Wildt, p.190, footnote 24. Because Mayer’s perspective is ‘diametrically 
opposed’ to that of the regime’s documents, Wildt’s implication is that his sources are hence appropriately 
balanced. 
36 Gellately, Backing Hitler, p. 6. 
37 Kaplan provides the merest of hints that she has thought about source choices but limits her discussion of 
issues with memoirs to comments on gender differences and the self-selected content of memoirs. Kaplan, 
Dignity and Despair, pp. 8-9. 
38 Johnson, Nazi Terror, pp. 23-27, and Kulka, ‘German Population’, pp. 271-272, 278-279. 
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they are ‘paramount’ sources. Presumably, he means that as sources, regime reports are 
superior to any other. He has not been even-handed in his treatment of sources because he 
disregards the weaknesses of his favoured sources but instead notes the weaknesses of the 
sources he does not use. 
 
Kershaw and Bankier are the only two of the eleven who take the trouble to discuss the 
shortcomings of their sources in any depth.39 They fail to indicate, however, how they 
compensate for any problems with balanced or effective use of alternate sources.  
Kershaw’s remarks qualify the trustworthiness of his sources, which are mostly the reports 
compiled by various Nazi agencies.40 He warns that they have ‘a strong internal bias, are 
subjective appraisals of the situation, and allow no possibility of quantification.’41  But he 
remains satisfied that the broad line of mood and opinion still comes through clearly, even 
if the best we can hope for is merely an impressionistic picture.42 Despite the 
methodological problems involved in using them, Kershaw clearly regards his regime 
agency reports as superior to all other kinds of primary sources. Bankier acknowledges that 
his sources, which are Nazi agency reports with the same origins as Kershaw’s, reflect the 
moods and attitudes of people under state coercion. He notes that this necessarily 
compromises the conventional notion of public opinion. While he declares that there is no 
way of ascertaining how representative his source information is, he still believes that 
informant use of terms such as ‘widespread’, ‘representative’, or ‘typical’ do imply a 
degree of quantification on which certain valid generalisations can be based.43  Even as he 
comments on the doubtful accuracy of one document, he undermines the value of other 
sources: ‘It is therefore important to use other sources when available, as a control or to 
correct distortions. Regrettably, however, additional material does not always put us on 
more solid ground.’44 Both of these historians appear to be content with their choice of 
principal sources, while deeming other sources to be of lesser value. 
 
Although Bankier and Kershaw are careful to acknowledge some problems with their 
sources, they fail to explore sufficiently other important factors that might affect the 
                                                 
39 Bankier, Germans, pp. 5-10 and Kershaw, Popular Opinion, pp. 5-10. 
40 Kershaw also discusses Sopade reports but makes no evaluative comments about them, providing instead 
just a general description of their origins and content. 
41 Kershaw, Popular Opinion, p. 6. 
42 Ibid., p. 10. 
43 Bankier, Germans, pp. 9-10. 
44 Ibid., pp. 117-118. 
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authority of their chosen sources. While the reports are indeed highly relevant to the 
subject matter, because their most significant aims included ascertaining public ‘mood’, 
they still require a very cautious approach. Whilst the use of such sources is entirely valid, 
the perspective of these sources is limited. This can and does distort the arguments of those 
historians who rely too much on this type of evidence.  
 
The first factor which affects the perspective of the reports is that those who compiled 
official reports operated from a strong ideological base. Their actions were motivated by 
and reflected their Nazi ideals and ambitions. Certainly, the reports of Nazi party officials 
such as Gauleiter, along with Gestapo and SD intelligence reports, are compromised by a 
high level of bias. For a while, large quantities of information from local offices such as 
councils or police stations were pieced together into reports. These tended to have a low 
level of bias but they were stopped in 1936 because they contained evidence of negative 
public mood which risked damaging the image of national unity sought by the regime.45  
Termination of reports for these reasons should alert us to the presence of agendas in the 
official agencies. In addition to the problems of ideological agendas, we have to bear in 
mind two elements that influence the official records of any regime: firstly, records are 
created, not for posterity, but for the administrative and legal purposes of the institutions 
that produce them and secondly, they are imbalanced because they reflect the activities of 
the powerful and organised elements in society, which means they cannot be a fully 
representational image of the human past.46 There are many aspects of human society and 
behaviour that official records cannot capture, particularly amongst the ‘ordinary’ people. 
In short, we must always bear in mind that the perspectives of the Nazi reports are limited 
by the ideology behind them and purpose-specific activities involved in their compilation.  
 
A second factor is that secondary texts do not tell us about how the reports, in particular 
Lageberichte and Stimmungsberichte (situation- and mood-reports), were compiled. 
Because they do not make clear the flow of information, the sequences involved in 
constructing a report, or the factors that compromised information, we cannot understand 
at what stages information might have been contaminated, altered or otherwise affected by 
                                                 
45 Bankier, Germans, pp. 5-6. These reports only existed for about twenty months between the years 1934-
1936. 
46 Wolfgang Weber, “Mass of Trash” or “Veins of Gold”?: An Investigative Report on the Relationship 
Between Oral History and Archives (Regensburg, 2000), pp. 42-45, esp. p. 42, quoting H. Jenkinson, A 
Manual of Archive Administration (London, 1937); and  pp. 35-36, quoting D. Reimer, ‘Oral History and 
Archives. The Case in Favor’, Canadian Oral History Association Journal, 1 (1981-82), pp. 30-33. 
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handling. Lawrence Stokes describes one example of how an informant obtained 
information from a specific context – a church service.47 But after information was passed 
on by informants, it travelled though numerous levels of authority. The raw material was 
processed any number of times, with varying final destinations and recipients. 
Enhancement or trivialisation of significant details was inevitable and handling in several 
offices meant layer after layer of potential for distortion. Lee Benson writes that historians 
should not be expected always to reconstruct every step in sequences of communication 
flows but adds that ‘it seems axiomatic that historians ought to try to reconstruct such 
sequences if they hope to reconstruct official perceptions with any reasonable degree of 
precision and credibility, or hope to understand and explain how those perceptions came 
about.’48  In the end, historians who work with these documents need to be open about the 
fact they have been processed an unknown number of times. The original information has 
been subjected to intervention which limits its ability to yield credible data.  
 
The third factor affecting the perspective of regime sources is that they originated with 
agents whose task was likely to have been influenced, not only by their own agendas, but 
by various other pressures. This probability is pushed aside by some historians who focus 
on the information in the reports, believing that they express ‘authentic’ opinion because 
they reported dissenting views that reflected negatively on the regime.49 Whether the 
historians are correct or not, they must still take into account how reporting was affected 
by the situations of the informants. There are several factors which would have influenced 
the collection of information. Informants were not specially trained to do the work, they 
had no concept of the techniques that form the basis of contemporary public opinion 
surveying, and their activities were supported what Stokes describes as ‘weak pillars’ of 
anonymity and chance.50 Conscious knowledge that they would face harassment or 
ostracism if discovered may have influenced their activities.51 We do not know how much 
they downplayed, or what they exaggerated. We have no way of ascertaining whether the 
information they reported was representative or typical. Added to this, their task was no 
                                                 
47 Lawrence Stokes, ‘Otto Ohlendorf, the Sicherheitsdienst and Public Opinion in Nazi Germany’, in Police 
Forces in History, ed. George Mosse (London, 1975), pp. 243-249. 
48 Lee Benson, ‘An Approach to the Scientific Study of Past Public Opinion’, The Public Opinion Quarterly, 
31:4 (1967-1968), pp. 546-547. (Italics Benson’s). 
49 For example, see Kershaw, Final Solution, p. 9, or Peukert, pp. 50, 52. 
50 Stokes, ‘Otto Ohlendorf’, pp. 259-260. By this, Stokes means that the informants were dependent on 
remaining anonymous and chancing across information useful to report. Neither element provided a good 
foundation for effective gathering of information. 
51 Ibid., p. 252. 
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doubt influenced by their ideological predispositions, the slanted focus of targeted 
informational searches, and the almost certain pressure to please, appease or toady to 
superiors. The question that we must ask is whether those on the lower rungs of this regime 
with totalitarian aspirations were totally convinced of their safety if they presented 
completely objective information to their managers. If an agent forwarded data about 
opposition to Nazi doctrines in his area, how much did that place him at risk if he also 
carried responsibility for successfully disseminating ideology?  Would he be tempted to 
use reports to prove his own efficiency? Would his instinctive desire for upward mobility 
or praise from superiors lead him to produce material more sympathetic to their own 
desires? We cannot possibly answer these questions definitively, but to avoid the danger of 
glibly taking the sources at face value, they must at least be asked.52  Even the SD 
questioned the reliability of many of its agents. Informants were classified into five 
categories. In three of these (Zubringer, Helfer, or Unzuverlässige) the agents were either 
paid, had other personal motives or were known to be unreliable.53 Eventually, tensions 
between the optimism demanded by Himmler and Germany’s increasingly critical situation 
led to changes in the tone of the SD reports, but, even before this, it is likely that agents 
must have been aware that too much bad news would be unwelcome.54 Not only Himmler, 
but also Goebbels, Bormann, some Gauleiter and even local party branches complained 
about or otherwise interfered with the reporting process.55 With such a multiplicity of 
pressures, the circumstances under which the agents set about their task were likely to have 
had significant impact on the overall result.  
 
The fourth factor is that regime reports could not gauge mood accurately because their 
informants could not access the real views of the people. Information from eyewitness 
testimonies tells us that people were aware there were spies around and that they were 
cautious in their communications. One survey respondent told interviewers: “In the course 
                                                 
52 To be fair, Bankier does make passing mention of obvious bias in the sources: Bankier, Germans, pp. 6-7. 
Kershaw also draws attention to the same issue: Kershaw, Popular Opinion, pp. 5-8. Of course the dilemmas 
of Nazi agents in subordination to the hierarchy do not apply to Sopade agents but their ideological 
orientation, focus on the working class, dwindling access to information and tendency to draw on leaked 
government sources remains important to take into account when assessing validity and reliability. 
53 Bankier, Germans, p. 7. Zubringer: paid informers on contract, Helfer: informers with personal motives, 
Unzuverlässige: unreliable collaborators, ex-convicts. 
54 Bankier, Germans, p. 8. 
55 Stokes, ‘Otto Ohlendorf’, pp. 238, 245, 248-249, 251-254. 
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of time, all people became cautious. They simply didn’t speak with people anymore.” 56  
Personal testimonies tell of a kind of double existence, for example:   
One day [a neighbour who was the local postmaster] calls me into his office and he says, 
“Look, I’m very embarrassed to say this. I value you as neighbours. But please tell your 
mother not to take it amiss if I don’t say hello to her. After all, I’m an official here and I 
could lose my job. So please don’t take it as if we have anything against you.”57  
 
Frequent signs of sympathy were made in secret, while in public they were kept hidden, 
even denied. Even our supposed friends feared one another and pretended to have an anti-
Jewish attitude.58 
 
Informants attempting to access the opinions of these people relied on overheard or 
provoked conversations in everyday environments.59  There are plenty of indicators in 
eyewitness accounts that this first step in the process of communicating information to the 
regime hierarchy frequently may have been thwarted or at least contaminated in some way:  
 
The few [Nazi] hundred-percenters are known; they are toadied to - and shunned. People 
warn you of them, stop talking or change the subject whenever they come into the room. 
And no one dares tell them to their faces what he thinks, what is bothering him, and what 
he trembles at.60  
 
Everyone, literally everyone cringes with fear. No letter, no telephone conversation, no 
word on the street is safe anymore. Everyone fears the next person may be an informer.61 
 
No one dared speak loudly, no one dared utter a harmless comment to his neighbour.62 
 
The old major said to me: Within these four walls you can speak your mind (sic).63 
 
From my immediate surroundings I can only think of one single woman who was devoted 
to the party. She lived on our street and collected things for the NS-People’s Welfare, and 
she wanted us to subscribe to the Völkischer Beobachter, which we did not have. She was 
suspicious, we were too.64 
 
                                                 
56 Interview 958 Berlin (unnamed) in Eric Johnson and Karl-Heinz Reuband, What We Knew: Terror, Mass 
Murder and Everyday Life in Nazi Germany (London, 2005), p. 359. 
57  Karl Meyer in Johnson, What We Knew, p. 22. 
58 Joseph Levy in Margarete Limberg and Hubert Rübsaat (eds.), Germans No More: Accounts of Jewish 
Everyday Life 1933-1938 (New York, 2006), p. 82. 
59 Stokes, ‘Otto Ohlendorf’, pp. 259-260. Public opinion research guidelines of the era advised: ‘The best 
way in which the tendencies at work in any community can be discovered and estimated is by moving freely 
about among all sorts and conditions of men and noting how they are affected by the news or the arguments 
brought from day to day to their knowledge.’ James Bryce, Modern Democracies, Vol. 1 (New York, 1921), 
p. 156, quoted by Benson, ‘Past Public Opinion’, p. 560. 
60 29 Sept 1938. Ruth Andreas-Friedrich, Berlin Underground: 1938-1945 (New York, 1989), p. 7 
61 19 August 1933. Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, p. 29. 
62 Joseph Levy in Limberg, p. 83. 
63 28 November 1938. Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, p. 265. 
64 Marion Yorck von Wartenburg, The Power of Solitude: My Life in the German Resistance (Lincoln, 2000), 
p. 39. 
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Social life was cut down enormously – you couldn’t trust anyone any more. 65 
 
It wasn’t so much that criticism was dangerous; it was pointless. Still I never felt free to 
say what I wanted, never felt a sense of personal freedom.66 
 
People have transformed themselves . . . they put on masks. No one knows what the 
individual thinks [or] . . . what he feels.67 
 
How significant was the fear that people noted in the personal testimonies above? Recent 
surveys of 2,648 people conducted by Eric Johnson and Karl-Heinz Reuband indicated that 
between 76 and 83 percent of people never feared arrest for themselves or their family 
members.68  For the most part they managed to live fairly normal lives until the war 
years.69 This differs from the opinions in early Third Reich historiography which depicted 
a society cowering, intimidated and threatened on all sides by the ubiquitous Gestapo.70 
The Johnson survey results also differ from accounts such as those above where people 
indicated they did feel fear. Johnson concludes that most people acquired a feeling of 
safety by keeping quiet and conforming to the system.71 On the infrequent occasions they 
failed to conform, they took few risks, employed much secrecy, and knew there was little 
danger of detection. Johnson and Reuband explain that interactions with fellow citizens 
depended on the level of trust; their respondents knew to restrain themselves in front of 
known Nazi sympathizers. Their final assessment is that people ‘retreated into their own 
private sphere and often turned a deaf ear to political issues.’72  Therefore, it seems fear 
                                                 
65 Maria Armkerl in William Sheridan Allen, The Nazi Seizure of Power: The Experience of a Single German 
Town 1930-1935 (Chicago, 1965), p. 179. 
66 Hans Abbenrode in Allen, Nazi Seizure, p. 179. 
67 Rudolf Steiner, quoted by Koonz, Nazi Conscience, p. 75. 
68 Johnson, What We Knew, pp. 354-355, 356-360. 
69 Accounting for this, Johnson and Reuband explain that the passage of time and recall of distant events 
leads to overestimation of normality and underestimation of fear. However, in agreement with other 
commentators, they do believe that repeated experiences of fear-inducing situations are likely to be 
remembered with a degree of accuracy.  See for example, Nechama Tec, ‘Diaries and Oral History: Some 
Methodological Considerations’, Religion and the Arts, 4:1 (2000), pp. 88-89, although Primo Levi warns 
recalled memories can become over-rehearsed and stereotyped by frequent re-telling, see Primo Levi, The 
Drowned and the Saved (London, 1988), pp. 11-12. 
70 See Klaus-Michael Mallman and Gerhard Paul, ‘Omniscient, Omnipotent, Omnipresent?: Gestapo, Society 
and Resistance’ in Nazism and German Society, 1933-1945, ed. David Crew (London, 1994), pp.166-196, 
and Michael Burleigh and Wolfgang Wipperman, The Racial State: Germany 1933-1945 (Cambridge, 1991), 
pp. 7-22, esp. p. 12.  
71 Johnson, What We Knew, p. 357. 
72 Ibid., p. 360. 
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and feelings of safety co-existed as people adapted to an environment they knew presented 
risks if they did not exercise caution.73  
 
To sum up, the reports produced by the Nazi regime are deeply problematic sources that 
must be used with great caution. Though they are valuable sources, and though it is 
entirely legitimate to make use of them, it is dangerous to privilege them over other 
sources. Those historians who base their conclusions largely on their interpretation of 
regime-produced reports have not carefully thought through the methodological issues that 
surround their use. It seems prudent that historians should be careful to balance their 
sources, yet few of them do.  
Newspapers 
The principle of taking a critical approach to sources means they must be thoroughly 
checked and evaluated against as many other sources as possible. The two essential 
elements of this rule are comparison and comprehensiveness of sources. The more limited 
the range of sources consulted, the greater the chance that the evidence will not be 
representative or helpful to build a complete (as opposed to one-sided) picture. Gellately’s 
approach to newspapers as sources provides an example of how vital it is to consult a 
variety of sources. Gellately tells us German citizens paid ‘avid attention’ to the 
newspapers, reading more attentively because of the need to figure out what was going on, 
even with knowledge of censorship in the material.74 Therefore newspapers, along with 
archived Gestapo files and other materials generated by the regime, are an important 
source for him because they help to prove his argument about ‘how and why the German 
people backed the Nazi dictatorship.’75  Gellately’s opinion on the role of the press in the 
lives of the German people contrasts sharply with Bankier’s. Bankier believes that public 
receptiveness to newspapers declined, with increasingly critical responses and lack of 
confidence in published information.76 He finds that Party claims of increased readership 
were in actual fact the result of coercion, with subscribers hoping to cancel at the first 
                                                 
73 For an extreme example of the co-existence of fear and feelings of safety see the stories of the residents of 
Mauthausen as described by Victoria Barnett, Bystanders: Conscience and Complicity during the Holocaust 
(Westport, Conn., 1999), pp. 5-9. 
74 Gellately, Backing Hitler, p. 6. 
75 Gellately, Backing Hitler, pp. 8, 339-343. Gellately’s partiality for newspapers sources is demonstrated in 
the footnotes to Chapter Six of Backing Hitler; the chapter where he most extensively discusses the responses 
of the population to the persecution of the Jews. Footnote references to secondary sources are the most 
frequent (37 percent) with press sources the second most frequent (22 percent). Official regime sources are 
third (19 percent).  
76 Bankier, Germans, p. 21. 
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opportunity.77 The way to decide which of these contrasting opinions is more correct and 
to learn more about the attitudes to newspapers is to compare the evidence found in 
newspapers with that provided by other sources. 
 
We can use three other types of source to give us a critical perspective on newspapers and 
their role in German society under the Third Reich: Statistical data on the circulation of 
newspapers, discussion of newspapers in personal narratives, and the Inside Germany 
Reports, which were based on news from informants in Germany and published in New 
York by anti-Nazi German refugees.78  Statistical evidence from Orton Hale’s study of the 
German press shows that readership did change significantly during the Nazi years, with 
reading patterns varying and subscription rates declining. At the beginning of the regime, 
pressure tactics and the initial wave of enthusiasm for the new government brought 
increases in newspaper subscriptions in 1933, but these dropped sharply, with the loss of 
one million subscribers in 1934.79 In each of the three years 1933, 1934, 1935, annual 
circulation declined by one million in sales and circulation annually.80  Only the outbreak 
of war brought on a substantial increase in press sales and circulation.81 The situation in 
Essen was typical of many German industrial cities. Essen had six daily papers, but when 
the Marxist publications were suppressed by the government, subscribers switched either 
to the non-partisan Generalanzeiger, which had the largest circulation, or the Catholic 
paper, or took no paper at all. They did not switch to the Nazi paper.82  
 
As freedom of the press was eventually squeezed out of existence, readers became 
increasingly cynical about and indifferent to newspapers. The author of an article in 
Zeitungs-Verlag, the publishers’ journal, stated in April 1934 that he heard people say on 
every hand: “Oh, I don’t read newspapers much any more.” 83  Klemperer’s diary records 
the same sort of responses, commenting: ‘Recently Heckmann, the gardener, and today 
Vogel, the grocer, in complete unanimity: “I have no idea what’s happening, I don’t read a 
                                                 
77 Bankier, Germans, pp. 25-26. 
78 Inside Germany Reports will be discussed more fully later in this chapter.  
79 Oron  J. Hale, The Captive Press in the Third Reich (Princeton, N.J., 1964), p. 145. 
80 Ibid., p. 230. 
81 Ibid., p. 236. 
82 Ibid., p. 145. 
83 Hale, pp. 146-148. No.15, April 15, 1934, Zeitungs-Verlag “Die Flucht aus der Zeitung.” 
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newspaper.” People are apathetic and indifferent.’84 Klemperer further describes his own 
reaction: ‘People simply regard it all as a theatrical sham, take nothing seriously and will 
be very surprised when the theatre turns to bloody reality one day.’ Inside Germany 
Reports comment: ‘As one person said, just returned from a long trip through Germany, 
where he had spoken with countless people craving news from outside: “No one believes 
what he reads in the papers any more, not even the nazis themselves”’ and ‘“Since many 
people don’t read the newspapers, or only read the notices about food rations, the sudden 
appearance of yellow stars surprised a great part of the population.”’85  Such comments do 
not, by themselves, prove that all Germans regarded the press with cynical indifference. 
But they do raise serious questions about the wisdom of relying too much on evidence 
taken from newspapers. Though newspapers perhaps can give some insight into popular 
attitudes, the evidence found in them must always be carefully weighed against other 
sources. When information from personal narratives is combined with the statistics from 
Hale, it becomes evident that newspapers alone cannot indicate the level of support the 
people gave to the regime.  
 
It is also important to remain clear about exactly what sources are capable or not capable of 
telling us. For example, Gellately does not clarify how newspapers contributed to the 
people’s support of Hitler. He notes that media reports and press stories were an essential 
rationalizing dimension of the dictatorship and that the media blatantly distorted reports 
about the events of the November 9 pogrom. 86 But this tells us nothing about the responses 
of the people. While newspapers from the Third Reich can tell us what sort of information 
was being disseminated, they do not necessarily indicate how the information was received 
or how reflective the press was of the behaviour or attitudes of the people, particularly in a 
system which made such a concerted effort to impose its own attitudes and behaviours.87   
                                                 
84 25 May 1938. Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, p. 248. Klemperer earlier comments how boring the people 
find the radio and how they make fun of it due to Goebbels’ monopoly, 14 July 1934, p.72: ‘The progression 
of feelings [about propaganda on the radio] runs from a deadened indifference to aversion and revolt.’  
85 Inside Germany Reports, No. 2 (15 May 1939), p. 2, No. 21 (Feb. 1942), p. 15. 
86 Gellately, Backing Hitler, pp. 6-7, 127. 
87 There seems to be a dearth of research available to address the question of the effect the press has on its 
readers, which, if it was available, would be a great value to the study of Nazi Germany. Larry Bartels writes: 
‘The state of research on media effects is one of the most notable embarrassments of modern social science.’ 
Larry Bartels, ‘Messages Received: The Political Impact of Media Exposure’, The American Political 
Science Review, 87:2 (1993), p. 267. In my search for studies examining the effects of media on attitudes I 
found that they usually focus on present-day technologies within democracies. For example one prominent 
text is Denis McQuail, McQuail’s Mass Communication Theory, 5th ed. (London, 2005). Although an entire 
section of the book is devoted to media effects (pp. 456-534), McQuail acknowledges that theory and 
argument take precedence over effective measurement. His (theoretical) conclusion on social-cultural effects 
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Reviewing the approach that some prominent historians take to their sources has revealed 
that there are issues, not only with their choice of sources but with their handling of them. 
This indicates they are not being entirely conscientious or attentive to their decisions about 
their primary source material. Looking beyond the problems of source selection, we now 
need to examine how historians use the evidence they find in their sources.   
 
The Problem with Use of Evidence 
The second methodological principle which historians should follow insists that they must 
refrain from imposing their pre-existing theories on the evidence. Instead, they must 
genuinely seek to test their theories against the evidence. Analysis of the arguments of 
some historians demonstrates that they over-generalise from or distort the evidence to fit 
their pre-conceived ideas. If pre-conceptions do get in the way of a historian’s enquiry, 
valuable information is under-utilised and the historian will read things into the text that 
are simply not there or discard useful information that is there.  It does not follow that poor 
methodology necessarily leads to faulty conclusions. If the methodology is flawed, 
however, the conclusions become questionable. The examples given below demonstrate 
that there are a variety of ways in which historians can misuse evidence.  
 
The first example of over-generalizing from the available evidence is provided by Michael 
Wildt in his study of violence against Jews up to 1939. Wildt extrapolates from a small 
number of illustrations to draw far-reaching conclusions. He addresses the question of 
participation in persecution by focussing in particular on the town of Treuchtlingen in 
middle Franconia.88 Wildt makes reasonable decisions about his source material. He 
accesses all available records that concern events in the town he studies, combining official 
records from the Municipal Archives and balancing them with the personal testimony of 
one of the town’s inhabitants. Although the selection is limited, it is not problematic. But 
issues arise with how he reaches the conclusion that German citizens participated en masse 
in violence against Jews. 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
is that while media do have effects and probably do account for some general trends, they are often 
inconsistent, cancel each other out, and are unlikely to be the main driving forces of fundamental long-term 
change (pp. 501, 516). 
88 Wildt, ‘Violence’, pp. 181-209. 
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Treuchtlingen’s 119 Jews were subjected to years of increasing harassment, culminating in 
a pogrom on Reichskristallnacht after which all the remaining Jews were finally driven out 
or deported. The stories of what happened to the town’s Jews are horrifying and there is no 
question that they were subjected to extremes of persecution which many did not survive. 
Wildt’s purpose is to focus on the treatment of the Jews not only at the hands of the SA 
and Hitler Youth but just as importantly on bystanders and observers who increasingly 
became participants and perpetrators. In answer to several questions including ‘Who 
participated in violence against Jews?’ and ‘How did violent actions spread, taking hold of 
bystanders and transforming them into perpetrators?’ Wildt finds that terror ‘from above’ 
was supported by increasing and expanding anti-Semitic violence ‘from below’, violence 
that growing numbers of people participated in or tolerated.89 In particular, he reaches two 
conclusions: ‘The November pogrom in Treuchtlingen was not the work of isolated SA 
gangs but rather the rampage of an entire town. Those who did not become perpetrators 
looked the other way and did not find the courage to resist. The reports mention only a few 
people who tried to help the victims.’90 Moreover, he implies that Treuchtlingen was 
typical of the rest of German society: ‘The pogrom in Treuchtlingen gives us an idea of 
how many “normal” Germans were involved in the violent assaults against Jews in 
1938.’91 
 
Wildt’s conclusions about violence against Jews centre on ‘Who?’ and ‘How many?’ To 
support his argument, he describes (in addition to the legislative persecution) sixty 
incidents in Treuchtlingen and throughout Germany in general (Figure 1). In twenty-six of 
these he states or implies the violence was carried out by the SA, SS or other NSDAP 
organisations. In a further seven, Hitler Youth or youths in general were the perpetrators.92 
                                                 
89 Wildt, ‘Violence’, pp. 183-184, 209. 
90 Ibid., p. 198. 
91 Ibid., p. 209. 
92 Even though the ostensible objects of his attention are ‘normal Germans’, Wildt mixes his references to 
official regime representatives (such as SS, SA or Hitler Youth) with references to the ‘ordinary’ people 
without clearly distinguishing between them, implying that the distinctions are of little significance. How 
much the actions of the ‘normal’ people mirror the activities of the Nazis remains an open question. It is not 
appropriate historical practice to use evidence in a way that merges them without justifying their interchange- 
ability. The issue of a ‘mythical barrier’ between Germans and Nazis which acts as an exculpatory tool to 
place the ‘ordinary people’ at a distance from the ‘perpetrators’ is the subject of discussion among historians. 
This is a valid concern. But without some form of distinction being made, it is impossible to discern 
accurately what did happen with the majority of the population who did not sign up to active participation in 
the Nazi programme. Eric Johnson reminds us that a degree of separation remains necessary in order to hold 
those who wilfully implemented the Nazi terror accountable. See Mark Wolfgram, ‘Rediscovering Narratives 
of German Resistance: Opposing the Nazi “Terror-State”’, Rethinking History, 10:2 (2006), pp. 204, 207; Y. 
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Of the remaining twenty-seven, he identifies just seven with vaguely specific terms such 
as: ‘a number of Gunzenhausen citizens’, ‘train passengers’, ‘local residents’, ‘a group of 
town citizens’, and ‘a horde of residents’.93 He does not specifically identify who 
participated in the other twenty incidents, although for some he uses non-specific terms 
such as ‘jeering crowd’, ‘people’, or ‘enraged mob’.94 The general context indicates that 
Wildt considers these people to be ‘normal’ Germans but he appears unable to use his 
evidence to effectively argue that large numbers of people actively participated alongside 
the SA and SS in violent actions. 
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Figure 1: Violence against Jews: participants listed by Wildt 
 
In terms of how many people these mobs comprised, he gives little information. The only 
figures supporting his statements about how many ‘normal’ Germans were involved in the 
assaults are for Leutershausen and Treuchtlingen. Fifty-two people were tried before the 
courts (thirty-nine convicted) in 1946 for offenses committed during the Treuchtlingen 
pogrom.95 In a town of about 4,200 people, this suggests just over one percent of the 
population were identified as participating in the pogrom.96 Approximately fifty citizens of 
about 1600-2000 Leutershausen residents broke into the synagogue and vandalized it, of 
which probably a fair number were uniformed representatives of the regime.97 There is no 
doubt that Jews experienced anti-Semitism in Leutershausen and other witnesses testified 
                                                                                                                                                    
Michal Bodemann, ‘Eclipse of Memory: German Representations of Auschwitz in the Early Postwar Period’, 
New German Critique, 75 (1998), pp. 57-89; and Johnson, Nazi Terror, pp. 21, 483-484. 
93 Wildt, ‘Violence’, pp. 188, 190, 196, 199. 
94 Wildt, ‘Violence’, pp. 187, 199, 200, 202. 
95 Wildt, ‘Violence’, p. 198.  
96 It is reasonable, however, to assume that more than these were involved but managed to escape being 
identified or brought to justice. 
97 Wildt, ‘Violence’, p. 196. 
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its presence even before the Nazi era.98 Furthermore, in small towns such as these, fifty 
people is a frighteningly large number. However, Wildt’s own figures do not convincingly 
demonstrate that more than a small percentage of the population of these towns 
participated actively in the terror. In neither case could it be said that what occurred was 
‘the rampage of an entire town’. 
 
Wildt bases his argument on detailed evidence drawn from just one community (which in 
any case does not really demonstrate what he claims that it demonstrates) along with a 
number of anecdotes from other communities which he implies are typical. This is a form 
of sleight-of-hand. He footnotes his essay with a comment that examples from other 
regions and localities confirm that Treuchtlingen was not a special case but he does not 
provide any evidence to support this.99 He simply notes that the essay is a preliminary 
study for a larger work that eventually appeared in 2007.100  But in drawing his 
conclusions, he manipulates the evidence and glosses over the implications of statistics 
showing that participation actually may have been fairly limited. It is entirely misleading 
for him to claim that he has demonstrated the ‘rampage of an entire town’ to give us an 
idea of ‘how many “normal” Germans were involved in the violent assaults against Jews in 
1938’. These claims go substantially beyond what his evidence is able to demonstrate.  
 
A second example of over-generalising from evidence (that is, asserting typicality) can 
occur when historians make a single example representative of the whole. For example, 
Kaplan, Bankier, Bartov, Friedländer, and Fritz Stern all assert that anti-Semitic attitudes 
were so pervasive that they extended even to anti-fascists. As evidence, such historians are 
fond of pointing to Thomas Mann.101 Novelist, Nobel Prize laureate and anti-Nazi, Thomas 
Mann left Germany with his Jewish wife when Hitler assumed power. His diaries reveal 
many disquieting details about his personal life and thoughts, among which were two 
entries:  
                                                 
98 Hilde (Tzipora) Jochsberger, in Carol Ingall, ‘Hava N’Halela: Tzipora Jochsberger and Her Vision for the 
Hebrew Arts School’, Journal of Jewish Education, 71: 2 (2005), p. 203, and Martin Anson, in The Living 
Memory of the Jewish Community oral history project,   
http://sounds.bl.uk/TextPage.aspx?page=backgroundJewish-Holocaust-survivors (1989), n.p. 
99 Wildt, ‘Violence’, p. 183, footnote 8. 
100 Michael Wildt, Volksgemeinschaft als Selbstermächtigung. Gewalt gegen Juden in der deutschen Provinz 
1919 bis 1939 (Hamburg, 2007). The basic premise of this larger work continues the theme of the 
preliminary essay.  
101 See Kaplan, Dignity and Despair, p. 26, Bankier, Germans, p. 69, Bartov, Disputed Histories, p. 206, 
Friedländer, Years of Persecution, pp. 13-14, and Fritz Stern, Dreams and Delusions, The Drama of German 
History (London : 1987), pp. 180-181. 
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But for all that, might not something deeply significant and revolutionary be taking place 
in Germany? The Jews . . . it is no calamity after all . . . that the domination of the legal 
system by the Jews has been ended. Secret, disquieting, persistent musings. Come what 
may, much will remain that in a higher sense is repellent, base, and un-German. But I am 
beginning to suspect that in spite of everything this process is one of those that have two 
sides to them.102 
 
I could have a certain amount of understanding for the rebellion against the Jewish element 
were it not that the Jewish spirit exercises a necessary control over the German element, 
the withdrawal of which is dangerous; left to themselves the Germans are so stupid as to 
lump people of my type in the same category and drive me out with the rest.103 
 
Such comments, considering his family circumstances, are surprising and contradict other 
remarks he made decrying the ‘weed of antisemitism’.104 He was also on record as saying: 
‘Antisemitism is the disgrace of any educated and culturally engaged person.’105 Clearly, 
given the apparent degree of inconsistency, such statements require closer investigation in 
order to locate the real extent of his anti-Semitism. Alfred Hoelzel is one of the 
surprisingly few analysts who have attempted to locate his real attitudes.106 Hoelzel, like 
Saul Friedländer, recognises Mann’s ambivalences, his ‘split consciousness’, in regard to 
Jewish people and also in regard to German society and fellow intellectuals.107  Hoelzel’s 
conclusion is that the picture of Mann is ‘complex, ambiguous and changes decisively with 
key events’ but his vigorous activity on behalf of persecuted Jews means:  
 
One can quibble all one wants about minor details; the fact remains that few other non-
Jewish personalities of renown supported these Jewish causes so generously and 
energetically . . . in spite of insensitivities and sometimes jarring lapses, Mann rallied to the 
Jews’ support when it counted most.108 
 
Nonetheless, other historians find Mann’s diary musings useful to help make a case for 
general opinions. According to Kaplan: ‘There seems to have been little public 
                                                 
102 10 April 1933, Thomas Mann, Tagebücher: 1933-1934 (Frankfurt am Main, 1977), p. 46. Trans.: Richard 
and Clara Winston, Thomas Mann Diaries 1918-1939 (London, 1983), p. 150.  
103 20 April 1933, Mann, Tagebücher, p. 54. Trans.: Winston, p. 153. 
104 Alfred Hoelzel, ‘Thomas Mann’s Attitudes Toward Jews and Judaism: An Investigation of Biography and 
Oeuvre’, Studies in Contemporary Jewry, 6 (1990), p. 236.  
105 Colm Tóibín, ‘I Could Sleep with All of Them’, review of In the Shadow of the Magic Mountain: The 
Erika and Klaus Mann Story, by Andrea Weiss, London Review of Books,  
http://www.lrb.co.uk/v30/n21/toib01_.html  (6 Nov. 2008), n.p. 
106 Hoelzel, pp. 229-254. 
107 Friedländer, Years of Persecution, p. 13. This ‘split consciousness’ is a concept not widely explored in the 
secondary sources in general. However, it is germane to the question of Jewish/non-Jewish relationships and 
should not be disregarded. Melita Maschmann calls it ‘fatal schizophrenia’: Melita Maschmann, Account 
Rendered: A Dossier on my Former Self (London, 1964), p. 41. 
108 Hoelzel, pp. 247, 249. 
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complaint—and silent endorsement—about the ousting of the Jews. When the Nazis 
purged the courts, even as staunch an anti-Nazi as Thomas Mann approved.’109 Bankier is 
referring to Mann when he says: ‘Just how far these wishes [to remove Jews from 
influential positions] permeated German society is shown by the fact that even anti-nazis 
subscribed to the measure.’110 The manner in which they quote Mann suggests that his 
opinions are indicative of opinions in general and that he is typical of anti-Nazis.111  
Nevertheless, just one example does not justify their implications. Pierre Ayçoberry 
advises that the use of ‘parallel biographies’ for any particular community under the 
microscope is a better way to establish typicality.112 By this he means placing accounts 
from similar groups of people alongside each other and comparing them to build a more 
representative picture. One individual cannot be deemed representative of his or her 
community without adequate corroboration.  
 
A further transgression occurs when historians generalise from a few examples and then 
take a small step from generalisation to using terms of quantification which support their 
arguments.  Some use evaluative terminology liberally when discussing reactions to the 
regime and to the outcasts of society:  
 
The great majority of the German people soon became devoted to Hitler and they 
supported him to the bitter end in 1945.113 
 
The vast majority [of the German population] cannot be characterized as having a sense of 
solidarity with the victims. True, there were other instances of goodwill; but, all told, they 
involved only a tiny fraction of the population . . . . The majority, however, seem to have 
been openly hostile.114 
 
Many Germans participated in persecuting Jews, either in their official positions . . . or in 
the course of their daily lives; most other Germans either applauded, ignored, or denied the 
persecution.115 
 
The majority of Germans accepted the steps taken by the regime and . . . looked the other 
way.116 
                                                 
109 Kaplan, Dignity and Despair, p. 26. 
110 Bankier, Germans, p. 69. 
111 Although not relevant to the discussion here, it is evident from the full text of the original diaries that 
Mann’s opinions did not represent anti-Semitism as clear-cut as Kaplan’s and Bankier’s interpretations 
would have us believe. His disgust for the situation in general and his personal animosity towards Jewish 
critic Alfred Kerr must be accounted for when interpreting these diary entries. 
112 Pierre Ayçoberry, The Social History of the Third Reich, 1933-1945 (New York, 1999), p. 7. 
113 Gellately, Backing Hitler, p. 1. 
114 Bankier, Germans, pp. 120-121. 
115 Kaplan, Dignity and Despair, p. 200. 
116 Friedländer, Years of Persecution, p. 324. 
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Quantifying statements like these become defining confirmations of hypotheses and remain 
fixed in the mind of readers. While a history written without expressive language might 
appear dry and pedantic, the use of terms such as ‘most’, ‘majority’, or ‘vast’ can quickly 
form the foundation of a theory and must be used with great care. Where they are used, the 
onus is on historians to prove their point with solid, incontestable evidence.  
 
Quantification is sometimes implied rather than stated. For example, it is frequently 
asserted in the secondary literature that mercenary attitudes towards the plight of Jewish 
people were widespread. Historians who make this claim, however, fail to mention that the 
persecution of Jewish people benefited only a tiny percentage of the non-Jewish 
population. Less than one percent of the population was Jewish, so the distribution of 
personal goods, the filling of vacated positions or other personal gain from denunciations 
could not have profited more than a small number of Germans.117 This undermines the 
implication that Germans in general were motivated by the desire to profit from Jewish 
misfortune.118  
 
So far, we can see that some historians are basing their arguments on evidence from which 
they have unjustifiably extrapolated, represented typicality, or suggested quantification. A 
further problem in the way historians use their evidence occurs where they speak too 
confidently on the basis of flimsy evidence. Bankier and Kershaw are among those who 
make claims that are not supported by solid evidence. 
 
On the topic of attitudes toward Nazi persecution of Jews, Bankier says: ‘There is 
conclusive evidence that on the whole the population consented to attacks on Jews as long 
as these neither damaged non-Jews nor harmed the interests of the country, particularly its 
                                                 
117 Frank Bajohr does, however, go further than mere implication of generally opportunistic behaviour. He 
estimates that 100,000 inhabitants of Hamburg and the North German regions bought possessions from 
30,000 Jewish households at auction in the years 1941-1945. Extrapolation based on this calculation indicates 
that less than 2 percent of the German population bought Jewish goods. Bajohr, ‘Aryanisation’, p. 279.  
118 Bajohr quantifies the motivations of buyers of Jewish companies as forty percent active and unscrupulous 
profiteers, forty percent ‘sleeping partners’ who inconspicuously profited and twenty percent as well-
meaning and sympathetic buyers. This is based on a sample of three hundred cases in Hamburg. However, 
interpretative issues of subjectivity and typicality are raised by his argument. Frank Bajohr, ‘The 
‘Aryanization’ of Jewish Companies and German Society: The Example of Hamburg’ in Probing the Depths 
of German Antisemitism: German Society and the Persecution of the Jews 1933-1941, ed. David Bankier 
(New York, 2000), pp. 242-244.  
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reputation abroad.119 He uses regime reports to dismantle previously-held theories that the 
population was either terrorized into silence or brainwashed and mobilized behind the 
Nazis. According to Bankier, the reports make clear what really happened:  
 
The Jewish theme was instrumental for some discontented sectors in expressing their 
dissatisfaction with the Nazi system. The Gestapo stations in Münster and Dortmund 
correctly captured the reality when they stated that the public went to Jewish shops not as a 
demonstration of solidarity with the persecuted, but as a way of expressing disillusionment 
with the regime. Furthermore, people could support the Nazis and yet disapprove of 
measures against the Jews. A striking example of rejecting Jewish persecution from an 
antisemitic stand is provided by a report from Harburg-Wilhelmsburg. The local Gestapo 
admitted that the public did not just fail to understand the attacks on the Jews, but actually 
condemned them. The reason for this attitude was given by the commentator himself: 
people felt that the maltreatment of Jews was counterproductive, since it turned them into 
martyrs; the party thus achieved the opposite of its original objective.120  
 
Here Bankier affirms the correctness of the Gestapo conclusions but he provides no 
evidence beyond the opinions of the Gestapo commentators, ideologues with clearly 
defined agendas, who have come to their own interpretations about motivations among the 
people. Nothing is heard from the population itself or from any other source. Using the 
information in the reports he successfully demonstrates that he can disprove the premise of 
a terrorized population; the people were neither silent nor brainwashed.  But Bankier fails 
to substantiate his (somewhat contradictory) replacement theory of consent for anti-Jewish 
measures coupled with dissent against the same measures where they did not suit personal 
interests. His ‘conclusive evidence’ consists solely of a subjective opinion from a 
problematic source. 
 
Solid support for arguments is just as important when a historian argues from silences in 
his or her sources. For example, Kershaw draws conclusions about the reactions of the 
people to Jewish deportations from Bavaria on the basis of what is not found in regime 
reports. He says:  
 
Most [SD] reports fail to mention any reactions [among the population to deportations] . . . 
For the rest, the silence is evocative. The absence of registered reactions in the sources is 
probably not a grotesque distortion of popular attitudes. Not only intimidation but 
widespread indifference towards the remaining tiny Jewish minority explains the lack of 
involvement in their deportation.121  
                                                 
119 Bankier, Germans, pp. 73-74. 
120 Ibid., p. 74. 
121 Kershaw, Popular Opinion, pp. 362-363. Kershaw anticipates attacks on his suppositions by remarking in 
the introduction to his 2008 work: ‘Arguments from silence remain open to objections whichever way they 
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Because the archives have little to say about how people reacted, he assumes firstly that 
they were silent and secondly that the silence was the result of intimidation or indifference. 
Nothing in his text substantiates these suppositions. Bankier also makes assumptions about 
silences in the sources but locates a different meaning for the absence of negative reactions 
to anti-Jewish measures. He believes this type of silence indicates that the persecution was 
consonant with public desire.122 In dealing with the gaps and silences in their evidence, 
Bankier and Kershaw appear to be following a principle of Roman law which remains 
extant in modern law: Quis tacet consentire videtur.123 
 
It is a legitimate and logical option for historians to suggest explanations where sources 
have made no comment on a particular issue. For example, Detlev Peukert provides two 
possible explanations for the silence of the population when persecution targeted the 
political left at the beginning of the regime. He believes that people either supported the 
cleaning out of ‘Reds’ or kept quiet due to fear of themselves becoming targets of the 
terror.124 Robert Kann suggests this is a legitimate procedure for historians dealing with the 
distant past and that there is a high degree of probability that we can locate attitudes of 
individuals from nonverbal or informal verbal reactions. He says that actions or non-
actions from which meaning can be ascertained can be substituted for verbal declarations. 
However, before historians make reasoned assumptions where there is little supporting 
evidence they must be careful to check their own agendas. Kann warns: ‘If one turns from 
the verbal method to that of observation by concludent action (sic), the decisive problem is 
and remains that of the impartiality of the historian. This . . . is truly germane to the whole 
realm of historical research.’125 To put it another way, if the historian has drawn a priori 
conclusions, there is a risk of attributing meaning to a gap in the evidence without 
considering possible alternatives.  
 
                                                                                                                                                    
fall.’ Alternatively, because he makes this comment in the context of re-issue of his original essays, he may 
be responding to objections that have arisen since he first argued the point. Kershaw, Final Solution, p. 10.  
122 Bankier, Germans, p. 69. 
123 ‘He who keeps quiet is assumed to approve.’ 
124 Peukert, p. 57. 
125 Robert A. Kann, ‘Public Opinion Research: A Contribution to Historical Method’, Political Science 
Quarterly, 73: 3 (1958), pp. 381, 382. Tim Mason emphasizes the necessity for historians to engage with 
self-critical reflection of identity because the subject of Nazism ‘assaults the deepest roots of the student’s 
identity.’ Tim Mason, Social Policy in the Third Reich: The Working Class and the ‘National Community’ 
(Providence, 1993), p. 283. 
 36
Historians should be prepared to give their readers opportunity to weigh up possible 
alternate explanations for the apparent silences. Silence can have many different meanings. 
For example, if we momentarily equate bystander silence with bystander non-action we 
can draw a parallel with a group of people who watch a man publicly assault his wife. If 
they fail to intervene, their silence is not necessarily evidence of their indifference to or 
approval of what is happening. Their non-action could be caused by fear, uncertainty, 
shock, paralysis or any other number of emotional and even physical barriers to response. 
Approval is perhaps the least common motive for non-intervention of bystanders. Our 
comprehension of different types of responses is helped by the research of social 
psychologists who have investigated non-action by bystanders in cases such as the 1964 
murder of Kitty Genovese in New York, who was stabbed to death while numerous people 
nearby failed to assist her. 126  They have established that the behaviour of bystanders is the 
result of complex processes which do not match the assumptions made by historians who 
suggest simplistic explanations. The principle of Quis tacet consentire videtur may exist in 
law, but it is not necessarily correct.  
 
If the meaning of silence or non-action is open to a variety of interpretations even within a 
modern democracy, how much more is it questionable within a political system where 
speaking up or taking action has the potential for severe consequences? Historians have 
been able to show that informants were not as ubiquitous as people believed and 
consequences were not always inevitable for people who did speak up, but this does not 
negate the fact that people believed they were actually under threat.127  
 
It is also important to ascertain context by taking into account the effects of the Nazi 
regime on Germany as a whole. One consequence of Nazi rule was ‘atomisation’ of society 
with separate communities finding themselves under different kinds of pressure.128 While 
the Jewish people were always the key targets of the Nazis, other groups were also 
attacked, such as the Communists in the early stages of the regime or at a later stage, the 
                                                 
126 For the background to the case of Kitty Genovese, see Bibb Latané and John Darley, The Unresponsive 
Bystander: Why doesn’t he help? (New York, 1970), pp. 1-6, and Philip Zimbardo, The Lucifer Effect: 
Understanding How Good People Turn Evil (New York, 2007), p. 314. Research on the ‘Bystander’, 
including the factors which point away from approval as an explanation for silence, will be discussed later in 
this chapter.  
127 Robert Gellately, ‘The Gestapo and German Society: Political Denunciation in the Gestapo Case Files’, 
Journal of Modern History, 60:4 (1988), p. 657. 
128 See William Sheridan Allen, The Nazi Seizure of Power: The Experience of a Single German Town 1930-
1935 (Chicago, 1965), pp. 209-226. 
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Catholics. These communities were never subjected to the increasingly perverse levels of 
vicious and destructive policy as the Jewish people were. But we must bear in mind the 
reactions of non-Communists during the persecution directed against Communists and how 
non-Catholics behaved during the periods when Catholics were specific targets. The 
epithet ‘indifferent’ is the most likely choice of description for the behaviour of Germans 
unaffected by any particular aspect of persecution. The people never rose in united defence 
of the Jews but neither did they arise in united defence of institutionalized people who 
were ‘euthanized’, Communists, Catholics, Roma or Sinti, homosexuals, or Jehovah’s 
Witnesses. As in any society, for the most part people respond to what affects them 
directly.  
 
Given the context of an atomised German society under the Nazis, it appears more valid, 
when searching to understand the attitudes and behaviours of ‘ordinary’ Germans, to 
examine how communities responded to the specific Nazi policies that affected them. By 
assessing the information that surrounds any gap representing lack of consciousness or 
attention to victims, we can possibly gain meaningful insight into why the plight of Jewish 
Germans and other victims passed under the radar of so many people. Likewise, because 
the vast majority of the population had no connection to Jews it is more useful to examine 
the attitudes of those who actually came into contact with them. There is a danger that 
Kershaw’s conclusion of indifference may obscure the places or occasions in German 
society when the activities of individuals who actually encountered Jewish Germans 
displayed a lack of indifference.  
 
Silences are familiar themes for historians, particularly as they address the important 
questions arising in other arenas, such as the silences of Allies in the face of pre-1945 
warnings of atrocity, of Germans steeped in post-war shame, or of survivors trying to cope 
with unspeakable devastation.129 But there is a multiplicity of reasons that can in principle 
explain each instance and historians must not confine themselves to just one possibility. 
Kershaw does not leave us with the option of weighing up if the silences mean other things 
but simply asserts that the answer lies solely with the indifference of the people. 
  
                                                 
129 See Klemens von Klemperer, German Resistance against Hitler: The Search for Allies Abroad, 1938-
1945 (Oxford, 1993), pp.5-6, 440; Bodemann, p. 62; and Ruth Wajnryb, The Silence: How tragedy shapes 
talk (Crows Nest, NSW, 2001), pp. 276-280. 
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For historians other than Kershaw, difficulty in interpreting silences appears to lead to 
inconsistencies and alternative explanations where it suits the overall argument. For 
Marion Kaplan, the absence of one thing appears to indicate the presence of something else 
when she writes that ‘there seems to have been little public complaint—and silent 
endorsement—about the ousting of Jews.’130 Here silence is equated with endorsement.131 
Bankier, as cited by Kaplan, also finds silence from the people over the removal of Jews 
from the judicial system means they endorsed the action.132  But he takes a different 
approach to silences under other circumstances. In relation to Nazi persecution against 
churches his implication is that the churches were silent yet resentful about the anti-Bible 
campaign.133 Here silence means something else. It does not mean endorsement, it means 
resentment. On the other hand, when silences are broken, such as when the silence over the 
‘Aryan principle’ was broken by a few protesting voices in army circles, Bankier boldly 
states that we should not attach any importance to them.134 These fluid interpretations are 
more likely indicators of a priori assumptions or pre-existing viewpoints than logical 
deduction based on considering all the available evidence.  
 
Even though arguments from silences can be legitimate, they are an ‘open space’ in the 
sources where historians can ascribe meaning based on their own biases without providing 
alternate options of interpretation. It is reasonable to suggest some answers which are more 
probable than others but the historian must be prepared to provide a rigorous argument 
which draws on all the available evidence from a balanced variety of sources. 
 
                                                 
130 Kaplan, Dignity and Despair, p. 26. 
131 Kaplan’s supporting evidence for her ‘silent endorsement’ comment is confined to cross-referencing 
Bankier’s opinions, Mann’s diary entry cited earlier in this chapter, and an example from a personal 
testimony where a woman expresses satisfaction to her Jewish neighbour that her daughter has chosen to 
marry the suitor (of two) who had the best prospects, improved since all the firings at court.  
132 Kaplan’s citation of Bankier draws attention to another problem: the perpetuation of errors as historians 
quote each other to reinforce the same points. This merry-go-round usage of secondary sources is potentially 
a favourite way to ensure a historian’s argument has backing. For example, Pierre Ayçoberry has based 
almost an entire book on secondary sources, in spite of the cover claiming his work is ‘original research’: 
Pierre Ayçoberry, The Social History of the Third Reich, 1933-1945 (New York, 1999). By doing this, he 
risks transferring any error resulting from misuse of evidence to the next generation of commentary. While it 
is not possible to avoid drawing on the research of other historians (as demonstrated throughout this present 
study), it is important to retain a healthy sense of any historian’s prejudices for or against sources, not to 
mention his or her personal or political background, educational influences and individual biases. See Mason, 
p. 283. 
133 Bankier, Germans, p. 69. 
134 Ibid., p. 70. 
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The Failure to Use Other Valuable Sources  
Further to the problems historians have with source selection and their use of evidence, 
another problem surfaces when they under-utilise other sources which could act as a 
corrective to the limitations of their preferred sources. In this section we shall examine two 
types of sources which historians in general do not recognise as valuable for this purpose. 
The first type of source bears resemblances to the regime-generated reports discussed in 
this chapter and the Sopade reports. These are the Inside Germany Reports, which were 
published in New York by the American Friends of German Freedom, an organisation of 
anti-fascist refugees from Nazi Germany.135 The second type of source is the accumulated 
knowledge available from other disciplines, most particularly in the social sciences, which 
can make valuable contributions to our understanding of life in the Third Reich.  
  
Bankier is one of the few historians who comments on the Inside Germany Reports as he 
discusses Jewish-German relations under the Third Reich. He has little use for them 
because he doubts the motivations and agendas of the United States-based refugees who 
compiled them. He claims that the reports ‘do not stand up to critical scrutiny’ because 
they take an uncritical approach to stories of support provided to Jewish people by non-
Jewish acquaintances. Where the reports publish information about assistance that was 
rendered, he responds with incredulity: ‘Typical of this uncritical and apologetic approach 
is the picture of . . . a country in which there were thousands of instances of non-
conformist behaviour, and Jews were secretly helped in every conceivable way.’136 
Bankier believes the anti-fascist writers were actively trying to foster images of ‘another 
Germany’ and that their information was merely a projection of their own wishes. Because 
it contrasts sharply with what he finds in the SD reports, he finds they have little value as 
sources. He says: ‘Obviously this picture, which contradicts any other available source, 
must be interpreted as ‘German exiles’ apologetics’.137 Unfortunately, Bankier has not 
acknowledged that as a category of source, the Inside Germany Reports have origins very 
similar to the regime-generated or Sopade reports: a specific group with particular 
                                                 
135 Inside Germany Reports: 1-25 (New York, 15 April 1939 – August 1943).  
136 Bankier, Germans, p. 118. Italics are Bankier’s. 
137 Bankier, Germans, p. 118. However, this does not prevent Bankier from quoting Inside Germany Reports 
on three other occasions: to reinforce points about abandonment of Jews by former friends, how non-Jews 
behaved for motives of personal profit and the virulence of anti-Jewish propaganda. This implies he finds this 
particular information to be reliable information because it cuts against the grain of the reports’ self-interest. 
He does not refer to any of the reports which present contrasting information. Bankier, Germans, pp. 121, 
140, 144. 
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viewpoints or agendas gathers data from informants within the grass-roots of society to 
build a picture of life and attitudes amongst the general population of Nazi Germany. 
Hence it is legitimate to assume that the reports will demonstrate similar strengths and 
weaknesses when subjected to critical scrutiny. When Bankier claims the reports contradict 
other sources he is no doubt referring to his favoured sources, the Nazi regime reports, 
which of course operate from a different ideological perspective and have their own 
agendas. Contradictions should be expected under these circumstances. Whether Bankier 
can accurately claim that the Inside Germany Reports contradict any other available source 
will be easier to determine when personal narratives are assessed later in this dissertation.  
 
There are two issues to consider as we assess the validity of Bankier’s position on Inside 
Germany Reports. Firstly, is he correct about the agendas of the anti-fascist refugees? 
Secondly, if he is, how much does it matter to the credibility of the reports? Recent 
research by Marjorie Lamberti asserts that these exiles, in their anticipation of a post-Nazi 
Germany, focussed on a vision of Germany’s reconstruction into a viable democracy and 
rehabilitation into the world community.138 This concept required a lenient peace, along 
with purging notions of the German population’s collective responsibility for Nazi 
offences. After the war, the anti-Fascists paid scant regard to the full horror of what had 
been done to the Jews as they sought to keep distinctions between the people and the 
regime. What happened was a Nazi crime, not the crime of the people.139  If Lamberti has 
correctly analysed the situation, this still leaves the issue of whether the credibility of the 
reports is at stake. Bankier fails to acknowledge that even if we allow for agendas among 
the anti-fascist exiles, this does not necessarily repudiate the information conveyed. Just as 
we cannot completely discard regime-generated reports because of their flaws, Bankier 
cannot throw out the information in the Inside Germany Reports, effectively falsifying it, 
on the basis of alleged politically manipulative journalism. No legitimate claim about 
whether or not Jewish Germans were supported by other Germans can be made either way 
until the Inside Germany Reports are systematically weighed against all the other available 
sources, including personal testimonies. Most significantly, Bankier’s argument for 
                                                 
138 Marjorie Lamberti, ‘German Antifascist Refugees in America and the Public Debate on “What Should be 
Done with Germany after Hitler,” 1941–1945’, Central European History, 40:2 (2007), pp. 279-305. 
139 It should be noted here that Lamberti’s main focus is on individuals who compromised the leadership of 
German refugee organizations in the United States during the war. She does not directly address the agendas 
of the Inside Germany Reports but her clear implication is that, in spite of the editor’s reliability and realism, 
they were influenced by the political machinations of the individuals she discusses. Lamberti, pp. 283, 285-
286, 296. 
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discarding these sources applies equally to the regime-generated reports he favours. The 
methodological problems of the Inside Germany Reports, especially pertaining to sources 
of information and bias, are no greater than those of the SD reports. As we saw earlier in 
this chapter, the problem lies not with the validity of their use, but with over-dependence 
on them. While neither source type should be discarded simply because of ulterior motives 
in their compilation, Bankier has applied uneven methodological standards in his selection 
of sources.   
 
Putting Bankier’s objections aside, how can the Inside Germany Reports be used to inform 
us and give us new understanding? If they are surveyed in their entirety, they provide 
information on many aspects of the situation in Germany, from people’s opinions on 
politics to the restrictions on food. They also devote considerable space drawing the 
attention of readers to the situation of the Jews. They report on compulsory labour and its 
indignities, the effectiveness of anti-Jewish propaganda, food deprivation and loss of 
rights, deportations, anti-Semitic attitudes amongst ‘ordinary’ people, the unresponsiveness 
of the world at large, and loss or maintenance of Jewish relationships with ‘Aryans’. They 
include long letters from Jewish escapees which detail specifics of their horrific 
experiences and the worsening of the situation.140 The reports also reproduce Nazi-
controlled newspaper articles (Stuttgart National Socialist Courier) which complain 
bitterly that ‘the German people are friendly towards Jews’ as they scathingly recount 
stories of compassion shown toward Jewish people and attack the participants as fit to be 
executed.141  
 
An interesting aspect of the reports is that they demonstrate self-awareness of their 
weaknesses and appear to anticipate the need for critical scrutiny. Informant backgrounds 
are regularly (but not always) provided with specific identity details omitted, for example, 
‘a young German sailor’, ‘a young Nazi, on leave from duty in Poland’, ‘an elderly Jewess 
from Berlin’.142 Descriptions of informants frequently include their professional 
qualifications, descriptions of places of work (sometimes with employee numbers), and the 
dates the informants left Germany.  Numerous letters are reproduced; typically they are 
                                                 
140 Inside Germany Reports, No. 3 (15 June 1939), pp. 4, 18; No.7 (10 Nov. 1939), p. 9; No. 8 (7 Dec. 1939), 
pp. 4, 12, 13; No. 9 (Jan.-Feb. 1940), p. 17; No. 13 (July 1940), pp. 17-21; No. 15 (Dec. 1940), pp. 7, 12-14; 
No. 18 (July 1941), pp. 3, 13; No. 20 (Dec. 1941), pp. 9-10;  No. 21 (Feb. 1942), pp. 13-15; No.23 (Nov. 
1942), pp. 7-10. 
141 Inside Germany Reports, No. 21 (Feb. 1942), pp. 13-15.   
142 Inside Germany Reports, No. 8 (7 Dec. 1939), p. 4; No. 11 (April 1940), p. 10; No. 21 (Feb. 1942), p. 14. 
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dated with regions of origin identified but the writers themselves are denoted only by 
alphabet letters. Sometimes informant notes are more extensive:  
 
By roundabout route, we received from Berlin the following letter written by an older 
Social Democratic worker. We reproduce it in full, not because it contains any sensational 
information, but because it is typical for that large section of workers who remained anti-
fascist.143  
 
Regions and sectors of society are usually included, for example, a special supplement on 
public opinion, labelled ‘via Paris’, is headed: ‘Report from an Infantry Regiment in 
Potsdam: The reporter from this section of the Reichswehr says …’144   
 
The Inside Germany Reports also alert readers to the purpose of the reports, their political 
orientation, limitations and integrity:  
 
Readers of Inside Germany Reports know that the only desire of those who compile the 
reports is to try to give an accurate picture of present conditions in Germany, as they exist 
and not as we would like to see them. It is hardly necessary to emphasize the extreme 
difficulties in the way of giving fair evaluation of public opinion and events in a country 
where, not only is a Gallup poll out of the question, but free expression of opinion and 
accurate reportage of occurrences is almost entirely inhibited by measures of the 
government. Below we have given a number of reports just submitted to us by observers in 
a number of factories and groups in different sections of the Reich. If the reports seem to 
contradict others that we have recently published, our readers should remember that each 
report is valid only for the district or special group which is purports to describe, further 
that public opinion in Germany, as elsewhere is a constantly changing phenomenon.145 
 
These reports are of value to historians in several ways. Firstly, they are useful for those 
who study how information was disseminated and how rumours worked – their 
trajectories, their impact and their accuracy. One significant report entitled ‘Mercy Killings 
or…’ details evidence which points to institutional killings.146  Published in May 1941, the 
information must have been received after the previously published report of 14 February 
1941. But we know that institutional murders were well underway by October 1939, a 
valuable point of comparison as we search to learn what people knew, and when.147   
                                                 
143 Inside Germany Reports, No. 17 (May 1941), p. 8. 
144 Inside Germany Reports, No. 3 (15 June 1939), p. 18. 
145 Inside Germany Reports, No. 3 (15 June 1939), p. 15. See also No. 9 (Jan-Feb. 1940), p. 1, and No. 14 
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integrity of reporting.  
146 Inside Germany Reports, No. 17 (May 1941), p. 11. 
147 Ian Kershaw, Hitler 1936-1945: Nemesis (London, 2000), p. 253.  Note that Jochen Klepper’s diary 
records the news as early as 2 May 1940 and William Shirer first hears of the killings on 21 September 1940. 
See Jochen Klepper, Unter dem Schatten deiner Flügel: Aus den Tagebüchern der Jahre 1932-1942 
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Secondly, the Inside Germany Reports contain a great deal of information about people’s 
opinions on a large number of topics. As will be repeatedly emphasized throughout this 
chapter, a key methodological rule is to ensure that sources are used in ‘symbiotic 
relationship’ with each other.148 With this in mind, the Inside Germany Reports are useful 
to examine in conjunction with Nazi and Sopade reports. Thirdly, as we evaluate the 
knowledge and responses of the Allies, they can help us determine what kind of 
information was actually available to other nations. In May 1941, Inside Germany Reports 
published in New York an alert to the Nazi predilection for mass murder, long before the 
1944 date noted by some official American sources.149 Fourthly, and most importantly for 
this dissertation, the Inside Germany Reports contain a number of extensive, detailed and 
contemporaneously reported testimonies from Jewish authors that can be compared with 
others as we investigate what they had to say about their interactions with non-Jewish 
Germans.  
 
The mindset of a historian in the approach to these sources makes a difference to how they 
are interpreted. An exercise to test the differences that pre-existing viewpoints could make 
to an interpretation uses the following passages as an example. One report presents a list of 
perceived attitudes amongst Germans, including the following:  
 
The Ostrich Attitude. Many otherwise decent Germans have always stuck their heads in the 
sand and refused to believe that the atrocities of the Nazis were as bad as they were 
painted, because they had never seen them with their own eyes. Many still are not as 
shocked by their leaders and by what is going on in conquered countries as they should be 
if they grasped the full truth. 150 
 
The report then suggests a response: 
Report on events in occupied countries, tell them specifically and graphically about 
pillaging, murders, firing squads. Large figures and statistics summarizing murders of 
hostages, etc. are not the most effective. Give brief incidental reports constantly and the 
reports should close with some statement such as: “This murder has made a thousand new 
and bitter enemies for the Nazis. What have you done, so that one day you can prove that 
you were in no way responsible?”151 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
(Stuttgart, 1956), p. 876, and William Shirer, Berlin Diary: The Journal of a Foreign Correspondent 1934-
1941 (London, 1941), p. 401.  
148 Weber, “Mass of Trash”, p. 31. 
149 Richard Breitman, U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis (Cambridge, 2005), p. 12. 
150 Inside Germany Reports, No. 24 (Feb. 1943), p. 9. 
151 Ibid. 
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There are two ways this passage could be interpreted. It could be warning Germans to 
prepare an exculpatory defence in the face of impending defeat or it could be a genuine 
attempt to alert people to the full-scale reality of the situation in Nazi Germany and to 
challenge their own attitudes. It depends on whether we approach the Inside Germany 
Reports with a pre-conceived notion they are manipulatively apologetic, or whether we 
approach them with an open mind with no pre-conceived assumptions. The latter approach 
can be put to the test by critical analysis which evaluates the interpretation for consistency 
against all the other Inside Germany Reports, and consults other sources for understanding 
of who was compiling the reports and why, and for whom they were intended. The former 
approach, exemplified by Bankier, renders them of very limited usefulness. 
 
In summary, the Inside Germany Reports have potential to inform us usefully and add to 
our understanding about life in the Third Reich if approached with an open mind that 
remains alert to their possible shortcomings. Bankier’s dismissal of their value renders his 
argument vulnerable to challenge and undermines his ability to be even-handed in handling 
his evidence. If we are careful to follow good methodological practice, the shortcomings of 
the reports can be mitigated and their value maximised. The key element to reiterate is that 
all sources have something useful to offer and it is not legitimate arbitrarily to dismiss 
them because they have some limitations. 
 
The third methodological principle advocated in this dissertation states that historians 
should be prepared to accept the benefits of drawing on the knowledge that other 
disciplines offer. The list of disciplines which can contribute to historical understanding is 
very long and I shall discuss only a few of them here. The point that historians must note is 
that history mostly concerns itself with the human past and historians are not necessarily 
trained to understand all aspects of human behaviour. As they assemble the fragments of 
information left by the past, the picture they build relies heavily on their skills of 
interpretation. Most of the history of the Third Reich is about human beings and how they 
behaved under extreme circumstances, so it is somewhat puzzling that historians seldom 
reference sources outside the historical profession that could assist with their interpretation 
and understanding.  
 
Those who do access other resources sometimes attract a backlash. One example is 
Christopher Browning’s study of the ‘ordinary’ men who comprised Police Battalion 101, 
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which draws on Stanley Milgram’s famous ‘Obedience to Authority’ experiments.152 
Burleigh labels Milgram’s work as ‘highly dubious’ but fails to provide any explanation 
for his conclusion.153  Bartov’s critique of Milgram is more extensive. He makes some 
interesting observations but his argument is seriously flawed and contains some inelegant 
red herrings.154 For example, one of Bartov’s chief accusations is that Milgram operated 
from a position of bias that distorted his findings. This is an allegation which could equally 
be levelled against Bartov himself, given what we shall discern from close analysis of his 
study of Klemperer’s diaries later in this dissertation. Milgram’s work continues to be 
peer-scrutinized and recent replication of his experiments has produced the same results.155 
Probably the world’s best-known social psychological research inside or outside the field, 
his experiments remain a ‘dramatic demonstration of how individuals typically 
underestimate the power of situational forces when explaining another person’s 
behavior.’156 Most of the historians commenting on the behaviour of ‘ordinary’ people in 
the Third Reich include discussions of situational forces but do so from the perspective of 
historical analysis, which inevitably falls short of expertly informed understanding of 
human behaviour. 
 
Milgram’s experiment is just one of numerous significant social psychology studies which 
can be of use for historians of the Third Reich. The power of situational influences and 
group dynamics, most notably seen in the ‘Stanford Prison Experiment’, can inform 
historians as they assess the environment in which Germans lived for twelve years.157 
Investigations of genocide, which include examination of other societies who have 
experienced mass killings, help us understand the conditions that generate transformations 
in human behaviour.158 The role of personal traits and identity in perpetrators, rescuers and 
bystanders enables us to catch a closer glimpse of what shapes individuals and their 
reactions to situations.159 The work of John Darley makes a valuable contribution to 
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understanding conformity. He finds that a person becomes more conforming as his level of 
fear increases and those who share the same threat will conform more to that group than to 
those who do not share the threat.160 This is helpful for understanding the behaviour of 
both Jewish and non-Jewish Germans in their interactions with each other as both groups 
were confronted by fear, albeit of differing intensity and significance for their lives.  
 
Darley’s most noteworthy contribution to social psychology is now almost forty years old 
but numerous challenges to his findings have served instead to confirm his results.161 This 
work was a range of experiments, conducted by Darley and Bibb Latané, which sought to 
understand bystanders and their responses to emergencies.162  Their conclusions were that 
the popular tendency to attribute bystander inaction to apathy or indifference does not 
explain much.163 This work is particularly significant for historians because the 
phenomenon of being a bystander is much discussed in the secondary sources. Although 
Darley’s ‘emergency’ situations cannot be said to replicate conditions in the Third Reich, 
responses to stressful situations are key points of similarity. The conclusions arrived at by 
Latané and Darley included identifying the decision-making process for those facing 
something difficult which requires a response. When a person is confronted by a situation, 
he or she has to notice something wrong, decide whether or not there is an emergency, 
decide whether it is his personal responsibility to act, and then decide what form of 
assistance he can offer, before finally deciding how to implement his decision.164 An 
intelligent historian will not respond to this information by simply overlaying this type of 
research onto our understanding of Third Reich life and looking for discrepancies. Instead, 
it contributes to our ability to analyse, in a thoughtful and qualitative manner, the everyday 
experiences of Germans under the Nazi regime, finding the points of resonance between 
social psychology research and the historical record. If the evidence from this research is 
legitimate, it demonstrates that simplistic explanations of anti-Semitism cannot be the 
whole story. It also ensures that we have the necessary background to be able to assess 
more fully the dimensions of responses to key events such as the 1933 boycott of Jewish 
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businesses or the terrors of Reichskristallnacht, or to understand better what happened 
when Jewish Germans and non-Jewish Germans encountered each other.   
 
Sometimes Nazi Germany is the specific focus of studies originating from other 
disciplines. For example, historians can benefit from the insights of political science 
concerning the structures of power and the behaviour of those who wield it, for example, 
investigation of another type of ‘bystander’: those observing Germany from the outside.165 
Sociological research by Samuel and Pearl Oliner has much to inform us about rescuers of 
Jewish people and the background to their altruistic behaviours.166 Here, historians can 
begin to weigh whether altruistic actions toward Jewish people were reasonable 
expectations for all Germans or just for a select few who conformed to specific criteria.  
 
The field of educational research can also contribute significantly to our understanding of 
qualitative and quantitative research.167 Along with other social sciences, educational 
research models good practice for clear and useful explanations of method which can be 
instructional for historians. The contributions of linguistic and literary studies are useful 
for creating awareness of nuances in primary source text and understanding how to 
interpret narrative.168 The significant issue of silence, already discussed in this chapter, is 
addressed from within the field of sociology. Eviatar Zerubavel tells us that most 
conspiracies of silence are generated by fear or embarrassment.169 Historians need to be 
sure they understand these concepts before they draw their own conclusions on the 
meaning of silence when they encounter it in their research.  
 
Shortcomings in method can be drawn to our attention by other disciplines. For example, 
public opinion research identifies a problem that historians need to address:  
 
A serious gap between historiographic theory and practice has resulted [from the recent 
interest of historians in mass behaviour]; the traditional rules of historical method were not 
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devised by scholars dealing with mass behavior and have not been amended in any 
systematic form by later scholars concerned with such phenomena. It follows, therefore, 
that historical method, as developed to date, can have only limited value as a guide to 
researchers trying to study public opinion in a mass society.170 
 
A deficiency in the field of mass communication studies (already mentioned in this 
chapter) highlights for us the importance of not casually ascribing undue influence from 
newspapers or other media. We simply do not possess enough information yet to know 
either way what impact the media actually had on the attitudes of people.  
 
The point of accessing information from other disciplines is not to become dependent on 
them for proving or disproving our historical arguments but to provide a thorough 
grounding which serves to benefit our understanding of the elements that comprise the 
human experience.  A testament to the benefits of disciplines working together can be seen 
in the outcomes of a 1989 conference held in Poland to explore the concept of altruism. 
Historians, psychologists, social psychologists, sociologists, philosophers, educators, and 
social welfare representatives pooled their resources to gain new insights, finding that 
individual disciplines alone were inadequate to explain all the dimensions involved. 
Mutual enrichment and cohesion were the ultimate benefits of collaboration.171  It seems 
logical to assume that if the discipline of history stands separate from connection or 
interaction with other disciplines, it surely can only present an unnecessarily constricted 
point of view. 
The historians in summary 
In this chapter, we have identified three problems in the way that historians use their 
evidence. Sometimes they make questionable decisions in terms of selecting evidence for 
analysis, frequently they over-generalise and/or distort their evidence in order to make it fit 
a pre-conceived theory, and they largely fail to make creative use of the evidence that can 
be supplied by other disciplines. One possible reason for these problems may be that where 
historians are concerned with the ‘ordinary’ people they are mostly interested to examine 
the level of support for the Hitler regime or how much they knew about what was 
happening to the Jews, particularly in regard to deportations.172 The study of people’s 
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within the sphere of public opinion research.  
171  Pearl Oliner et al, Embracing the Other: Philosophical, Psychological, and Historical Perspectives on 
Altruism (New York, 1995) pp. 6-9.  
172 These two points of focus are easily ascertained by surveying summaries provided on the covers of social 
histories about the Third Reich.  
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attitudes toward their Jewish compatriots has, for the most part, been confined to sections 
within the larger, more broadly-based general studies. The decisions historians make about 
how the non-Jewish population behaved are usually supplementary to conclusions drawn 
about the level of support and knowledge of deportations. In other words, if it can be 
shown that the people largely supported the regime and it can be demonstrated that they 
knew what was happening to the Jews, historians then deduce that they were indifferent to 
or endorsed the fate of the Jewish people. They substantiate these theories by drawing on 
examples from eyewitness accounts which tell what happened when ‘Aryans’ encountered 
Jews. They use these anecdotal examples, however, to add emphasis to an argument 
without careful analysing how representative or typical they are.  
 
My argument is that even if historians claim that ‘ordinary’ Germans supported the regime 
and had knowledge of the plight of the outcasts this does not necessarily say anything 
about the attitudes and behaviours of non-Jewish Germans toward the Jewish people. 
Proving one point does not necessarily prove another. Relationships were very complex 
and there can be no simple description of attitudes or behaviours in general.173 When it 
comes to attitudes, one Sopade report comments: ‘Not only does public opinion no longer 
exist, there is no longer even such a thing as group opinion.’174 A single indicator of this 
complexity can be seen in Victor Klemperer’s relationship with the grocer Vogel, who is 
mentioned many times in the 1933-1945 diaries as a purveyor of gossip, information 
detrimental to the regime, provisions, encouragement and general support for Klemperer 
during dark days. Somewhat startlingly, he ultimately emerges as a member of the Nazi 
Party.175  Historians have not yet reached a place where justifiably they can claim to 
understand the attitudes of the ‘ordinary’ German people toward Jewish Germans.  
 
The question of more importance to this present study is: have historians been 
conscientious in making the best possible use of the evidence they have? If they are correct 
that the evidence can only supply us with impressionistic data, then it begs the question of 
why do they persist in making sweeping and confident claims about people’s attitudes? 
                                                 
173 See Mark Roseman, The Past in Hiding: Memory and survival in Nazi Germany (London, 2000), p. 12.  
174 Ayçoberry, p. 90. 
175 29 June 1945, 6 September 1945. Victor Klemperer, I Will Bear Witness: A Diary of the Nazi Years 1942-
1945 (New York, 2001), pp. 16, 48-49. Vogel exemplifies the ‘grey areas’ where people apparently 
collaborated and resisted at the same time, which do not fit with historians’ preferences for neat categories of 
behaviour as described by Kushner (footnote 31). See Bob Moore, Resistance in Western Europe (Oxford, 
2000), p. 10. 
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The responsibility of the historian is to ensure he or she is in possession of sufficient 
reliable data, not only to be able appropriately to support any assertions, but also to locate 
alternate explanations or re-examine the issue from different angles. It can be tempting to 
extrapolate where the evidence is flimsy, but it is not excusable – particularly if there are 
other sources of information which have the ability to provide firmer foundations for 
hypotheses. This leads to another question. Until this point, we have mostly looked at how 
historians handle evidence from official sources. If we examine their use of personal 
narratives, can we discover if they deal with this type of source any better? The remaining 
two chapters investigate what personal testimony sources can tell us and how historians 
handle them. 
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Chapter Two 
Personal Narratives 
 
Personal narratives, in the form of diaries and memoirs written by Jewish people, 
constitute a much larger body of evidence than is usually recognised. Writing in 1996, 
Walter Laqueur notes about 120 published diaries written by Jews in occupied Europe with 
300-400 unpublished or fragmentary diaries. He believes there are more.1 According to 
Laqueur, just three men – Victor Klemperer, Willy Cohn and Richard Koch – left a ‘huge 
body’ of evidence.2 More recently, Alexandra Garbarini has discovered that hundreds of 
diaries remain unexplored and unpublished in a number of archives. Her implication is that 
there may be more still to uncover because the rate of diary-writing during the Nazi years 
increased as external pressures from the regime forced people to turn inward.3  The 
memoirs stored away in archives around the world run into the thousands. Raul Hilberg 
was informed that survivor testimonies were ‘getting out of hand’ already by the late 
1950s; the 18,000 accounts identified at that time has grown much larger since.4 Even 
without adding other types of personal testimony such as oral histories, interviews, or 
surveys, personal testimony literature could well be the single largest body of evidence 
available. If we separate out the many which would have been written by people in 
occupied Europe there still is much unexplored material which could give us information 
about relationships among the ordinary people of Germany.  
 
Even though some scholars believe these types of sources are too fragmentary to be useful, 
projects such as the Oneg Shabbes underground archives have set precedents.  According 
to Simone Gigliotti, these diaries from the Warsaw ghetto occupy a privileged status 
among scholars because of their contemporaneously ‘authentic and visceral accounts’.5 
Although the Oneg Shabbes accounts were purposively assembled as a testimony for the 
                                                 
1 Walter Laqueur, ‘Three Witnesses: The Legacy of Viktor Klemperer, Willy Cohn, and Richard Koch’, 
Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 10:3 (1996), pp. 253, 261. 
2 Ibid., p. 265. 
3 Alexandra Garbarini, Numbered Days: Diaries and the Holocaust (New Haven, 2006), pp. xi, 2-3. 
However, note that the ability of diaries to reveal the information being sought will vary. For example, while 
Klemperer’s diaries are of extensive value in addressing the questions of attitudes among the people, Jochen 
Klepper’s diary is more focussed on his inner life: his thoughts, emotions and spirituality so is less 
informative than Klemperer on the same issues.  
4 Raul Hilberg, ‘I Was Not There’, in Writing and the Holocaust, ed. Berel Lang (New York, 1988), p. 18. 
5 Simone Gigliotti, ‘Numbered Days: Diaries and the Holocaust’, American Historical Review, 112:5 (2007), 
p. 1498.  
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outside world, they contain no essential differences from those written by Jews in 
Germany, particularly if we compare them with similar accounts according to the principle 
of ‘parallel biographies’ recommended by Ayçoberry.6 Diaries from Germany have not 
been gathered together into an organised collection but their value remains as relevant as 
those from Warsaw.  
 
Historians and personal narratives 
Historians’ attitudes toward personal narratives vary. Of the eleven historians discussed in 
Chapter One (Bankier, Bartov, Burleigh, Friedländer, Gellately, Heim, Johnson, Kaplan, 
Kershaw, Kulka, and Wildt), just four make extensive use of them as sources.7 The only 
historian among the eleven who utilises a wide range of data both official and personal is 
Saul Friedländer. He is enthusiastic about the value of personal testimonies and claims 
‘centre stage’ for diaries in his two volume work on the Holocaust. He writes that ‘the only 
concrete history that can be retrieved remains that carried by personal stories.’8   
 
For the most part, however, this large pool of evidence has not yet been fully utilised, 
despite the huge historical interest in Nazi Germany and the Holocaust. The most notable 
gap in the historiography of the Third Reich is arguably the failure of historians to make 
thorough use of the accounts provided by eyewitnesses whose experiences are recorded in 
diaries, memoirs, oral histories, interviews, or surveys. 9 Even the few historians who are 
enthusiastic about personal narratives have rarely done anything more sophisticated with 
them than to use excerpts to illustrate or emphasise a point. Unfortunately, evidence drawn 
from personal narratives is not always applied in ways that are methodologically sound. 
 
At this point, my critique of the use of personal narratives by historians is based on the 
fourth of the methodological principles that I outlined in my introduction, namely, that the 
                                                 
6 Ayçoberry, p. 7. See also Rita Horváth, ‘On Comparing Jewish Survivors’ Testimonies taken by the 
National Relief Committee for Deportees in Hungary and Other Large-Scale Historical-Memorial Projects of 
She’erit Hapletah in the Immediate Aftermath of the Holocaust (1945-1948)’, Yad Vashem (2004), 
http://www1.yadvashem.org/about_yad/departments/institute/Dr_Ritahtml.html. 
7 These four are Heim, Bartov, Kaplan and Friedländer. Note that Bartov and Heim appear here only because 
they have written monographs specifically focused on Klemperer’s diaries. 
8 Friedländer, Years of Persecution, p. 5, and The Years of Extermination (New York, 2007), pp. xxv, 63. 
9 Recently there has been some growth in the number of publications which make wider use of personal 
narratives, for example: Peter Fritzche, Life and Death in the Third Reich (Cambridge, Mass., 2008). 
However, the emphasis in this dissertation is on the best use of personal narratives to obtain maximum value 
from them. Even the recent works still rely on the historians’ impressionistic responses to personal narratives.  
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evidence from sources generated by the group under scrutiny is just as valuable as the 
evidence generated by groups not under scrutiny. Where the topic concerns relations 
between Jewish and non-Jewish Germans in the Third Reich, this means the personal 
testimonies generated by the ‘ordinary’ people (the group under scrutiny) should be 
considered just as valuable, or even more valuable, as the reports compiled by the Nazi 
regime or Sopade (the group not under scrutiny). The personal narratives I reference from 
this point forward were chosen because they are commonly quoted by the historians who 
do use testimonial evidence in some manner as they argue their viewpoints.  
Limited or non-use of personal narratives 
Some historians share Friedländer’s enthusiasm for personal narratives but they 
demonstrate a mysterious failure actually to utilise them. In quoting from two diaries, 
Michael Burleigh writes: ‘Sometimes their insights and sensibility are of a higher order 
than those of historians and other contemporary commentators whose investment is often 
in some methodological dogma or theory rather than in the spirit of those times.’10 Yet his 
comprehensive bibliography, which lists hundreds of titles, contains a mere handful of 
personal narratives. His chapter which examines the relationships between German Jews 
and their neighbours is of the most interest to this present study. It contains 187 footnotes, 
of which only thirty-one (16.6 percent) reference personal narratives (other than Nazi 
sources such as Goebbels’ diaries) from a total of just eight sources.11 Robert Gellately 
also makes very little use of eyewitness accounts from diaries or memoirs, footnoting only 
a small number of references to such testimonies. In his study of how Germans backed 
Hitler, the bibliography listing his key sources acknowledges just one primary source 
personal narrative – Victor Klemperer’s diary.12 Yet this is a book whose jacket cover 
emphasises that it is about the ‘ordinary’ people. It seems extraordinary that their voices so 
rarely speak. 
 
Other historians, such as Kulka, Hilberg or Kershaw, are reluctant to use personal 
narratives in more than a limited way. They argue that such sources are problematic and 
these historians invariably demonstrate that they believe official documents are of greater 
                                                 
10 Michael Burleigh, The Third Reich: A New History (London, 2000), p. 5. 
11 Burleigh, Third Reich, pp. 281-342 and 847-856. 
12 Robert Gellately, Backing Hitler: Consent and Coercion in Nazi Germany (Oxford, 2001), pp. 339-343. 
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importance.13 Bartov notes that historians find it easier to write about perpetrators because 
they can refer to official documentation. Study of victims is less preferred because the 
sources which inform us about victims – diaries, memoirs, letters or interviews – are more 
subjective and less reliable.14 Because Kulka doubts the reliability of personal narratives, 
he says they can neither affirm nor refute historians’ interpretations of attitudes toward 
Jews.15 Raul Hilberg believes diaries lose contextual meaning because ‘unanchored 
fragments’ of detail float in the text.16 Kershaw also sits in the camp of those who find the 
benefits of personal narratives limited. He believes they are affected by self-censorship: 
‘Direct, authentic expressions of opinion in their original form are few and far between. In 
the pervading climate of fear and repression, frank political comment in diaries, papers, 
and letters of private individuals was naturally sparse.’17  
 
Though Bartov and his colleagues are certainly correct to note that personal narratives are 
problematic as historical sources, it is striking that they fail to mention that the official 
sources that they prefer to use are equally or even more problematic. It may be true, as 
Kershaw claims, that the writers of letters and diaries were restrained by a degree of ‘self-
censorship’. But this is equally true of the authors of official reports and even truer of the 
vox populi reported in Nazi Lageberichte and Stimmungsberichte. 
 
Hilberg, in particular, is dismissive of personal narratives and he assembles a long list of 
reservations about the value of such material: important details are left non-specific 
because of caution in the face of risk, rumours may or may not be true, and facts pertinent 
to a historian may be omitted because the witness deems them unimportant.18  Though 
some of his qualms are valid, Hilberg’s overall conclusion – that the evidence of 
eyewitnesses is unreliable – can be challenged. There are numerous personal narratives in 
existence which contain many specific details that were recorded with full knowledge of 
                                                 
13 This attitude could be rooted in the origins of historical practice, when history concerned itself more with 
the structures of power and key figures such as von Ranke occupied their thoughts with political and 
ecclesiastical history. But foundational historiography did not account for the development of social history 
and the study of public opinion, which is the necessary basis for examining relations between Jews and non-
Jews in Nazi Germany. 
14 Omer Bartov, Germany’s War and the Holocaust: Disputed Histories (Ithaca, N.Y., 2003), p.196. 
15 Otto Dov Kulka, ‘The German Population and the Jews: State of Research and New Perspectives’ in 
Probing the Depths of German Antisemitism, ed. D. Bankier (New York, 2000), p. 279. 
16 Raul Hilberg, Sources of Holocaust Research: An Analysis (Chicago, 2001), pp. 164-165.  
17 Ian Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent in the Third Reich: Bavaria 1933-1945 (Oxford, 
1983), p. 6.  
18 Hilberg, Holocaust Research, pp. 161-165. 
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the enormous risks, just some of which are discussed in this dissertation.19 These authors 
tended to reduce the level of risk by hiding or smuggling documents, rather than falsifying 
or omitting crucial text.20  Instead of omissions, they often employed substitutions for an 
individual or location while retaining the details of what actually happened.  
 
Hilberg also finds survivor testimonies to be less meaningful or even inauthentic because 
they tend to follow archetypal patterns.21 Even if he is correct about archetypes in the 
storytelling, this does not necessarily render the stories meaningless. Given the fact that 
Jewish people living in Nazi Germany were collectively persecuted, and thereby endured 
many common experiences, it is hardly surprising that there are patterns in their testimony.  
A further concern expressed by Hilberg is that survivors are not representative – they are 
an elite group who survived because they or their circumstances contained specific 
elements which gave them a greater chance of surviving. Furthermore, they do not 
represent all survivors as many chose not to speak out for specific reasons and their 
accounts are selective.22 In fact, however, those who survived the Holocaust often did so 
for reasons that were fortuitous or random. Jewish people from all walks of life and all 
circumstances perished while others with the same attributes did not. It was not necessarily 
the young, the brave, the perspicacious, or the rich who survived – it was the fortunate.  
 
Not only does Hilberg discount the value of diaries and memoirs, he also has little 
confidence in oral histories. This type of evidence, he claims, is compromised by the 
influence of the questioner, the interviewee’s conception of how their evidence will be 
used, abridged statements and problems of chronology.23 He also believes that verbatim 
quotes equate to novelization.24 His list of worries also includes the fact that information 
can be concealed, forgotten, or obscured by the inability of the interviewee to express it.25  
                                                 
19 Victor Klemperer, Frederich Reck, Ruth Andreas-Friedrich, Jochen Klepper, Missie Vassiltchikoff or Else 
Behrend-Rosenfeld are some of the writers who clearly were prepared to risk being specific with details.  
20 For example, Klemperer’s wife smuggled his diaries, a few pages at a time, into the safe-keeping of 
Annemarie Köhler, Fredrich Reck hid his diary in the woods of his estate. 
21 Hilberg, ‘I Was Not There’, pp.18-19, and Holocaust Research, p. 67. See also Theodore Ziolkowski, 
‘Versions of Holocaust’, Sewanee Review, LXXXVII (1979), pp. 680-681, for an expansion on the idea of 
archetypal survivor literature. 
22 Hilberg, Holocaust Research, pp. 48-49. 
23 Ibid., pp. 65-66. 
24 Ibid., pp. 70-71. 
25 Ibid., pp. 166-167. In regard to these problems, the works of Lawrence Langer are of particular use, 
especially (for this dissertation): Lawrence Langer, Holocaust Testimonies: The Ruins of Memory (New 
Haven, 1991). Other studies referenced for this dissertation were Hilberg, Langer, and Friedländer in Writing 
and the Holocaust, ed. Berel Lang (New York, 1988); essays by Browning, White, Funkenstein and LaCapra 
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Although Hilberg’s concerns about the reliability of oral testimony are well-founded, they 
are matched by equivalent problems in other sources. But many of the problems identified 
by Hilberg can be at least partially addressed by using oral testimonies, diaries and 
memoirs in conjunction with a variety of other sources. In dismissing personal narratives 
as useful sources, Hilberg gives greater voice to the perpetrators, to the cost of the voices 
of the victims. 
 
Another prominent historian who has expressed doubts about the value of certain types of 
personal narrative is David Bankier. According to Bankier, the post-war recollections 
provided by Jewish survivors have limited value due to discrepancies and contradictions 
caused by memory lapses and omissions.26 They also contain confusions and 
generalizations caused by conscious or sub-conscious ‘touching up’ of the past. He writes: 
‘We must bear in mind the warning of experts in the field of oral history, that memory is 
not a reproduction of reality but rather a symbolic mediation and elaboration of meaning 
with imagination guiding the perception of reality.’27 For Bankier, this means that the 
recollections of survivors should be confined to illustrating or adding colour to accounts 
based on less subjective sources (by which presumably he means his preferred regime-
generated reports). Although other historians examined for the purposes of this study do 
not explicitly discuss their views with regard to personal narratives, we can infer from their 
practice that they broadly agree with Bankier. Most historians, where they use personal 
narratives at all, do so purely to reinforce a point or to add atmosphere.  
 
Bankier’s dismissal of these memoirs raises the issue of validity in personal recollections 
made after the passage of time. Weber relates how oral or auto/biographical accounts have 
been historically perceived as unreliable because they were considered ‘intentional, 
selective, reflective, retrospective and produced light years away from the actual event’ 
and therefore deserving of exclusion from academic history.28 It is certainly true that, when 
                                                                                                                                                    
in Probing the Limits of Representation: Nazism and the Final Solution, ed. Saul Friedländer (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1992); James E. Young, Writing and Rewriting the Holocaust: Narrative and the Consequences of 
Interpretation (Bloomington, Ind., 1988); Wolfgang Weber, “Mass of Trash” or “Veins of Gold”?: An 
Investigative Report on the Relationship Between Oral History and Archives (Regensburg, 2000); and 
Wallace Martin, Recent Theories of Narrative (Ithaca, N.Y., 1986). 
26 David Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution: Public Opinion under Nazism (Oxford, 1992), pp. 
118-119. Bankier does not specifically say to which post-war recollections he is referring but his text implies 
that he means post-war oral histories in general. 
27 Bankier, Germans, p. 118. 
28 Weber, “Mass of Trash”, pp. 26-28. 
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an eyewitness constructs an account of an event, the very process of doing so is affected by 
the socio-cultural, historical and psychological or emotional factors that exist as he or she 
reconstructs and externalizes the account. All accounts must be considered partial and 
incomplete.29  Psychologist Daniel Schacter explains what this leaves us with: ‘We do not 
store judgment-free snapshots of our past experiences but rather hold on to the meaning, 
sense, and emotions these experiences provided us.’30 However, personal narratives also 
have important advantages over the official documents that Bankier, Hilberg and others 
deem to be more reliable.31 As Weber points out, official records cannot answer the 
qualitative questions of history, such as motives or reasons for past human behaviour. In 
this area, he finds that oral histories are indeed useful and he suggests that oral history and 
documentary history should be ‘symbiotic partners of the same discipline.’32  
 
Another category of personal narratives of which Bankier is suspicious comprises 
interviews with German-Jewish exiles that were recorded whilst the Nazi regime was still 
in power. Even though this evidence was recorded soon after the event, and therefore not 
degraded by the vagaries of memory over time, it should still – according to Bankier – be 
‘taken with a grain of salt.’33  For example, Jewish émigrés to Britain were interviewed by 
Foreign Office officials about their experiences in, and impressions of, Nazi Germany. It 
sometimes happened that such émigrés recounted incidents where non-Jewish Germans 
had either expressed hostility to the anti-Semitic policies of the regime, or demonstrated 
kindness towards individual Jews. For two reasons, Bankier discounts such testimony. 
Firstly, he argues that criticisms of the regime voiced by non-Jewish Germans to Jewish 
Germans were less meaningful because of the unlikelihood the complainants would be 
denounced.  This rather baffling point implies that, in Bankier’s view, Germans were more 
likely to express a true opinion when they feared denunciation than when they did not.34 
Bankier’s second reason for discounting these interviews is that those who did express 
criticism were not necessarily representative of majority opinion. Immediately before his 
‘grain of salt’ comment, Bankier’s text reads:  
                                                 
29 Yvonna Lincoln, ‘Emerging Criteria for Quality in Qualitative and Interpretive Research’, Qualitative 
Inquiry, 1:3 (1995), p. 280. This principle applies equally to Jewish eyewitnesses recounting their 
experiences long after the event and regime agents compiling reports for their superiors. 
30 Daniel Schacter, Searching for Memory: the Brain, the Mind, and the Past (New York, 1996), p. 5. 
31 Note that official regime reports were also ‘intentional, selective, reflective, retrospective’ material. 
32 Weber, “Mass of Trash”, pp. 30-31. 
33 Bankier, Germans, p. 119. 
34 Note the puzzling discrepancy where Bankier accepts the validity of complaints about the regime as 
described in SD reports, but cannot accept them in eyewitness testimony. 
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According to a third witness . . . the public attitude was sometimes hostile but mostly 
neutral and reserved. There had been individual expressions of sympathy, such as a Jewish 
family finding fruit, pastry and chocolate at the door of its flat. There were still friendly 
relations between Jews and non-Jews in many buildings.35  
 
Bankier does not deny the evidence outright but his implication is that it is less than credible and 
certainly is not representative.  
 
What is particularly troubling about Bankier’s discussion of personal narratives is that, 
despite the fact that he is very interested in the beliefs and behaviour of ‘ordinary’ people, 
he seems eager to dismiss the value of their voices. Instead of listening to the vox populi 
directly, he is more inclined to believe the assessment of Nazi officials concerning the 
attitudes of ordinary people. He privileges what is essentially second-hand testimony over 
a first-hand testimony. In taking a hierarchical approach to sources, Bankier opens himself 
to questions of why he does so. He clearly prefers one type of account to another, but he 
does not acknowledge that the cautions associated with those he designates unreliable 
apply equally or to an even greater extent to his preferred sources. He leaves himself 
exposed to accusations of discarding valuable information because it does not fit with his 
particular viewpoint. He is not alone, however, in taking uneven or unjustified approaches 
to sources. This attitude amongst historians demonstrates that they are not prepared to 
seriously consider that sources generated by the group under scrutiny are just as valuable 
as the reports compiled by the Nazi regime or Sopade.  
Misuse of evidence from personal narratives 
The misuse of evidence from personal narratives can take several forms. As we saw in 
Chapter One, evidence can be misrepresented when historians over-generalise or make 
claims based on insufficient data.  For example, Marion Kaplan makes sweeping claims 
about what happened at funerals when she writes: ‘Funerals were a time and place where 
small-town meanness was particularly conspicuous, since funerals had previously been a 
time of general neighbourliness, sympathy and piety.’36  She records two incidents, taken 
from memoirs, of Jews being harassed and concludes: ‘By the end of 1938, harassment at 
Jewish funerals had become widespread. Small groups of Germans would shout antisemitic 
insults at mourners gathered at the cemetery, whether in cities, like Leipzig, or in small 
                                                 
35 Bankier, Germans, p. 119. 
36 Marion Kaplan, Between Dignity and Despair: Jewish Life in Nazi Germany (Oxford, 1998), p. 38. 
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villages.37 Her endnotes indicate that her source material is not substantially larger than the 
two examples she provides in the text.38 It is problematic for Kaplan to use a term such as 
‘widespread’ on the basis of two examples. This is not to say that her assertion is incorrect; 
perhaps harassment at Jewish funerals was widespread. But there is a mismatch between 
her statement and the evidence that she supplies to support it. In effect, she asks the readers 
to take it on trust that the incidents to which she refers were typical. 
 
It is worth noting, however, that just as Kaplan has plucked examples from personal 
narratives to illustrate her assertion that Jewish funerals were harassed, it is also possible to 
find numerous counter-examples. In his diaries Klemperer describes, at length and in 
detail, eleven Jewish funerals that he attended; in none does he mention any kind of 
harassment.39 Hans Winterfeldt, a survivor of Auschwitz, wrote about his experiences in 
Lippehne: ‘The only excursion we could take without fear was to the Jewish cemetery.’40 
Kaplan’s assertion can thus be challenged by an equal or larger number of perfectly 
appropriate contrary examples. Even though Kaplan favours the use of personal 
testimonies, she appears to pick and choose illustrations to demonstrate her argument 
without any attempt to show that they are typical or indicative of general patterns. 
 
The problem of imposing pre-existing theories on the evidence also occurs when historians 
reference personal narratives. They can either claim that the evidence says something other 
than what it really says, or they can imply it is somehow misleading because it does not fit 
with their general argument. Eyewitness accounts recorded as personal narratives appear to 
be particularly vulnerable to this sort of misuse. While historians only rarely label sources 
as completely false, they do betray their prejudices toward some by employing expressions 
which in effect invalidate the evidence or influence the reader. Y. Michal Bodemann 
provides an example of this phenomenon when he avowedly sets out to demonstrate that 
Germans after World War II sought to evade responsibility for the crimes that the Nazis 
                                                 
37 Ibid., p. 38. For one of her two examples, Kaplan fails to note the disapproving reactions of non-Jewish 
onlookers to an anti-Semitic comment about a Jewish death, which, if included, might have undermined her 
theme of harassment.  
38 Kaplan, Dignity and Despair, p. 243. 
39 20 July 1933, 18 July 1940, 19 June 1942, 5 July 1942, 10 August 1942, 18 September 1942, 3 January 
1943, 18 April 1943, 3 May 1943 (two funerals), 9 May 1943. Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, pp. 24, 333, and 
Victor Klemperer, I Will Bear Witness: A Diary of the Nazi Years 1942-1945 (New York, 2001), pp. 81-82, 
93-94, 118-119, 147, 185, 215, 223-224, 226-227. 
40 Hans Winterfeldt in Margarete Limberg and Hubert Rübsaat (eds.), Germans No More: Accounts of Jewish 
Everyday Life 1933-1938 (New York, 2006), p. 100. 
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had perpetrated in their name.  Bodemann uses the narrative of Else Behrend-Rosenfeld, 
which she wrote during the regime, as an example of how he believes the Shoah was 
reduced to ‘its mere contours’. 41 He claims that she blurred the boundaries between Jewish 
and non-Jewish Germans, and between victims and perpetrators. Behrend-Rosenfeld’s 
testimony is notable because she stresses the many kindnesses that were shown by non-
Jews to herself and other Jewish people during the war years.42 She provides a detailed 
account of her experiences of relations between Jewish and non-Jewish Germans which is 
useful to compare with other testimonies. According to Marita Krauss, Behrend-
Rosenfeld’s purpose in writing was to record her experiences of suffering, but without 
bitterness.43 Bodemann, however, claims that she ‘de-authenticates’ Jews by re-shaping 
them into middle-class, bourgeois Germans for the comfort of her readers. It is convenient 
for Bodemann’s case if Behrend-Rosenfeld’s testimony can be ruled tainted because it 
does not fit his perception of how it should be framed in light of the Shoah. For him, 
Behrend-Rosenfeld’s descriptions of interactions between Jewish people and non-Jews 
have no intrinsic meaning unless they convey the full weight of Jewish ‘otherness’ and 
suffering. Meaning is assigned to behaviour, not on the basis of how the eyewitness 
represents her experiences, but on how well it fits Bodemann’s interpretation of the Shoah.  
 
Bodemann is by no means the only example of a historian who tries to cast doubt on the 
reliability of personal testimony when it conflicts with a pre-conceived theory. For 
example, we have already seen how Bankier downgrades the value of testimony that 
conflicts with his general assertions about how non-Jewish Germans mostly consented to 
Nazi persecution, and that support offered to Jews was infrequent.44  A further example is 
provided by Daniel Johnson.  He discusses Jochen Klepper, whose diaries were used as 
evidence in the Eichmann trial. Klepper recorded his views that the people did not support 
Hitler’s anti-Semitism or that Nazi measures such as Reichskristallnacht alienated the 
population. Johnson’s response to these beliefs is that Klepper was ‘in denial’.45 Moreover, 
                                                 
41 Y. Michal Bodemann, ‘Eclipse of Memory: German Representations of Auschwitz in the Early Postwar 
Period’, New German Critique, 75 (1998), pp. 63, 68.  
42 Else Behrend-Rosenfeld, Ich stand nicht allein: Leben einer Jüdin in Deutschland 1933 bis 1944 (Munich, 
1988). Behrend-Rosenfeld traces her personal odyssey in diary/letter form as she comes to terms with her 
transformation from her understanding of herself as fully German to being an outcast Jew. As the regime 
progresses she develops the courage and strength to assist other Jews before going into hiding herself.  
43 Marita Krauss, ‘Nachwort’ in Else Behrend-Rosenfeld, Ich stand nicht allein: Leben einer Jüdin in 
Deutschland 1933 bis 1944 (Munich, 1988), p. 270. 
44 Bankier, Germans, p. 118. 
45 Daniel Johnson, ‘What Victor Klemperer Saw’, Commentary, 109: 6 (2000), p. 48. 
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Susanne Heim asserts that Klemperer was plain mistaken in the times when he felt 
particles of hope in response to the behaviours of non-Jews towards him.46 In each of these 
examples, the historian has sought to cast doubt on the reliability of witnesses who provide 
testimony that contradicts his or her analysis.  
 
A further misuse of personal narratives occurs when the assertions made by historians do 
not match the evidence they provide. An example of this discrepancy appears in the 
editors’ introduction to a section in the Limberg and Rübsaat memoirs.47 In the segment 
entitled ‘The First Victims: Doctors and Lawyers’, the editors declare:  
 
Those [doctors] who still managed to practice were driven to ruin in other ways. Their non-
Jewish patients abandoned them one by one. Some remained loyal for a time and came, if 
necessary, under cover of darkness . . . there were also patients who attempted to exploit 
the doctors’ situation by employing blackmail and false accusations.48  
 
According to the editors, non-Jewish patients thus actively colluded with the regime to 
hound Jewish doctors out of business. Two testimonies from doctors, chosen by Limberg 
and Rübsaat as representative, follow the introduction. If these testimonies are scrutinized 
closely, their statements about how doctors fared at the hands of their patients are not 
consistent with the evidence presented.  
 
Doctor Henriette Necheles-Magnus describes mixed responses to the regime among her 
medical colleagues and the despicable behaviour of the non-Jewish doctor who 
appropriated her practice after she was forced to give it up.49 But, most notably, the general 
substance of her account published in Limberg concerns the loyalty of her patients. She 
provides nine specific examples of loyalty and does not mention that she felt abandoned by 
any patients. The second account, from Arthur Samuel, consists solely of three stories 
where he found himself at risk because of his status as a Jew.50 The first occurred in 1928, 
before the Nazis came to power, and concerns a legal difficulty over a drug-addicted 
patient. In the second, he narrowly avoids prosecution based on false accusations. 
                                                 
46 Susanne Heim, ‘The German-Jewish Relationship in the Diaries of Victor Klemperer’ in Probing the 
Depths of German Antisemitism, ed. D. Bankier (New York, 2000), pp. 316, 324. 
47 Margarete Limberg and Hubert Rübsaat (eds.), Germans No More: Accounts of Jewish Everyday Life 
1933-1938 (New York, 2006). These memoirs were selected from the ‘Harvard collection’ of essays written 
by German émigrés while the regime was still in power. The background to this collection is discussed later 
in this chapter. 
48 Limberg, p. 18.  
49 Henriette Necheles-Magnus in Limberg, pp. 19-21. For further secondary source information about how 
Jewish doctors were treated, see Michael Kater, Doctors under Hitler (Chapel Hill, 1989), pp.184-185. 
50 Arthur Samuel in Limberg, pp. 22-24. 
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Samuel’s testimony reveals that these accusations were motivated not by anti-Semitism, 
but by the desire of a non-Jewish family to protect their reputation and business. In both of 
these stories, his problems peak when he becomes entangled with the legal authorities. The 
third concerns a grateful and previously loyal patient who foolishly (‘the stupid goose’) 
believed a non-Jewish doctor who claimed that Jewish doctors poisoned their patients. 
While it is clear that Doctor Samuel’s difficulties are related to his being Jewish, the 
circumstances and motivations of the other protagonists are clearly more complex than 
simple anti-Semitism.  It is of course possible that the essays not chosen for inclusion in 
the Limberg collection may have contained multiple stories of abandonment and 
exploitation by the ‘ordinary’ people. But the evidence that the editors provide, which they 
claim to be representative of all the essays submitted, does not fully support their summary 
of the situation.  
 
The narratives selected by Limberg and Rübsaat for publication in their book were chosen 
from a larger collection kept at Harvard University. There were a total of twenty-four 
essays written by doctors or dentists in the complete collection. It would be a relatively 
straightforward process systematically to analyse them to assess how representative the 
two chosen by Limberg and Rübsaat were in describing the loyalties of patients.51 The 
problem these editors have is that they did not interrogate the text, checking it against their 
conclusions, to ensure that their statements accurately reflected what was in the 
testimonies. 
 
As we have seen, some historians question the reliability of personal testimony when it 
contradicts their line of argument. But they can also commit the opposite methodological 
sin by using personal testimony that is useful to their case without informing the reader 
that there are serious problems with its reliability. Examples of this problem are provided 
by historians who quote the diaries of Bella Fromm, a German socialite and gossip 
columnist who was Jewish.52  Fromm ostensibly wrote a diary while mixing freely with the 
Nazi elite. Much of her evidence, however, can be proven to be second-hand and compiled 
                                                 
51 Harry Lieberson comments on the general tenor of the essays in the complete collection: ‘the doctors have 
more to say [than anything] about day-to-day personal relationships, which they observed at close range in 
private practices, hospitals and clinics.’ Harry Liebersohn and Dorothee Schneider, ‘“My Life in Germany 
before and after January 30, 1933”: A Guide to a Manuscript Collection at Houghton Library, Harvard 
University’, Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, 91:3 (2001), p. 25. 
52 Bella Fromm, Blood and Banquets: A Berlin Social Diary (New York, 1942). 
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long after she left Germany to live in the United States.53  Kaplan’s argument that Jewish 
men were most often the target of vilification through stereotyping is undermined by her 
use of Fromm as a source. She quotes an anecdote recounted by Fromm but fails to 
acknowledge the difficulties raised by Fromm’s forging of her own material.54 Likewise, 
Friedländer does not account for how Fromm’s reliability affects her story of Hitler Youth 
boys vandalising a Jewish jewellery store.55  In either case, this particular information 
provided by Fromm may or may not have been authentic; we cannot tell from the text and 
Kaplan and Friedländer have not assisted us in the decision. In essence they ask us to 
accept Fromm’s information at face value and their carelessness about their source leaves 
us not knowing if their arguments are valid.56 
 
To summarize: the way in which many historians make use of the evidence found in 
personal narratives is deeply problematic. If evidence tells of Jewish people receiving ill-
treatment at the hands of ‘ordinary’ Germans it is accepted at face value. If, however, the 
evidence indicates supportive or kind behaviour, historians frequently attempt to rule the 
evidence out on the grounds that it is biased or unrepresentative. This suggests that, instead 
of starting with an open mind, historians are approaching their sources with pre-conceived 
prejudices that influence their assessment of the reliability of the evidence that is found in 
those sources. 57  
 
                                                 
53 For information on the reliability of Fromm’s papers, see Henry Turner, ‘Two Dubious Third Reich 
Diaries’, Central European History, 33:3 (2000), pp. 415-420. 
54 Kaplan, Dignity and Despair, pp. 35-36.  
55 Saul Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews, Volume 1: The Years of Persecution 1933-1939 (New York, 
1997), p. 262. 
56 A further example of this problem, not discussed in depth here because it is not directly relevant to the 
topic of this thesis, has more serious consequences. Götz Aly uses Hermann Rauschning’s testimony to make 
a point (which is key to his argument), about detailed planning for German expansion by a young academic, 
without acknowledging Rauschning’s status as a discredited source. See Götz Aly and Susanne Heim, 
Architects of Annihilation: Auschwitz and the Logic of Destruction (London, 2002), p. 4. See also Ian 
Kershaw, Hitler 1889-1936: Hubris (London, 1998), p. xiv, where Kershaw notes that Rauschning’s work 
should be disregarded altogether because it has so little authenticity.   
57 In the foreword to Samuel and Pearl Oliner’s investigation of altruism in Europe under Nazism, Harold 
Schulweis poignantly comments: ‘Paradoxically, confronting goodness may be more painfully challenging 
than confronting evil.’ Harold M. Schulweis, ‘Foreword’ to The Altruistic Personality: Rescuers of Jews in 
Nazi Europe, by Samuel and Pearl Oliner (New York, 1988), p. xi. As the bitter history of Germany’s Third 
Reich has been compiled, it has somehow seemed easier to find examples of complicity with the regime than 
to identify instances of decency. 
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What personal narratives can tell  
When they are used appropriately, personal narratives have a great deal to offer. 
Appropriate use of these sources includes accepting the fifth of the methodological 
principles that I outlined in my introduction: Sources and the evidence they yield must be 
approached with an open mind, recognising that they all have something to tell and should 
be ruled inadmissible only with very good reason. This requires a historian to start with the 
initial assumption that each personal narrative has some historical significance.58 The rule 
applies to all sources, even those viewed with scepticism because historians suspect their 
authors of manipulating truth for some self-serving purpose. Certainly, personal narratives 
must be used with extreme care, but this holds true for all types of sources. There are 
numerous ways, however, in which personal narratives can be more useful than official 
sources. 
 
Firstly, personal narratives describe what happened in the writer’s immediate surroundings 
and offer us a ground-eye view that provides a closer and more intimate picture than that 
available from nearly all other types of evidence.59 Furthermore, they reveal what the 
narrators thought and felt at the time, something no other source can definitively convey.60 
Chaim Kaplan, a Polish Jew confined in the Warsaw ghetto, recorded in his diary:  
 
The time may come when these words will be published. At all events, they will furnish 
historiographic material for the chronicle of our agony . . . . In them the truth is reflected – 
not a dry, embalmed truth, but a living, active truth proclaiming before the world: “Behold, 
there is no pain like unto mine.” 61  
 
The ground-eye view offered in eyewitness testimony gives us a perspective that is wider 
than usually acknowledged. Although historians designate personal narratives as 
unrepresentative because they are stories told by individuals, they fail to notice that the 
accounts actually provide us with information about the activities of all the people 
encountered by the narrators. Just one individual writing a diary can interact with dozens, 
                                                 
58 See Saul Friedländer, ‘True Believers’, TLS, 5161 (2002), p. 6. 
59 Laqueur, ‘Three Witnesses’, pp. 252-253. 
60 ‘Official academic history has  . . . nothing to tell us about the differences in intensity of historical 
occurrences. To learn about that, you must read biographies, not those of statesmen but the all too rare ones 
of unknown individuals. There you will see that one historical event passes over the private (real) lives of 
people like a cloud over a lake. Nothing stirs, there is only a fleeting shadow. Another event whips up the 
lake as if in a thunderstorm. For a while it is scarcely recognisable. A third may, perhaps, drain the lake 
completely.’ Sebastian Haffner, Defying Hitler (London, 2002), p. 6. 
61 20 February 1940. Chaim Kaplan, Scroll of Agony (New York, 1965), p. 121. 
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even hundreds of other individuals.62 Records of these encounters can act as mini-opinion 
polls. If we view a single diarist as someone who can put us in touch with the actions of his 
or her community, we have the ability to build up our understanding of communities all 
over Germany. In this way, personal narratives can allow us to increase our understanding 
about the distinctive characteristics of a particular group or the difference in responses 
among specific communities.63  Moreover, we can locate things undetected by any other 
source. Gestapo reports, for example, cannot reveal what happened in conversations inside 
people’s homes, how individual shopkeepers responded to their Jewish customers, or 
detect spontaneous gestures of kindness or cruelty. In an atmosphere where people 
believed that they were being watched, supportive activities in particular were driven 
underground and hence became undetectable.64 Despite all these qualities, most historians 
have failed to assign equal status to sources generated by the very people they are seeking 
to examine.  
 
Personal narratives can also help us gain better understanding about the fragmentary 
perspectives of the people who were eyewitnesses. They allow us to discern the mistakes 
of judgment people can make as they observe the behaviour of others or the subtle 
pressures that influence attitudes. Reports compiled by the regime could not perceive these 
nuances of human behaviour. For instance, the extraordinary story of Christian Arras, as 
recounted by Mark Roseman, provides us with an example of how Jewish witnesses 
sometimes misunderstood the motives of the non-Jewish Germans with whom they 
interacted. Arras was employed to service trucks at Izbica detention camp and was able to 
gain access to prisoners. He became a conduit for letters and packages that passed between 
Marianne Strauss and her fiancé.65  Marianne’s explanation for his motivations was simple:  
 
Christian was an opportunist, entirely an opportunist. He became very wealthy, [he and his 
wife] were very well off, working for the SS, repairing all these things. So in a way, that 
was how he became useful. And they were useful, but of course they were very well paid 
                                                 
62 A remarkable feature of the stories told by Jewish survivors who hid is the surprisingly large numbers of 
people, often strangers, who were involved in keeping them hidden. For example, see the stories in Eric 
Boehm, We Survived (Boulder, Col., 2003).  
63 Weber, “Mass of Trash”, p. 40. 
64 See Gellately, Backing Hitler, p. 136. See also Geyer’s argument that many individual small acts of 
kindness, with the reactive intent of restoring societal social bonds broken by the regime, constituted 
undetected resistance.  Michael Geyer, ‘Resistance as Ongoing Project: Visions of Order, Obligations to 
Strangers, Struggles for Civil Society’ Journal of Modern History, 64: Supplement (1992), pp. S235, 237. 
65 Mark Roseman, The Past in Hiding: Memory and Survival in Nazi Germany (London, 2000). 
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for it, and in the end they got a lot of my [deported] aunt’s things, just to keep and give 
back after the war if they had returned. And after the war I only saw him once. 66 
 
Because of her perception that he was financially benefiting from his efforts on behalf of 
her family, Marianne assumed that his motives were merely opportunistic. Later she 
speculated again on his motives, concluding instead that perhaps he was just a daredevil 
who liked taking risks.67 Her basic attitude toward him was one of mistrust, and it does not 
seem to have occurred to her that his motive could be altruism. In the course of his 
investigations, Roseman uncovered more information about Christian Arras from other 
testimonies. He discovered that Arras had consistently and regularly delivered aid to 
prisoners and smuggled information back and forth from the camp. That his motives were 
not profiteering was proved by the testimony of some of those he assisted: “Clearly, no 
material incentive had been involved since the poverty-stricken [recipients] had nothing to 
offer.”68 Roseman became convinced that Arras in fact had been a hero who sought to 
undermine the Nazi regime and continually risked his own safety by supporting deported 
Jews. Marianne’s perspective was limited, which prevented her from fully understanding 
Arras and his activities.  
 
When historians discuss opportunistic attitudes among the population they seldom offer 
evidence that presents a different perspective.  Personal narratives allow us to discern that 
not everyone sought to gain personal advantage from the misfortunes of the Jewish people. 
For example, Fritz Goldberg, a scriptwriter from Berlin, described the response of the non-
Jewish German who inherited his job: ‘He treated me with respect and consideration, and 
repeatedly told me he was embarrassed he was to be getting his position in such a way.’69 
With no hint of taking advantage, Ludwig Misch’s neighbour told him as he was being 
evicted from his flat: “I am ashamed to be a German.”70 As a lawyer banned from 
appearing in court, Siegfried Neumann found his colleagues not seeking benefit from the 
situation, but rather covering for him.71 Victor Klemperer, in spite of his pessimism, 
experienced support from colleagues on numerous occasions.72 Only a systematic analysis 
of personal narratives could reveal whether such stories were typical or atypical. The 
                                                 
66 Ibid., p. 201. 
67 Ibid., p. 202. 
68 Ibid., p. 201. 
69 Fritz Goldberg in Limberg, p. 114. 
70 Ludwig Misch, a musician from Berlin, in Limberg, p. 117. 
71 Siegfried Neumann in Limberg, p. 30. 
72 For specific examples, see Chapter Three of this dissertation, footnote 166.  
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existence of such testimony demonstrates how dangerous it is to pluck examples from 
personal narratives and use them merely to illustrate or add colour to a pre-conceived 
argument. We could find examples in personal narratives of the complete range of 
interactions between Jewish and non-Jewish Germans. Used unsystematically, personal 
narratives can therefore be made to serve almost any argument that a historian might care 
to make.  
 
Personal narratives also give us the opportunity to glimpse other nuances of human 
behaviour, important to the process of interpretation, which official sources cannot reveal. 
For example, a relationship described in Klemperer’s diaries permits us yet another 
perspective on the issue of opportunistic behaviour. Berger, a friendly and talkative 
greengrocer in Dölzschen, moved into Victor Klemperer’s house when it was confiscated. 
Klemperer suspected that Berger’s previous kindness was motivated by a desire to get his 
hands on Klemperer’s house.73 Yet Berger emerges clearly from the pages of the diary as 
someone who was anti-Nazi and by Klemperer’s initial assessment a ‘very decent man’.74 
Later, Berger demonstrated behaviour that the diarist believed was opportunistic, so, after 
the war, the vengeful Klemperer turned the tables on him with some opportunism of his 
own. Klemperer managed to keep Berger’s possessions (although only temporarily in the 
end), regardless of the pleas of the former tenant.75 This tit-for-tat opportunism serves to 
draw attention to the possibility that the two men engaged in essentially human behaviour 
that was not connected to the measures taken by the regime. It is possible that their 
opportunism was simply a reflection of how humans can behave toward each other in any 
society at any time. Despite the extraordinary situation in Germany at the time, not all 
behaviours were extraordinary.  This begs the question of whether it is correct to assign 
new meaning (complicity in Nazi crimes) to the opportunistic behaviour of those who did 
take advantage of Jewish misfortune. Whatever the answer, personal narratives offer the 
opportunity to re-examine the questions from different perspectives, to test the theories, 
and to check that conclusions are credible.  
 
                                                 
73 16 December 1939. Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, p. 309. Klemperer was initially happy with the 
arrangement but vacillated in his opinions of Berger and his motivations as time progressed. 
74 10 May 1938, 16 December 1939. Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, pp. 246, 308. 
75 20 June 1945, 14 July 1945. Victor Klemperer, The Lesser Evil: The Diaries of Victor Klemperer 1945-59 
(London, 2003), pp. 4-5, 22. 
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Personal narratives can offer even further interpretive possibilities that are not found in 
other types of sources. For example, historians often refer to the breakdown in 
relationships between Jewish and non-Jewish Germans. Their interpretations generally 
assert that relations disintegrated because ‘ordinary’ Germans turned their backs on their 
Jewish acquaintances. There are plenty of statements in personal narratives to support this 
argument, such as: 
 
Personal relations with “Aryans,” even when it was a matter of saying hello on the street 
and in public, dwindled more and more. Even former close friends and acquaintances, 
colleagues, and wartime comrades shied away from talking to us, greeted us in secret, and 
excused this behaviour with their fear of persecution or other difficulties.76 
 
This statement could be taken at face value and plenty of similar accounts can be found to 
support the concept of ‘Aryans’ turning their backs on former friends. But personal 
narratives also reveal other elements that contributed to the breakdown of relationships. 
The following selection of anecdotes shows that, at least in some cases, Jewish people 
were the ones who withdrew from relationships, usually for reasons of self-preservation. 
This means that rejection by non-Jewish Germans was not the only explanation for 
disrupted relationships: 
 
Frau Voss . . . has to go to an ‘Aryan’ birthday, she would prefer not go, she cannot bear to 
see any Aryans any more.77 
 
I never go anywhere any more. I am so well known through my profession and my 
position; why should I make trouble for myself and for others? I’m happy to be at home in 
peace.78 
 
In 1935 . . . I was visiting my hometown. No one had lifted a finger against the people 
there. But they were lonely, lonely. They only left their houses if they had no other choice. 
Not out of fear that something could happen to them, but rather so they would not have to 
keep experiencing how people avoided them.79 
 
I was more frightened than ever. I now ate my meals alone in a separate room next to the 
dining hall. I entered the room cautiously, so as not to meet anyone, gulped down my lunch 
in ten minutes and then disappeared. When I walked onto the street, I first took a long look 
at the passersby to be sure I was in no danger.80 
 
                                                 
76 Joseph Levy in Limberg, p. 81. 
77 12 August 1940. Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, p. 337. 
78 9 October 1935. Hertha Nathorff, Das Tagebuch der Hertha Nathorff: Berlin-New York, Aufzeichnungen 
1933 bis 1945 (Munich, 1987), trans. from Hermann Graml, Antisemitism in the Third Reich (Oxford, 1992), 
p. 210.  
79 Heinemann Stern in Limberg, p. 79. 
80 Gerta Pfeffer in Limberg, pp. 66-67. The cause of her fear was the threat that photos of her birthday party, 
attended by Nazi party members, would be published in Der Stürmer. 
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My friend Emmy invited me to our usual group hike . . . [She] whispered in my ear, “You 
are wonderful, you are just as much a part of us as everyone else.” Although I thought that 
was a good thing, I sensed she was also aware that I was no longer one of them. She later 
asked me once more to take part in our usual hike. But I could hide no longer. “No thanks, 
I can come with you no more.” “Why not? We have reassembled our group, and the others 
won’t notice because you don’t look Jewish. Please come along!” She did not know how 
much that hurt me. But this “they won’t notice” made up my mind not to go. I never hiked 
with them again.81 
 
A [non-Jewish] gentleman addressed [Victor Klemperer] on Postplatz. “Do you not 
recognise me? . . . I passed you recently, you saw me and looked away. I was afraid you 
looked away because you thought I would not greet you. That is why I am addressing you 
today. How are you?”82  
 
[As a Jew] I was afraid to address acquaintances on the street for fear of being reported for 
something, and I could also harm the people I spoke to.83 
 
For the sake of our gentile friends, we turned our heads so as not to greet them in the 
streets, for we did not want to bring upon them the danger of imprisonment for being 
considered a friend of the Jews.84 
 
Informing on people began to assume unimaginable dimensions, and those people who had 
kept up their friendships and social relations with one another without regard to racial 
considerations now had to stop if they wanted to survive.85  
 
 
Historians have noted the retreat into the ‘private sphere’ because of the pressures for all 
those living in the Third Reich. We need to build into our understanding of relationships 
between Jewish and non-Jewish Germans that the withdrawal was conceivably mutual.86 
Although the difference is subtle it can be a significant factor in discussions of how non-
Jews were complicit in the Nazi rejection of Jewish people. 
 
Systematic analysis of personal narratives 
The sixth, and last, methodological principle that I listed in my introduction is that 
historians must approach their material as systematically as possible. The best approach to 
source material is through a combination of quantitative and qualitative analysis. Each of 
these types of analysis can bring a different dimension to historical study and each requires 
                                                 
81 Luise Stein in Limberg, pp. 144-145. 
82 11 February 1936. Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, p. 147. 
83 Gerta Pfeffer in Limberg, p. 65. 
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85 Eva Wysbar in Limberg, p. 87. 
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a systematic approach.87 Quantitative analysis can be used to evaluate typicality, to assess 
reliability, and to test hypotheses. Qualitative research is concerned to develop a richer 
understanding of the topic with particular focus on the perspectives of the group under 
scrutiny.88 Following principles of quantitative research requires us to accept that it 
involves empirical enquiry and that observable measurable facts can be identified in the 
available evidence.89 This can be problematic for many historians, particularly those 
operating from within a post-modernist theoretical framework.90 These historians are 
joined by others who dismiss any possibility of quantitative analysis of the available 
evidence from Nazi Germany.91 It is reasonable, however, to argue that historical argument 
about events from the past must be able to be put to some form of test.92 Moreover, by the 
very fact that historians use terminology such as ‘great majority’, ‘vast majority’, or ‘most’ 
means that they have employed some sort of quantifying procedure to argue authoritative 
propositions about what did or did not occur during the Third Reich.93  My argument 
suggests that by assembling a larger body of evidence and ensuring qualitative methods are 
also applied, it is legitimate to undertake a comparative study of the stories told by 
eyewitnesses in order to locate a reasoned hypothesis about interactions among the 
‘ordinary’ people. Precedents for this type of analysis, such as the surveys undertaken by 
Eric Johnson and Karl-Heinz Reuband, are already accepted by historians.94  
 
Qualitative analysis is an essential adjunct to quantitative analysis provided a sound 
methodological approach is consciously applied. Psychology researchers have developed 
guidelines for appropriate qualitative research which can be adapted for historical practice. 
Good qualitative historical enquiry will include being transparent about methodology and 
perspective, will pay careful attention to context, will make appropriate use of examples, 
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will permit interrogation for credibility, will address specific questions without undue 
extrapolation to more general questions, and will argue coherently in order to further 
enlighten readers. 95   
 
Historians must firstly be transparent about their methodology. Transparency requires 
scholars to state clearly how they approached the evidence, the methods they employed 
and how they arrived at their conclusions. An essential precursor is self-awareness (and 
acknowledgement) of stance or motivation. Lack of this self-awareness can lead to 
difficulties with coherence and consistency in the argument.96 The position of a historian, 
whether motivated by curiosity, personal background, or political orientation, can 
influence the argument, just as an interviewer can have impact on an oral history. Failure 
to acknowledge this denies the reader opportunity to be fully informed as he or she weighs 
and interprets the historian’s argument. Some historians openly acknowledge their personal 
motivations or backgrounds.97 Many do not. Those who do, however, seldom go on to 
explain their methodology, drawing the reader’s attention to both the weaknesses and the 
strengths of the methodology. Neither do they always acknowledge the part that 
speculation plays in their argument.98  
 
Thorough enquiry into context is also essential in qualitative analysis. Every source must 
always be assessed for its potential to provide reliable information. This includes 
identifying, insofar as is possible, the background to each source, the context under which 
it was compiled, by whom and why, the steps involved in creating it and the history of its 
travels before coming to the attention of the scholar. The source can then be categorised by 
the circumstances under which it was created, its function and role, and its relationship to 
the topic or groups under investigation. Even though most historians would insist that this 
is standard historical practice, nonetheless, they fail to convey the results of their source 
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investigations in their text, leaving themselves exposed to questions about methodology. In 
addition, failing to be diligent and transparent about the source background and context can 
cause two further problems. Firstly, it places the integrity of their argument at risk, as we 
saw with Kaplan’s and Friedländer’s use of Bella Fromm as a source. Secondly, it denies 
the reader the opportunity to weigh up possibilities of alternative interpretations, so the 
historical construction becomes entirely subject to the prejudices of the individual 
historian. Information on context of origin is often readily available in personal narratives 
generated during and after the Third Reich, for example, in the ‘Harvard collection’ of 
essays.99 Because these and so many other authors have self-consciously recorded their 
stories for purposes of memorialisation, contextual details are often also carefully included 
in personal narratives. In qualitative analysis, this assists substantially with evaluating 
testimonials.   
 
Where examples are used to support an argument, they must be representative of both their 
original source and the outcomes of systematic analysis. Anecdotes from personal 
testimonies can play two kinds of roles in supporting the historian’s argument. The 
importance of being representative is not as crucial in the first kind of role. These examples 
are used strictly to ‘add colour’ to a discussion; the points of argument stand independent 
from the example and its inclusion makes no difference to the argument either way.  For 
example, Richard Evans discusses technological progress during the Third Reich, as 
exemplified by the building of the new Autobahn.100 To illustrate his point, Evans records 
comments from Klemperer’s diary about his car ownership and experiences of driving. 
Evans’ main point relates to the growth in vehicle production and ownership, supported by 
footnoted statistical information. Whether or not Klemperer’s comments are included in 
the text makes no actual difference to the discussion, but serves to enhance the readability 
of the information and provide an intimate glimpse of one person’s experience with driving 
on the new motorways. This is a perfectly legitimate use of personal testimony even 
though it does not admit any recognition of the full value to be drawn out of personal 
narratives. 
 
The second role examples can play requires close attention to their ability to be 
representative because they constitute the supporting ‘proof’ for an argument. We have 
                                                 
99 Liebersohn, pp.1-130. 
100 Evans, Third Reich, p. 326. 
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already seen how Kaplan argues that persecution of Jews was extended to harassment 
while attending funerals. The only evidence she offers comes from two examples. Even a 
larger number of examples would still not prove the point she is making because there is 
no explanation of how representative her examples are. Her technique is to argue by 
‘layering’ anecdotes, piling up example after example, to create an overall impression. 
This leads to conclusions based on what seems to be there rather than what actually is 
there. To make her claim in a manner that is methodologically robust, Kaplan would need 
to make clear to her readers that her examples were genuinely representative. She would 
also have to demonstrate how she concluded that they were in fact representative by being 
transparent about her methodology.  
 
Historians should be systematic as they make decisions about how representative their 
examples are. The first step is to be sure examples are representative of the source from 
which they originate. This requires examining the context and origins of both author and 
document, quantifying specific incidents (e.g.: ‘a shopkeeper slipped me some of his best 
tomatoes’) and evaluating them against general or summarizing statements (e.g.: ‘all 
Germans treated us badly’ or ‘things got worse as time went on’), and taking into account 
any other supporting information. The second step is to compare this information with 
other sources generated under similar conditions to be able to see any pattern which 
emerges. A useful third step is to divide the body of evidence into categories such as oral 
histories, memoirs or diaries, sources generated during or after the Third Reich, so that the 
specific issues of some types of source, such as problems of memory recall, can be 
exposed. For example, if a body of diaries reveal the same patterns of evidence as 
memoirs, we can with greater clarity identify how substantial a factor memory is. By 
engaging with a substantial body of evidence from personal narratives and following this 
extensive process, at the very least we have the potential to locate patterns of typicality. 
 
With the principle of systematic analysis in mind we can now turn to personal narratives to 
test some specific aspects of historians’ assertions about relations between Jewish and non-
Jewish Germans. The analysis uses some personal narratives that are among the most 
commonly referenced by the historians discussed in this dissertation.101 Two significant 
                                                 
101 The main personal narratives referenced from this point forward are the Limberg and Rübsaat memoirs 
(English translation) and the 1933-45 diaries of Victor Klemperer, although others are also briefly referenced. 
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questions sit behind the analysis. Do any patterns emerge from systematic analysis of 
personal narratives? Does systematic analysis confirm the assertions of historians?  
 
As we explore these questions, there are two provisos to keep in mind. The first is that the 
exercise undertaken below is an experiment. It does not pretend to provide definitive 
answers. It is an exploration of a limited and flawed number of samples. But it tests the 
ground to see if there is potential to engage a wider, more formal study on the same 
question. The second proviso is that we must not forget that we are dealing with 
information where the eyewitnesses tell us their perspectives about what they experienced. 
As such, the data is more subjective than empirical. In historical re-construction, however, 
sometimes this is all we have to go on. As we have already established, the information 
from personal narratives is no more, or less, flawed than the information available from the 
most commonly used sources for Third Reich history, the reports generated by the regime 
itself.  
 
The methodology for this exercise was simply to make a count of the stories told by 
eyewitnesses and combine it with other information to build a picture of what they chose to 
tell us about their experiences. However simplistic or crude the count method is, 
nevertheless, it is systematic and gathers information from the same sources used by 
scholars, who employ these stories to provide a basis or support for their own arguments. 
While there are many cautionary factors to take into account, this process is at least more 
systematic than the entirely impressionistic approach which has hitherto been used by the 
historians we have examined so far.  
 
Before analysing what personal narratives say about relationships we must assess their 
relative strengths and weaknesses. The main body of evidence used below is the Limberg 
and Rübsaat selection of memoirs from the ‘Harvard collection’. This collection is the 
result of an essay contest sponsored by Harvard University in 1940 which, combined with 
a few other memoirs held by the Leo Baeck Institute, provides a body of information 
published and widely referenced in different formats.102  The Limberg selection comprises 
material from twenty-eight of the essay writers, translated into English. Limberg and 
                                                 
102 Most particularly Monica Richarz (ed.), Jewish Life In Germany: Memoirs from Three Centuries 
(Bloomington, 1991), abridged from Jüdisches Leben in Deutschland: Selbstzeugnisse zur Sozialgeschichte, 
3 vols. (Stuttgart, 1976-1982), and Limberg, Germans No More, abridged from Sie durften nicht mehr 
Deutsche sein. Jüdischer Alltag in Selbstzeugnissen 1933 – 1938 (Frankfurt, 1990).  
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Rübsaat have selectively culled the essays from the larger collection and although they do 
not acknowledge their editorial intervention, they have also reduced the size of some 
essays.103 For example, Necheles-Magnus submitted twenty-six typewritten pages, 
containing material such as descriptions of her student life, but her contribution selected 
for Limberg focuses solely on personal experiences in her medical practice.104   
 
Furthermore, experiences of life under the regime are only partially represented in the 
Limberg selection because of the confinement to a specific time period (1933-1938). They 
cannot reveal what happened in encounters occurring after the introduction of the yellow 
star or when deportations began. The limitations of selectivity also extend to the original 
authors themselves. Given a specified theme, the writers have made selective choices by 
choosing just some elements from their own experiences deemed related to the topic and 
worthy to discuss. Nonetheless, the story elements selected by the writers can still be 
accepted as significant and representative in their minds. By conscious choice the writers 
have decreed which of their experiences assume significance for them.  
 
Aside from these weaknesses, this collection also has advantages over some other 
memoirs. The editors claim the collection ‘paints the most representative picture possible 
of Jewish life in Germany’ in the years 1933-1938.105  While the statement is rather 
hyperbolic, they have made a genuine effort to cover the gamut of life for the Jewish 
population of Nazi Germany through the selection process and division of essays into 
categories. The memoirs give us at least a glimpse into a wide range of Jewish experiences. 
They also have a degree of immediacy. Some were recorded months, or even weeks, after 
the events they described, so issues of memory recall after significant time elapse are not a 
problem. Another advantage is also due to the time of writing. For most of the writers the 
full extent of the unfolding horror was not yet known, thereby giving them no opportunity 
to reinterpret events influenced by the full knowledge of Shoah.  
 
                                                 
103 Approximately 230 German refugees responded to an invitation to describe their life in Germany before 
and after 1933, the intention being to use the material “for a study of the social and psychological effect of 
National Socialism on German Society and the German people.’ Liebersohn, p. 1. See in particular footnotes 
1 and 2 in Liebersohn, p. 1, in for information on the identities of the contributors: not all were authentically 
identified, and not all were German, Jewish, or unsympathetic to the Nazi cause. 
104 The recommended (but not compulsory) length for the essays was at least 20,000 words. Liebersohn, pp. 
3, 90, and Necheles-Magnus in Limberg, pp. 19-21. 
105 Limberg, p. viii. 
 76
The first question concerns how the Limberg memoirs can shed new light on relationships 
between Jews and non-Jews in the workplace and in wider contexts. Loyalty was one of 
the more common themes that emerged from the essays in this collection. For example, we 
have already seen that Doctor Necheles-Magnus described nine instances of loyalty 
amongst her patients with no instance of disloyalty recorded.106  Friedrich Weil, a wine 
merchant, reports three instances of loyalty from clients and four of disloyalty.107 Because 
the sample is so small, neither of these provides sufficient information to satisfactorily 
draw adequate pictures of the responses of ‘Aryan’ patients to their Jewish doctors or 
customers to their suppliers. But, if a number of similar accounts were compared with each 
other, it might be possible to locate patterns leading to a typical picture.  
 
Where the writers discussed relationships with non-Jews, the category of relationship most 
frequently mentioned was client/customer interaction. Twenty-two stories in the Limberg 
selection revolved around whether the Jews had experienced loyalty or disloyalty in these 
pre-existing relationships. Figure 2 shows that they chose to relate more instances of 
loyalty than of disloyalty. What does this tell us? Did they simply prefer to recollect more 
good things about the life they left behind than bad things? Or were they being accurate in 
their representation of how events occurred? We cannot tell from this limited information 
but it is clear enough that there is justification to widen our examination. 
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Figure 2: Incidence of loyalty/disloyalty in client/customer relationships (Limberg) 
 
If we widen the count from client/customer interaction to all instances of interaction with 
non-Jews, the larger sample shows that incidents of loyalty still outnumber incidents of 
disloyalty. For an incident to be assessed as specifically involving an element of loyalty (or 
                                                 
106 Henriette  Necheles-Magnus in Limberg, pp. 19-21. 
107 Friedrich Weil in Limberg, pp. 14-16 and 48-50. Weil also writes about several other acts of client 
kindness and remorse but these are not recorded here as acts of loyalty due to timing: by taking place just 
before his departure they cannot demonstrate commitment to relationship.  
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disloyalty) there had to be indication of prior relationship between the Jewish and non-
Jewish protagonists. Of the total 132 encounters between Jews and non-Jews described in 
Limberg, seventy (53 percent) fit this specification. Forty-seven tell of a non-Jew 
demonstrating some act of loyalty towards a Jew, such as continuing a social or business 
relationship in spite of the adverse situation, covering for someone in order to protect them, 
or provisioning them (Figure 3). The twenty-three instances of disloyalty mostly involve 
cessation of social or business relationships. 
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Figure 3: Incidence of loyalty/disloyalty during all encounters with non-Jews (Limberg) 
 
 
In all forty-seven occurrences of loyalty, some type of active behaviour was engaged by 
the ‘Aryan’.108 For example, one account tells of a nanny who helped smuggle the children 
in her care across the border to safety, leaving all her possessions behind and not daring to 
return because of specific threats against her.109 Others stories are less dramatic, with acts 
of loyalty being as simple as customers buying extra produce to demonstrate their support, 
even when they could barely afford it.110 By contrast, of the total twenty-three incidents of 
disloyalty, passive behaviour (withdrawal of relationship or silence at key moments) 
occurred in sixteen instances with active behaviour indicated in only seven instances, for 
example, refusal to pay a debt or a daughter persuading her mother to divorce her Jewish 
adoptive father.111  
 
The act of demonstrating loyalty carried some danger for the ‘Aryan’ participant in thirty 
(64 percent) of the total forty-seven instances. Sixteen (34 percent) involved a measure of 
public protest against the regime, such as the old lady who cursed the regime so loudly her 
                                                 
108 In a formal study of this issue, this type of information would have to be compared with other studies, 
such as those undertaken by Johnson and Reuband where 38% of their respondents indicated they received 
significant support or help from non-Jewish-Germans, meaning 62% did not. (For those still in Germany 
after 1941, the percentage for those receiving help climbed to 61%).  Johnson, What We Knew, pp.282-283.  
109 Eva Wysbar in Limberg, p. 94. 
110 Henriette Necheles-Magnus in Limberg, pp. 19-20. 
111 Friedrich Weil, David Grünspecht, and Raffael Mibberlin in Limberg, pp. 15, 52, 63. 
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Jewish supplier asked her to quieten or two businessmen who refused to erect “Jews not 
welcome” signs in their shops.112 Twenty-four (51 percent) faced the risk of physical 
danger, arrest, loss or abuse.113 For example, in spite of frequent threats and public insults, 
a household maid continued to visit the family she had worked for until they left Germany 
in 1939.114 The above information indicates that the Jewish narrators in this sample were 
far more likely to report supportive behaviour that involved proactive behaviour and less 
likely to report proactive adversarial behaviour. The two most likely explanations are that 
these are the types of behaviour they preferred to report (for any number of speculated 
reasons) or that their reporting was in fact accurate and provided genuine representations 
of what happened. Whatever the reason, the information contrasts markedly with the 
anecdotes most often commented on by the secondary sources, which more often than not 
focus on proactive adversarial behaviour as being the dominant experience of Jews who 
later told of their experiences. 
 
If the seventy instances of loyalty or disloyalty are divided into specific categories of 
relationship, eight categories can be identified: Friend/Family, Neighbour, Colleague, 
Employee, Employer, Client/Customer, Merchant/Service Provider, and Other (Figure 4). 
Of the three incidents falling into the ‘Other’ category, two indicated there was a pre-
existing relationship without specifying its nature, the other involved the wife of the 
narrator’s building doorman.  
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Figure 4: Demonstrations of loyalty/disloyalty in existing relationships (Limberg) 
 
 
                                                 
112 Friedrich Weil and Leo Grünbaum in Limberg, pp. 50, 69. 
113 For example, Limberg, pp. 53, 61, 67, 94, 165. Ten (21%) instances involved both protest and risk. 
114 Joseph Levy in Limberg, p. 80. 
 79
 
Figure 4 shows that in only two categories (Friend/Family and Neighbours), incidents of 
disloyalty outweighed loyalty. This is somewhat surprising, particularly as conceivably it 
indicates that the essays writers recalled that the more intimate relationships were the most 
damaged. Withdrawal of relationship, usually passive or silent but no less painful, was the 
issue in ten of the total seventeen incidents falling into these two categories. Active 
rejection (the daughter who persuaded her mother to divorce her adoptive father because 
he was Jewish) occurred in just one incident.  
 
On the whole, their recollection of events involves telling stories about being treated with 
sympathy more often than not. This information cannot form the basis for an argument or a 
conclusion. But careful and critical analysis does tell us is that perhaps widening the 
search, similarly analysing a much larger body of diaries and memoirs, may reveal 
information that although carrying a number of cautions, yields data that is more 
empirically based than the impressionistic surveys undertaken by most historians. There is 
enough information here to justify calling for a re-examination of at least one assertion 
made by historians. As already mentioned in Chapter One, Bankier cites motives of job 
preservation when maids objected to the Nuremberg Laws.115 In personal narratives there 
are numerous anecdotal accounts, which Bankier does not account for, of maids who 
remained loyal to Jewish employers, even in the face of great personal risk. Some of these 
are, for example: ‘our loyal Anna’ who financially provided for her employers and others 
when their funds were frozen, ‘our Lina’ who was followed by an equally loyal successor, 
‘M’ who refused to stop visiting even when harassed and threatened, the faithful staff of 
Eva Wysbar, one of whom gave up everything she had for the sake of her employer’s 
family, or generous Agnes Scholze, who appears many times in the pages of Klemperer’s 
diaries.116  If a systematic survey of workplace or relationship loyalties reveals patterns, 
then perhaps it is time to re-examine the basis upon which historians rest their claims.  
 
What does systematic analysis of two samples of personal narratives reveal about attitudes 
and behaviours toward Jewish people over time? For this exercise, I assembled a sample of 
oral histories for comparison with the Limberg memoirs. This oral history sample contains 
three sets of oral histories (see Figure 5), two of which were conducted in informal 
                                                 
115 Bankier, Germans, p. 80. 
116 ‘Aralk’; Eva Wysbar; Joseph Levy; Rafael Mibberlin in Limberg, pp. 60-61, 80-81, 93-94, 173-179. 
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journalistic style by Cynthia Crane and Alison Owings.117 The other set, from the Johnson 
and Reuband collection, contrasts with the Crane and Owings sets because their almost 
3,000 surveys and 200 face-to-face interviews, distilled into a smaller collection of 
representative testimonies, were conducted under rigorous and systematic conditions.118  
The second sample contains the written memoirs of the Limberg English translation. This 
collection, which ends at 1938, records a slightly larger number of incidents (128) than the 
oral histories (101).119  
 
 
Source No. of 
Incidents 
% of 
total 
sample 
Crane 13 12.87 % 
Johnson 58 57.43 % 
Owings 30 29.70 % 
  101 100% 
Figure 5: Oral history samples: encounters with non-Jews 
 
 
Again we must note that the composition of the oral history and memoir samples is more 
random and considerably smaller than would be legitimate for a formal and extensive 
survey. If the Limberg collection was to undergo formal and comprehensive analysis, the 
essential first step would be to refer back to the original documents in their unedited 
format. For the experimental exercises conducted in this chapter, the best use of them in 
their edited and translated format is to compare them with other sources to see if the 
information they offer is consistent with other testimonies. A proper survey would access 
the substantial body of personal narrative literature now available and clear categories 
could be established: division by genre (diary, oral history – formal or informal, or written 
memoir), time of recording (during the regime, immediately after or long after), category 
of narrator (Jewish or non-Jewish), and region of origin. As already mentioned, 
                                                 
117 Cynthia Crane, Divided Lives: The Untold Stories of Jewish-Christian Women in Nazi Germany (New 
York, 2003), and Alison Owings, Frauen: German Women Recall the Third Reich (New Brunswick, 1993). 
Note that the oral histories recorded by Crane and Owings were not conducted under rigorous interview 
conditions. The Owings’ interviews in particular are somewhat compromised by interviewer involvement. 
The Johnson surveys and interviews were conducted according to standard opinion research methodology. 
For reasons of space, I cannot discuss at length here the respective strengths and weakness of these sources, 
which I only briefly reference here. In a larger, more formal study, I would take a different methodological 
approach to each of the two types of interview. 
118 Johnson, What We Knew (London, 2005). 
119 Four ‘neutral’ experiences, having neither positive nor negative effects on Jews, were excluded from the 
count of incidents in Limberg. These concerned observations of incidents occurring between ‘Aryans’ and 
not involving interactions with Jews. 
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discrimination between general or imprecise statements (‘Things got worse as time went 
on’, ‘on the whole we felt supported by our Aryan friends’), and descriptions of specific 
incidents (‘A man approached me on the street, shook my hand and apologised for the way 
Jews are being treated’), have potential to reveal patterns. Because we are only concerned 
here to establish if there is potential for further investigation, these small samples can act 
as indicators of what could be learned by counting and dating accounts of specific 
encounters between Jews and non-Jews (Figures 6, 7).120  
 
The graphs below, which summarise the results of the count method, are fairly self-
explanatory. Figure 6 shows that the oral history sample contains stories that had both 
negative and positive effects on the narrators.121 Overall, the narrators of the oral histories 
told fifty-five stories that had a positive effect on them, and forty-six that had negative 
effects. When the incidents described are charted in a graph to show the years during 
which they occurred we can see from the trendlines that the number of ‘positive’ stories 
told about encounters with non-Jews dropped slightly over time. The number of ‘negative’ 
encounters dropped more significantly. A pattern of escalation in negative encounters with 
non-Jews is not demonstrated in the stories told by these narrators. In fact, they chose to 
tell more stories about ‘positive’ than ‘negative’ encounters in the later years of the regime. 
 
                                                 
120 In most cases (81%) narrators specified dates or they were calculated from biographical information and 
historical context (e.g. 1933 boycott, November 9 pogrom). The remaining 19% of dates were estimated by 
logical deduction from the biographical or contextual information. 
121 From this point forward in the thesis, the designators ‘positive’, ‘negative’, or ‘neutral’ (with or without 
quotation marks) will represent the emotive responses evoked by the experiences of eyewitnesses. ‘Positive’ 
responses are those which provide temporary hope or uplift of the senses, ‘Negative’ are those contributing to 
emotions such as depression, anger, or sense of loss, ‘Neutral’ are those where no emotional response is 
evoked. These designations will be occasionally reiterated throughout the text for ease of reading.  
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Figure 6: Encounters (101) with non-Jews over time: oral history samples, with trendlines 
 
 
As seen in Figure 6 above, the stories told by the memoir writers (Figure 7) also show that 
for every year of the regime in which they were in Germany (note these stories are for the 
years 1933-1938 only), they had more stories to tell about ‘positive’ encounters than 
‘negative’. In total, they described seventy-nine positive incidents and forty-nine negative. 
The trendline for negative stories moves down slightly, but the trendline for positive 
experiences moves down at a faster rate. Even though the rate of positive encounters 
dropped overall and was still moving downwards around the times the narrators left the 
country, it still maintains a higher position than the rate of negative encounters.  
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Figure 7: Encounters (128) with non-Jews over time: memoir samples, with trendlines 
 
Differences and similarities co-exist in the sample graphs. For example, the jumps in 
negative experiences in 1935 make it worth exploring further to see if empirical evidence 
about responses to the Nuremberg Laws can be distilled from personal narratives. 
Likewise, peaks in 1938 indicate another possible time period to further explore. The 
trends in negative experiences are slightly, but not dramatically different, in each of the 
samples. The oral histories graph records a significant downward trend where the written 
memoirs in Limberg record only a very slight trend down. Most significantly, however, the 
samples do not support the statements made by historians about deteriorating attitudes 
towards the Jewish population.  
 
It is beyond the parameters of this dissertation to speculate why the patterns in these 
samples emerge as they do.122 Nevertheless, both secondary and primary sources suggest 
factors that must be considered alongside any examination of the issue. Firstly, the policies 
of the regime meant Jewish contact with ‘Aryans’ was increasingly reduced to a 
minimum.123  Secondly, once deportations began, aside from those who successfully hid, 
                                                 
122 See Chapter Three for further information on the same topic found in Klemperer’s diaries.   
123 Hans Mommsen, ‘What Did the Germans Know about the Genocide of the Jews?’, in November 1938: 
From ‘Reichskristallnacht’ to Genocide, ed. Walter Pehle (New York, 1991), pp. 189-190. 
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Barkai tells us that only a few ageing Jews remained for anyone to have contact with.124 
Thirdly, for the ‘Aryan’ Germans, the personal stresses of war would have impacted all 
their relationships and behaviours, not just those with the Jewish outcasts.125 Fourthly, the 
impact of disillusionment must be weighed up, as suggested by one survivor:  
 
The young husband of the woman above us was killed. We heard her crying. She didn’t say 
“Heil Hitler” any more. She spoke in a very kind manner to my mother even before the end of 
the war after she had lost her husband. The Nazi time was over for her.126 
 
By undertaking a simple count method, we can see that while Jewish survivors told stories 
that conveyed the horror of what happened to them under the rule of the Nazi dictatorship, 
they also frequently indicated that the ‘ordinary’ Germans they encountered were not 
always unkind, rejecting or supportive of the regime’s actions. More often than not, the 
samples looked at here indicate that they told stories of kindness and encouragement. We 
cannot prove anything about the actions of the people from this method, but we can 
confidently state that the assertions of historians are, at the very least, misleading because 
they have relied on general statements and randomly selected examples that they have not 
proven to be representative of all the evidence. Just as importantly, we can see that if 
systematic analysis is applied to the study of personal narratives, it has the potential to give 
us further insight into what happened in relationships between Jews and non-Jews in the 
Third Reich. 
 
The samples of personal narratives examined in this chapter are flawed because of their 
smallness and the process of selectivity which they have undergone before being 
published. Yet those historians who do find it acceptable to quote from personal narratives 
appear to have had no qualms about using these, and other similar stories, to support their 
arguments. There is one primary source, frequently quoted by historians, which has fewer 
limitations because of the quality of the information it contains and the extent of its 
testimony. The 1933-1945 diaries of Victor Klemperer open a remarkable window to one 
man’s experiences. These diaries and the ways they can be analysed are the focus of 
Chapter Three.
                                                 
124 Avraham Barkai, ‘The German Volksgemeinschaft from the Persecution of the Jews to the ‘Final 
Solution’’, in Confronting the Nazi Past: New Debates on Modern German History, ed. Michael Burleigh 
(New York, 1996), p. 95. 
125 For examples of how all types of relationships were placed under strain, see Anonymous, A Woman in 
Berlin: Eight Weeks in the Conquered City (New York, 2005). 
126 Jewish female, 20, Hamburg in Crane, Divided Lives, p. 206. 
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Chapter Three 
The Diaries of Victor Klemperer 
 
Since they were first published in 1995, the diaries of Victor Klemperer have arguably 
become the single most frequently quoted personal testimony, written from a victim’s 
perspective, which has emerged from the Nazi era.1 Many historians quote from 
Klemperer’s diaries to support their interpretation of the relationship between Jewish and 
non-Jewish Germans under the Third Reich. The key question of this chapter is whether 
Klemperer actually says what historians claim that he says. To this end, I shall analyse 
systematically both the text of Klemperer's diary and the uses to which the diary has been 
put in the secondary literature. 
 
The reason why Klemperer has attracted so much scholarly attention is related to 
underlying trends in the historiography of Nazi Germany. In the early post-war years, 
historians had promoted the view that a totalitarian National Socialist regime had imposed 
its will, top-down, on Germany’s citizens.2  Eventually theories of Polykratie and ‘broadly 
diffused societal complicity’ emerged, which led to a shift in focus away from the power 
structures and activities of the regime to social-historical examinations of the ‘ordinary 
people’ in Germany. In this context, Klemperer’s diaries provided a unique window for 
scholars interested in viewing society from a ‘bottom-up’ approach. Klemperer’s 
comprehensive and even expert viewpoint made him well equipped to comment on the 
society in which he lived. He was not representative of the powerful elements of his 
society, but lived and moved among the ‘ordinary’ people. Because his diaries were 
articulate and detailed, they have proven to be an invaluable resource for historians 
interested in the sections of society who generally leave less of an imprint behind them 
than those who belong to the structures of power.3  
 
                                                 
1 Victor Klemperer, Ich will Zeugnis ablegen bis zum letzten: Tagebücher 1933-1945, Vol. I-II (Berlin, 
1995). The English translations mostly used here are: Victor Klemperer, I Shall Bear Witness: The Diaries of 
Victor Klemperer 1933-41 (London, 1998), and Victor Klemperer, I Will Bear Witness: A Diary of the Nazi 
Years 1942-1945 (New York, 2001). 
2 Geoff Eley, ‘Hitler’s Silent Majority? Conformity and Resistance under the Third Reich’ (Part One), 
Michigan Quarterly Review, 42:2 (2003), p. 391. 
3 See Miles Fairburn, Social History: Problems, Strategies and Methods (New York, 1999), p. 204. 
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Klemperer’s diaries quickly reached bestseller status and historians have since found them 
a valuable source of new information. 4 Steven Aschheim says: ‘These diaries constitute 
perhaps the most intricately detailed, sharply perceptive and painfully wrought chronicles 
of everyday life in the Third Reich (at least from the viewpoint of its victims) that we 
possess.’5 Henry Turner writes: ‘By far the most important German diary of the century for 
social history, it will long remain an indispensable source of information for anyone 
seriously interested in understanding modem Germany.’6 Walter Laqueur finds them 
‘worth whole libraries’ as a source of conveying what it was like to be a victim of the 
Third Reich.7   
 
While scholars are enthusiastic about Klemperer’s diaries as an historical source, they also 
express anxiety about why they have attracted so much interest from the general public, 
particularly in Germany.  A number of historians claim that non-academic readers 
misunderstand or misuse the diaries as they take quotations out of context in order to prove 
that ‘ordinary Germans’ did not, after all, treat Jews so badly. For example, Susanne Heim 
believes that German readers want to locate exoneration in some sort of mirror Klemperer 
held up to them.8  Heim herself finds no such absolution in the diaries. Instead, she claims, 
the frequent emphasis made by reviewers regarding the positive aspects of Klemperer’s 
interactions with ‘Aryans’ are proof of distortion of perception. It is not the mirror which is 
faulty, but the viewpoint of the observer.  Likewise, Omer Bartov repeatedly warns 
scholars who might be tempted to find anything in Klemperer other than German 
complicity with the Nazi regime. He claims that only highly selective reading of the text 
will find anything other than society turning against the Jews, and ‘tendentious historians’ 
will find the diaries useless because of Klemperer’s vacillations; his diaries cannot serve to 
provide an apology for ‘ordinary Germans’ in the Third Reich.’9 Although this begs the 
question of why historians feel the need to issue these warnings, and whether or not Heim, 
                                                 
4 Peter Gay, ‘Inside the Third Reich’, New York Times, 22 November 1998, p. BR15. See also Hans Reiss, 
‘Victor Klemperer (1881-1960): Reflections on His ‘Third Reich’ Diaries, German Life and Letters, 51:1 
(1998), p. 66. 
5 Steven Aschheim, ‘Comrade Klemperer: Communism, Liberalism and Jewishness in the DDR. The Later 
Diaries 1945-59’, Journal of Contemporary History, 36: 2 (2001), p. 325. 
6 Henry Turner, ‘Victor Klemperer's Holocaust’, German Studies Review, 22: 3 (1999), p. 385. See also 
Robert Gellately, Backing Hitler: Consent and Coercion in Nazi Germany (Oxford, 2001), p. 340. 
7 Walter Laqueur, ‘Three Witnesses: The Legacy of Viktor Klemperer, Willy Cohn, and Richard Koch’, 
Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 10:3 (1996), p. 261. 
8 Susanne Heim, ‘The German-Jewish Relationship in the Diaries of Victor Klemperer’ in Probing the 
Depths of German Antisemitism, ed. D. Bankier (New York, 2000), pp. 312, 325. 
9 Omer Bartov, Germany’s War and the Holocaust: Disputed Histories (Ithaca, N.Y., 2003), pp. 197 and 
199-200.  
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Bartov and others are right, Klemperer’s diaries are a rich source not yet fully mined for 
the wealth of information they contain. 
 
Being Klemperer  
Before ascertaining what insights can be elicited from the diaries, it is important to 
establish Klemperer’s credentials as a competent witness. As a professor of literature, he 
certainly possessed training and skills beyond those of many writers. His dismissal from 
his university post in 1935, calamitous though it was for him, probably served him well by 
freeing him to devote greater amounts of time to the writings that we now access.10 
Because he was married to an ‘Aryan’ he was afforded a measure of protection from the 
worst of the regime’s excesses, giving us, unusually, a full personal testimony from the 
beginning to the very end of the regime. Even the fateful bombing of Dresden, which came 
just as he was about to receive his deportation order, gave him opportunity to escape in the 
ensuing mêlée. This served to assist his capacity to present a complete testimony; many 
other personal narratives are cut short by death or exile.  
 
In addition to his fortuitous circumstances, the quality of the text makes it a highly 
valuable resource.11 No reviewer could do less than accept Klemperer’s writing was 
meticulous, observant and frequently astute, faithful in recording even the smallest of 
details, honest and unhesitating to expose even his own weaknesses or failings. His 
determination to provide an accurate record is evident from many remarks he made about 
his task: ‘I will bear witness, precise witness!’ and ‘I find it difficult to report everything in 
chronological order.’12 At other times he commented: ‘The changing details of everyday 
life are precisely what is most important,’ and ‘I want to go on observing, taking notes, 
studying until the last moment.’13 Even knowledge of the risks he exposed others to was 
                                                 
10 While working as a forced labourer, he would get up at 3.30 every morning to record the previous day’s 
events. Victor Klemperer, The Language of the Third Reich (London, 2006), p. 265. 
11 The original diaries, comprising 5,000 pages, are held in the Saechsischen Landesbibliothek, Dresden. The 
editor of the German editions, Walter Nowojski, notes in an appendix to the 1997 edition that he has made 
some cuts to the original text, mostly where there were multiple repetitions or Klemperer reproduced extracts 
from the press. Difficulties deciphering handwriting were overcome with the assistance of Klemperer’s 
widow, his second wife Hadwig. Rolf Dencker, http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrowse.pl?trx=vx&list=h-
german&month=9903&week=b&msg=3OlfeWA3c/3HzDSd/svMIw&user=&pw, 28 Sept. 2008.   Further 
cuts were made for the English translation, again mostly for reasons of repetition. Martin Chalmers, 
‘Introduction’ in Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, p. xxi.  
12 27 May 1942, 29 May 1942. Klemperer, Diary 1942-1945, p.61. 
13 10 December 1940, 21 July 1944. Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, p. 348, and Victor Klemperer, Diary 1942-
1945, p. 337. 
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not enough to deter him: ‘Eva [his wife] said I must not mention any name, must not put 
anyone at risk. Right—but how could I keep a precise record without names?’14 This 
exacting approach gives the text not only coherence but credibility. 
 
Klemperer’s motives for writing are also relevant to interpretation of the text. Translator 
Martin Chalmers comments that Klemperer’s diaries were not intended for publication.15 
Omer Bartov agrees, believing the diaries were ‘written only for himself.’16  Klemperer 
himself, however, seems to provide evidence contradicting these statements. He had been a 
prolific diarist in youthful adulthood, but early in the Nazi regime, he noted the shaping of 
an additional purpose for his daily record.17 He developed the determination to bear precise 
witness ‘to the very end’ and despite dread of being caught or that his efforts might be 
wasted, he viewed his writing as his duty, life calling, and his own personal heroism.18 
Less than a month after his return home after the collapse of the Nazi regime, he offered 
his diaries to a publisher and in subsequent entries over the next few months, agonized 
over how he was going to prepare the material for publication.19 When asked by an 
acquaintance to explain why he focused on everyday minutiae rather than on wider 
political developments, he replied: “It’s not the big things that are important to me, but the 
everyday life of tyranny, which gets forgotten. A thousand mosquito bites are worse than a 
blow to the head. I observe, note down the mosquito bites.”20 Throughout the diaries he 
makes it clear that his intent was to inform others, even though he frequently indicated that 
he himself did not expect to survive the Nazi period. To ensure the survival of his 
documents, he had them regularly smuggled away for safe-keeping, a few pages at a time. 
It seems he wanted to create a testimony intended for a memorial: comprehensive and 
public.21  
                                                 
14 29 January 1945. Klemperer, Diary 1942-1945, p. 398. 
15 Chalmers, ‘Introduction’ in Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, p. xx. 
16 Bartov, Disputed Histories, p. 196. 
17 19 August 1933. ‘From now on I want always to note briefly what occurs to me in relation to my 
memoirs.’ Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, p. 29. 
18 8 February 1942, 27 May 1942, 11 June 1942. Klemperer, Diary 1942-1945, pp. 12, 61, 75. 
19 23 June 1945. Victor Klemperer, The Lesser Evil: The Diaries of Victor Klemperer 1945-59 (London, 
2003), p. 12. By 1957, when LTI: Lingua Tertii Imperii was published, he no longer had intent to publish the 
diaries. Klemperer, Language, p. 9. In fact, the diaries were not actually published until long after 
Klemperer’s death, possibly because he lived in East Germany under the Soviet system and the diaries make 
many derogatory comments about communism.    
20 8 April, 1944, Klemperer, Diary 1942-1945, pp. 307-308. 
21 For pertinent remarks on the distinctive feature which separates Holocaust diaries from other diaries - the 
consciousness of belonging to and being accountable to a communal ordeal - see David Patterson Along the 
Edge of Annihilation: The Collapse and Recovery of Life in the Holocaust Diary (Seattle, 1999), pp. 21-22. 
Patterson believes this imparts a ‘spirit of testimony’ to diaries written by Jews. We cannot know what 
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While accuracy and detail were Klemperer’s concern, immediacy was his advantage. 
Klemperer mostly recorded events on the very day that they occurred, making questions 
about distortion of memories immaterial. Additionally, he was unable to cross-reference or 
contaminate text with later alterations because of his regular despatch of pages into hiding. 
There are, however, many gaps in the diaries, sometimes up to two weeks in length. In 
subsequent entries after such gaps, Klemperer often provides explanations and summarises 
events, recording incidents or conversations which had occurred during the interval.22 This 
means that although we clearly do not possess a record of every single day, we can assume 
that Klemperer was likely to have recorded any event or experience that he considered to 
be of significance.  
 
Understanding Klemperer’s character is fundamental to the interpretation of his text. 
Michael Burleigh remarks that value judgments about personalities are often missing from 
academic accounts. In Burleigh’s view, such judgments, although subjective, are 
important.23  In Klemperer’s case, commentators have not been slow to point out some of 
his outstanding personality characteristics. His translator lists traits of disarming honesty, 
directness, cantankerousness, suspicion, hypochondria and bad temper, which seem to 
resonate with most commentators, who sometimes add their own descriptions: ‘neurotic’, 
‘petty’, ‘frustrated’, ‘prickly’, ‘problematic personality’, and ‘fussy, vulnerable and 
idiosyncratic’.24 For the most part, however, historians list these traits but make no 
comment on their implication for our interpretation of Klemperer's text. Historians tend to 
focus on the information offered in the text without integrating understanding of 
Klemperer’s personality into their interpretation.  
 
Klemperer himself was extraordinarily candid in his self-analysis, given that he expected 
one day the diaries might be read by others. He made no attempt to hide his flaws. For 
                                                                                                                                                    
Klemperer would think of this theory, given he wanted to be German more than he wanted to be Jewish. But 
his firm resolve to bear witness gives credence to the possibility that he had an instinctive desire to represent 
the plight of the Jews through his testimony. 
22 For example, 19 October 1935. Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, pp. 130-131. Material included in the original 
German publication but edited out for the English translation is justified by the translator in the Introduction 
(p. xxi). For the most part these omitted passages bear no relevance to the argument of this thesis, but on the 
rare occasion that useful material exists within the omissions, the German-language edition is referenced. 
23 Michael Burleigh, The Third Reich: A New History (London, 2000), p. 931. 
24 Chalmers, ‘Introduction’ in Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, p. xx; Saul Friedländer, The Years of 
Extermination: Nazi Germany and the Jews, 1939-1945 (New York, 2008), p. 64;  Heim, p. 313; Aschheim, 
pp. 325, 326; and Gay, ‘Inside the Third Reich’, p. BR15. 
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instance, he regularly recorded, in somewhat comical fashion, his habit of stealing food 
from his neighbour.25 He was aware of his predilection towards pessimism in his writing. 
He told his second wife, Hadwig: “Ordinarily I am quite happy. But when I write I am sad 
‘til death. Maybe because when you write you begin to think over it all, and you hunch 
over as you write and, alors, you begin to be a pessimist.”26 Ultimately he was 
unconcerned about how he presented:  
 
Day and night (literally) I am dogged by thoughts of death and futility . . .  .Only [the 
regime’s] ending will show how I have spent the last part of my life, whether I shall be 
considered irresponsibly indolent and unprincipled or tenacious and self-assured or 
whether nobody will give a hoot, myself included. This last statement is 99 per cent 
likely.27 
 
Unawares, Klemperer revealed other important aspects of his personality. The key element 
of his character, which bears crucially on meaning in his text, appears mostly as a 
descriptor, passed over without scholarly recognition of the potential impact on the 
historical record. Peter Gay writes: ‘He exploited his flaws - his pedantry, obstinacy, self-
involvement - to make a masterpiece.’28 But Gay does not further explore the significance 
Klemperer’s self-involvement to discern just how essential it is to interpretation of the 
diaries.  
 
This self-involvement made Klemperer selfish, avowedly cold-hearted, hypochondriac, 
inordinately fearful of imminent death and careless in his relations with others. These 
qualities were not solely the consequence of Nazi pressures. Klemperer demonstrated the 
same tendencies in both his pre- and post- regime diaries.29 He knowingly placed others at 
risk and often revealed awareness of the dangers he brought to himself and others: ‘This 
scribbling, this manuscript in the house is undoubtedly a constant risk to my life—and also 
to some mentioned in it.’30 His lack of compassion for others troubled him sometimes: 
                                                 
25 16 March 1942, 24 March 1942, 6 June 1942, 26 June 1942, 20 July 1942, 10 August 1942, 16 August 
1942. Klemperer, Diary 1942-1945, pp. 29, 31, 68, 87, 104, 120, 123. 
26 Paula Weideger, Financial Times, 21 February 2004, www.j-bradford-
delong.net/movable_type/refs/Safari_Scrapbook3/Klemperer%20FT.html 
27 14 October 1940. Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, p. 343. 
28 Gay, ‘Inside the Third Reich’, p. BR16.  
29 For example: ‘Trude Öhlmann is without any doubt whatsoever at death's door . . .Once again this wasting 
away leaves me terribly cold. And again, as so often in recent years, this hideous sense of triumph: I am 
12 years older and will go on living. And always this mixture of indifference and dull fear: when will it be 
my turn?’ 31 October 1948. Klemperer, Diaries 1945-59, p. 270. 
30 5 April 1943, also see 24 June 1942, 27 September 1944. Klemperer, Diary 1942-1945, p. 212, 85, 364. 
Instances of identifying people and their anti-Nazi activities or sentiments are too numerous to record here, 
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‘When I woke up early this morning I thought with dismay of my own coldness of heart.’31 
He often lacked gratitude towards the many people who helped him and tended to dismiss 
them from memory once they were of no further use to him.32 One example of his lack of 
empathy was his response to the fate of property agent Helmut Richter, who often proved 
his support for Klemperer by slipping him provisions, making arrangements to assist him 
to retain ownership of his house against the regime’s efforts to dislodge him, and offering a 
hiding place if revolution should break out. Klemperer deduced Richter was involved in a 
conspiracy to overthrow the Nazis and had no hesitation in recording the information the 
man imprudently passed on to him.33 When Richter was arrested, the pity Klemperer felt 
for him was ‘odiously blunted’:  
 
My very first reaction was to be almost quietly pleased or amused, that my protector and 
guardian was now worse off than myself, that Aryans, too, were personally experiencing 
the hand of the tyranny . . . .But then I was tormented by what his arrest meant for us. Loss 
of bread coupons, loss of extra money . . . the house in great danger, for who will be the 
next trustee? 34 
The reason it is essential to understand Klemperer’s personality is that it can make a 
significant difference to analysis of his diaries. Failure to comprehend his character means 
we are likely to misinterpret meaning in the text. This has particular significance when his 
diaries are used as evidence by historians interested in the question of relations between 
Jewish and non-Jewish Germans under the Third Reich.35  
 
As we saw in Chapter One of this dissertation, there is a general (though not unchallenged) 
consensus amongst historians that non-Jewish Germans showed little concern for the plight 
of their Jewish compatriots. Such historians generally believe that the testimony supplied 
by Klemperer supports their pessimistic assessment of the behaviour and attitudes of 
‘ordinary Germans’.  Omer Bartov, for instance, describes ‘the “good Germans” who 
increasingly abandon him.’36 Susanne Heim also comments on: ‘the silent withdrawal of 
                                                                                                                                                    
but for example, he details the activities of two named Quakers who were covertly assisting Jews: 3 
December 1938, 15 December 1938, and 31 December 1938. Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, pp. 266, 269, 273. 
31 27 September 1936. Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, p. 182. 
32 When the most trustworthy of their friends, Annemarie Köhler, died of lung cancer in 1948, Klemperer 
wrote: ‘[The news] did and then again did not shake us. For us she had long ago become lifeless and virtually 
dead.’ 23 September 1948.  Klemperer, Diaries 1945-59, pp. 266.  
33 14 February 1943, 1 May 1943. Klemperer, Diary 1942-1945, pp. 199-201, 222. 
34 27 June 1943. Klemperer, Diary 1942-1945, pp. 241-242. Richter was eventually sent to Buchenwald and 
died as the result of his experiences there. Klemperer, Diaries 1945-59, pp. 550-551. 
35 Turner, ‘Victor Klemperer's Holocaust’, pp. 387-388. 
36 Bartov, Disputed Histories, p. 197. 
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acquaintances and colleagues and his gradual isolation, which seems to have hurt him more 
than the government-ordered harassment.’37  
 
At first glance it seems logical to fit Klemperer into the perceived pattern of abandonment 
of the Jews by the ‘ordinary’ citizens of Germany. After all, Klemperer often talks of his 
feelings of isolation and abandonment with pained exclamations such as: ‘Our terrible 
abandonment by all friends.’38 For two reasons, however, his complaints should not 
necessarily be taken at face value and should always be contextualised.  
 
Firstly, Klemperer’s comments must be placed in context because he was sometimes 
mistaken in his assessments of presumed abandonment. On 8 May 1940 he recorded his 
thoughts about his friend Annemarie:  
 
I have to see that I get some money from Annemarie Köhler. I had wanted to break with 
her completely, since she has not been here since autumn (pleaded heart trouble, as if she 
had not taken a taxi before); I can no longer afford to be sensitive. 39 
 
The next day, he re-thought his original opinion: 
 
Cordially received by Annemarie, who with her puffy face really does look ailing. Perhaps 
her staying away really was not intended as a slight to us.40  
 
Two months later, Klemperer discovered the extent of her illness:  
 
Annemarie . . . much and very depressingly changed. Swollen face, both eyes infected like 
a bulldog’s, constant cough. She evidently has serious heart disease.41 
 
In spite of this, in a fit of post-birthday depression, he seems to have forgotten her 
circumstances and lumped her in with others who he felt had abandoned him: 
 
On the 9th I became aware not only of my age, but also of my terrible isolation. Cool lines 
from Annemarie Köhler, who has not come to see us for at least one and a half years. 
Johannes Köhler, Fräulein Carlo, my former colleagues – where are they? ‘When all 
become unfaithful’, one would need to believe in a bon dieu.42  
 
He continued to question Annemarie’s loyalty into the following year:  
 
At Annemarie’s . . . .With heavy heart – she has not come to see us for two years. Fear? 
Disloyalty? – But she was completely unaffected, warm, passionately anti [Nazi] . . . .She 
                                                 
37 Heim, p. 321. 
38 14 September 1936. Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, p. 182. 
39 8 May 1940. Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, p. 320. 
40 9 May 1940. Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, p. 322. 
41 26 July 1940. Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, p. 335. 
42 14 October 1940. Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, p. 343. 
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really cannot get away, . . . all the work of the clinic is on her shoulders, also she has 
serious heart problems. (She has an unnaturally thick, swollen head, a constant dry 
cough).43  
 
Clearly there were extenuating circumstances to explain Annemarie’s lack of contact and 
Klemperer either forgot or ignored them as he continued to question her loyalty. A cursory 
or unsystematic analysis of the diaries could easily miss the point that at least some 
instances of perceived abandonment in fact have other explanations.     
 
Secondly, it is important to contextualise Klemperer’s comments in light of his personality, 
which allowed frequent vacillations between angry despair and consoling hope. He often 
made statements which contradicted views that he had expressed earlier when in a different 
mood. We have to assess whether his comments were the product of momentary despair or 
a reflection of his actual and thoughtful opinion. In other words, we need to establish 
whether Klemperer's comments about abandonment are typical and representative of his 
evidence overall. When one analyses the text systematically, it becomes apparent that his 
references to abandonment are usually more the result of the specific circumstances of the 
time than of a deep-seated and considered opinion.   
 
Omer Bartov’s choice is to take Klemperer’s comments at face value, as evidence of how 
Klemperer was abandoned by his non-Jewish friends and colleagues. Bartov writes: ‘By 
December 1936, as his telephone line is cut, and his housekeeper is no longer allowed to 
work for him, and his friends are either in exile or with the Nazis, Klemperer 
acknowledges that he is “completely alone, absolutely alone.”’44  But Bartov makes no 
attempt to contextualise Klemperer’s comment, or systematically evaluate whether, on the 
basis of this quotation, it is legitimate to conclude that Klemperer really had been 
abandoned. A brief survey of the six month period before this diary entry will allow us to 
determine how Klemperer’s feelings of isolation were supported by his actual experiences.  
 
On 9 June 1936, Klemperer received a visitor: ‘On Thursday the young Köhlers came to us 
in tears. His mother has died . . . .His father faces instant dismissal if they associate with 
us.’ Klemperer noted Köhler’s ‘conflict of conscience, tears of nervous exhaustion’ and 
                                                 
43 21 May 1941. Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, p. 368. 
44 Bartov, Disputed Histories, p. 206. Diary entry: 8 December 1936. Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, p. 193. 
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wrote: ‘I cannot find it in myself to blame their Johannes so very much.’45 To avoid 
placing the family at risk, Klemperer sent a wreath and condolence letter instead of 
attending the funeral in person. At the time, Klemperer uncharacteristically seemed to hold 
no hard feelings against Johannes, but was irked by the subsequent lack of contact when 
thenceforth young Köhler failed to send his usual birthday, Christmas or New Year’s 
greetings. Klemperer apparently never had contact with him again.46 Johannes’ widowed 
father, who faced dismissal from his job as a railway inspector, did however risk a ‘thank 
you’ visit for the expressions of sympathy later in June, albeit under cover of darkness.47 In 
the six months between young Köhler’s visit and the date of Bartov’s quote, Klemperer 
made thirty-six diary entries, with his ‘terrible abandonment by all friends’ comment 
appearing roughly in the middle (14 September 1936). In that period, he recorded receiving 
or making social visits thirty-five times. He was visited in his home thirteen times by non-
Jewish Germans, made two visits to the homes of non-Jews and was contacted twice by 
(other) non-Jews asking if they could pay a visit. In the same period he also received visits 
from Jewish friends, relatives or non-Germans (Italian) twelve times and made visits out to 
Jews six times, including two funerals. The totals show that he had social contact with 
various ‘Aryans’ seventeen times and with Jews eighteen times in this ‘lonely’ period. At 
the same time he was out and about substantially more than previously because of frequent 
excursions he and Eva made in their newly acquired car.48 Klemperer was no doubt being 
entirely sincere when, on 8 December, he complained that he felt ‘completely alone, 
absolutely alone’. But it is more likely that his misery at this time was precipitated by the 
illness he had suffered in the previous days, his dire financial situation, and by the fact that 
his phone had been cut off. Bartov is mistaken to assume that Klemperer's comment was an 
accurate reflection of his social situation. Here sits no supporting proof of ‘terrible 
abandonment by all friends’.  
 
In general, to what use have historians put Klemperer’s diaries? Some use them in a 
descriptive sense, helping to build their narrative without specific analysis of the text. For 
an example (previously noted), Richard Evans mentions Klemperer’s responses to the new 
Autobahn in the context of discussing new developments in German technology under the 
                                                 
45 9 June 1936. Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, p. 161. 
46 28 December 1937, 8 January 1938. Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, pp. 233, 237. Johannes Köhler is never 
mentioned again in any subsequent diary entries. 
47 26 June 1936. Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, p. 164. 
48 6 March 1936. Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, p. 148. 
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Nazis.49 Others use his text by analysing and interpreting it to support their arguments, 
most typically in discussion of the behaviour of ‘ordinary’ Germans towards outcasts. An 
article in Commentary magazine by journalist and historian Daniel Johnson makes no 
pretensions to being a scholarly investigation but is worth mentioning here because of the 
sentiments he expresses which resonate with those of many historians.50 He begins his 
discussion by saying:  
 
Klemperer's tribulations, recorded in minute detail, make unmistakably clear just how 
badly most ordinary Germans of the 30’s and 40’s did in fact treat their Jewish neighbors.51  
Furthermore: 
It is true that he mentions occasional acts of generosity to Jews by individual Germans, but 
these acts were rare and seldom involved serious risk. They were far outweighed by the 
instances of petty cruelty, especially from those in any position of authority.52  
His final conclusions on the diaries are not surprising:  
Klemperer bears witness, alas, not to the decency of most ordinary Germans, but to their 
moral cowardice. 53  
His parting shots are aimed at twenty-first century Germans:  
Typical of the German mindset is the unwillingness, or refusal, to take cognizance of 
certain uncongenial interpretations of the past . . . . A closer reading of the Klemperer 
diaries would cure [readers] of any illusions about what wartime Germans knew or wanted 
concerning the Jews. But no such closer reading is likely to take place, and for reasons the 
diaries themselves make clear. Truly to immerse oneself in this modern classic is to find 
oneself wondering, and not for the first time, whether the mentality of national self-
deception and willful ignorance that it so brilliantly depicts will ever, like the ideology of 
National Socialism, fade into history. 54 
Johnson barely bothers to present evidence to support his claims, which is disturbing 
because of the degree of exposure they receive by being published in a magazine with wide 
readership. But more disturbing is the way some academic scholars have arrived at similar 
conclusions by using Klemperer’s text in particular ways that ignore good historical 
method. Two such examples worth examining here come from Bartov and Heim.  
 
                                                 
49 Richard Evans, The Third Reich in Power: How the Nazis Won over the Hearts and Minds of a Nation 
(London, 2005), p. 326.  
50 Daniel Johnson, ‘What Victor Klemperer Saw’, Commentary, 109: 6 (2000), pp. 44-50. 
51 Ibid., p. 45. 
52 Ibid., p. 49. 
53 Ibid., p. 49. 
54 Ibid., p. 50. 
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Bartov’s Klemperer  
Bartov’s commentary on Klemperer’s diaries is found as a chapter in his book, Germany’s 
War and the Holocaust: Disputed Histories, published in 2003.  This work sets out to 
critically analyse recent literature and interpretations of Germany’s war, the genocidal 
policies of the Nazi regime and the reconstruction of German and Jewish identities.55 The 
chapter is a reprint of a review essay previously published in The New Republic.56  
 
According to Bartov, Klemperer’s diaries provide us with ‘a view of German society under 
Nazism by the perfect insider who is rapidly transformed by the regime’s ideology and its 
internalization by the population (italics mine) into the ultimate outsider.’57 While 
Bartov’s core theme is Klemperer’s agonising struggle to maintain his German identity, 
there is also a sub-theme he wants his readers to detect:  
 
The world that we see through Klemperer’s eyes is a world in which most (though not all) 
Germans gradually turned their backs on the Jews, excluding them from their midst partly 
out of prejudice or conviction, partly out of fear and opportunism, and partly out of 
indifference and moral callousness.58  
 
Only misrepresentative, highly selective reading of the text, claims Bartov, allows 
consideration of Klemperer as an apologist for ‘ordinary Germans’.59 To support his dual 
themes, Bartov directly or indirectly quotes Klemperer 110 times and lists a chronology of 
events within which Klemperer’s struggle is contextualised. The picture which emerges 
undoubtedly indicts the ordinary people. Bartov provides no explanation of how he 
analysed Klemperer’s text or distilled the 110 references from the diaries. Instead, it 
appears we are expected to trust that his selection of quotes is representative of 
Klemperer’s text as a whole. 
 
                                                 
55 Omer Bartov, Germany’s War and the Holocaust: Disputed Histories (Ithaca, N.Y., 2003). To note 
Bartov’s context: Bartov is a recognised authority on warfare and genocide and this monograph on 
Klemperer steps slightly outside his normal area of expertise. It is possible that analysis of a diary such as 
Klemperer’s is not familiar territory for Bartov, which provides a possible partial explanation for some of the 
errors he has made. However, this explanation could not serve to excuse the extent of misrepresentation 
discussed in this chapter.  
56 Omer Bartov, ‘The Last German’, The New Republic, 219:26 (Dec. 1998), pp. 34-42. In this thesis I have 
referenced the page numbers from the chapter in Bartov’s book, but my analysis is based on the journal 
article because the journal arguably has wider readership and hence more opportunity for influencing 
opinions. The text alterations (some minor insertions) made for the book edition of the essay have no effect 
on my argument. 
57 Bartov, Disputed Histories, p. 196. 
58 Ibid., p. 197. 
59 Ibid., pp. 197, 199, 213. 
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In order to ascertain whether Bartov’s selection is, in fact, representative of Klemperer’s 
diaries, it is necessary to evaluate systematically both Klemperer’s text and Bartov’s 
representation of Klemperer’s text. The majority of the quotes Bartov has chosen to use 
reflect Klemperer’s opinion or interpretation of what he observes and they can be divided 
into eight categories (Figure 8). Each category is assigned a value of positive, negative, or 
neutral according to the emotional effect on Klemperer: 60  
1. Klemperer’s beliefs about his identity as a German.61  
2. Klemperer’s attempts to analyse the relationship between the Nazi regime and 
Germany.62  
3. Klemperer’s expressions of emotion or state of mind.63  
4. Klemperer’s appraisal of the vox populi: the opinions, beliefs, and ‘mood’ of the 
‘ordinary’ Germans, which had a negative effect on him.64   
5. Klemperer’s record of the vox populi of Jewish acquaintances he encountered.   
6. Klemperer’s appraisal of the vox populi (of ‘ordinary Germans’) that had a positive 
effect on him.65 
7. Klemperer’s record of specific incidents, which had negative effect on him.   
8. Klemperer’s record of specific incidents, which had positive effect on him.66   
 
The first six categories contain Bartov’s references from Klemperer’s diaries which are 
based on Klemperer’s subjective assessments. The last two categories provide more 
‘objective’ information because they describe specific incidents, not opinions. If we 
                                                 
60 Positive effect – providing temporary hope or uplift of the senses. Negative effect – contributing to 
emotions such as depression, anger, or sense of loss. Neutral – no emotional effect. 
61 Although they are subjective and carry negative emotional weighting, Klemperer’s comments on his 
identity as German have been allocated neither negative nor positive status for this analysis. Rather, they are 
designated neutral because they tend to be more analytical than emotive. 
62 An example of Bartov’s quotes from Klemperer which fit in this category is where Bartov writes: ‘The 
[LTI] study was intended to demonstrate how the “completely unchecked” leaders of Nazi Germany “seek to 
unscrupulously stupefy a silent mass…”’ Bartov, Disputed Histories, p. 198. Klemperer: extracted from a 
lengthy passage describing his harrowing eight-day jail term, 20 July 1941. 
63 For example: “Head held high for the difficult last five minutes!” Bartov, Disputed Histories, p. 212. 
Klemperer: 31 December 1941. 
64 For example, Bartov quotes him saying: “Hitlerism is after all more deeply and firmly rooted in the nation 
and corresponds more to the German nature than I would like to admit.” Bartov, Disputed Histories, pp. 206-
207. Klemperer: 13 July 1937.  I use the term vox populi in the sense Klemperer used it throughout his 
diaries, denoting just not what the people had to say on various matters but also their beliefs and opinions as 
interpreted by Klemperer. See for example 15 January 1944, Klemperer, Diary 1942-1945, p. 289. 
65 For example: ‘In August, [Klemperer] can still detect “not a shred of politics, no anti-Semitism,” and he 
“cannot believe that the mood of the masses is really still behind Hitler.”’ Bartov, Disputed Histories, p. 202. 
Klemperer: 19 August 1933. 
66 For example, where a former colleague (albeit wearing a Party badge) publicly and warmly greets 
Klemperer. Bartov, Disputed Histories, p. 206. Klemperer: 20 June 1937. 
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tabulate Bartov’s references to Klemperer across these eight categories, the results are as 
seen in Figure 8.  
25
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2
17
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Belief: about German identity (25 neutral)
Opinion: on the regime in relation to Germany (35 negative)
Feelings: betrayal, loss, anger, etc. (9 negative)
Vox populi: 'ordinary' Germans (12 negative)
Vox populi: Jew s (7 negative)
Vox populi: 'ordinary' Germans (2 positive)
Incident record (17 negative)
Incident record (3 positive)
 
Figure 8: Klemperer as quoted by Bartov 67 
 
For the most part, Bartov builds his case upon Klemperer’s subjective comments, rather 
than the more ‘objective’ data described in specific incidents. Most categories of 
statements quoted by Bartov are not only subjective, but also relate to depressive feelings 
or impressions experienced by Klemperer. In conveying Klemperer’s gloomy state of 
mind, his fear, sense of loss, bitterness and anger, they can be designated ‘negative’: 
pessimistic, unfavourable, melancholic and characteristic of Klemperer’s wretched 
experience of being Jewish under the Nazis. With some justification, Bartov presents 
Klemperer’s life as generally unrelenting misery and degradation.  
 
Taken as a whole, Bartov’s 110 references from Klemperer’s diaries divide into eighty 
‘negative’ statements, five ‘positive’ statements, and twenty-five ‘neutral’ statements 
(Figure 9): 
72%
5%
23%
Negative (80)
Positive (5)
No emotive value (25)
 
Figure 9: Experiential emotive values assigned to Bartov's Klemperer quotes 
 
                                                 
67 The colours used for categories/statements in graphs throughout the thesis are: ‘neutral’ (ivory), ‘negative’ 
(magenta), and ‘positive’ (blue). 
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For this analysis, we are most interested in the sub-theme of Bartov’s essay, which is the 
behaviour or attitudes of ‘ordinary Germans’ toward Jewish people.  His main theme is 
Klemperer’s struggle with his German identity and we can discard his twenty-five 
Klemperer quotes on this subject as they are not relevant to the attitudes or behaviour of 
people. We can also eliminate Klemperer’s thirty-five comments on the Nazi regime 
because although the regime clearly affected all Germans, this category of quotes focuses 
on the actions of the authorities against Jews, for example, Klemperer’s further loss of 
identity when he is forced to change his name to Victor-Israel, or his reception of news 
about the establishment of the Polish ghetto.68  The nine quotes relating to Klemperer’s 
feelings are illustrative but cannot serve as evidence of the behaviour of others.  Similarly, 
Bartov’s seven quotes related to opinions offered by Jews also do not address the 
behaviour of non-Jews.69  
 
After discarding Bartov’s quotes that do not deal with the attitudes and behaviours of 
‘ordinary’ people towards the Jews, we are left with just thirty-four instances where Bartov 
quotes from Klemperer’s diaries. Fourteen of these are Klemperer’s opinion and if they 
were to be analysed for their contextual validity, they would necessarily have to be 
weighed against other statements by the diarist which suggest an opposite viewpoint. 
Bartov is correct to say that Klemperer vacillated, offering inconsistencies, contradictions 
and a whole range of emotions.70 He was just as likely to say: “Hitler really was in line 
with the will of the German people,” as ‘No-one, whether inside or outside, can fathom the 
true mood of the people,’ or ‘There is no doubt that the people feel the persecution of the 
Jews to be a sin.’71  Even if extensive analysis was applied to all instances of Klemperer’s 
opinion throughout the diaries, the resulting picture would still reflect only his opinion: 
subjective and not able to be externally verified. This means that it is dangerous to build a 
picture based on Klemperer’s opinions. They are just opinions, no more, no less.  
 
The remaining twenty quotes in Bartov’s catalogue of comments from Klemperer provide 
a firmer foundation for an analysis of how the people behaved toward the Jews. They are 
based on actual events and experience – things that actually happened to Klemperer or that 
                                                 
68 Bartov, Disputed Histories, pp. 208, 209-210. Klemperer: 24 August 1938, 11 August 1940. 
69 Bartov’s quotes from Klemperer that reflect the vox populi of Jewish acquaintances (category 5) are 
typically concerned with Klemperer’s disgust over the attitudes of fellow-Jews who are pro-Zionist, fear 
communism more than Hitler, or appear to accept the disintegrating situation.  
70 Bartov, Disputed Histories, pp. 199-200. 
71 10 January 1937, 22 January 1939, 4 October 1941. Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, pp. 199, 281, 419. 
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he witnessed. Thus, they provide a more ‘objective’ picture of Klemperer’s experiences. 
These references consist of seventeen negative experiences for Klemperer and three 
positive. This begs the question of Bartov’s selection process. On what basis did he decide 
to note the anti-Semitic attitudes of one colleague instead of the loyalty of other colleagues 
or Hitler Youth abuse directed at Klemperer instead of verbal encouragement from a 
stranger on the street? 72 Does Bartov’s selection of incidents reflect his own opinion on 
the relative proportion of positive or negative attitudes towards Jews? How representative 
of Klemperer’s experiences are these incidents?  
 
To provide the reader with contextual background, Bartov supplements his analysis with a 
chronology of actual events (as opposed to opinions) drawn from the diary from the 
beginning of the Nazi regime to the end of 1941.  Bartov lists sixty-one events in his 
chronology: forty-three of which describe actions taken by the Nazi regime against the 
Jews in general and eighteen incidents which involve Klemperer’s personal interactions 
(Figure 10).73 Of these personal experiences, five were with Jewish Germans and thirteen 
involved non-Jewish Germans. Just three of these instances – ‘fleeting flashes in the 
darkness’ – suggest Klemperer also recorded some positive encounters.74 Overall, as we 
can see from both Figures 9 and 10, Bartov gives his readers the impression that 
Klemperer’s experience of interactions with non-Jewish Germans was overwhelmingly 
negative.  
71%
16%
8%
5% 43 negative regime policy
actions against Jew s (70.5%)
10 negative personal
experiences w ith 'ordinary'
Germans (16.4%)
5 negative personal
experiences w ith Jew ish
Germans (8.2%)
3 instances of positive
experiences (4.9%)
 
Figure 10: Chronology of events listed by Bartov 
 
Having now constructed a picture of what Bartov claims that Klemperer says, we can now 
proceed to analyse what Klemperer actually does have to tell us about his relationships 
                                                 
72 Bartov, Disputed Histories, pp. 204, 212. 17 June 1934, Postscript to 1935, 1 November 1941, 16 March 
1942, 19 April 1942. Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, pp. 69, 137-138, 423 and Diary 1942-1945, pp. 41. 
73 The discrepancy of two events between Figure 1 and Bartov’s chronology discussed here concern events 
Klemperer had heard of (suicides and deportations) but not personally experienced.  
74 Bartov, Disputed Histories, pp. 206, 209, 211. 
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with non-Jewish Germans. If we count every instance of reported interaction between 
Klemperer and non-Jewish Germans (Bartov’s ‘ordinary Germans’), for the entire period 
of the regime, a picture emerges that is very different to that provided by Bartov. A 
systematic analysis of Klemperer’s text reveals that he recorded more ‘positive’ than 
‘negative’ interactions with non-Jewish Germans (Figure 11).  
 
The discussion which more fully explains these results occurs later in this chapter. For 
now, it is sufficient to note that there appears to be a substantial discrepancy between 
Bartov’s representation of Klemperer’s experiences with non-Jewish Germans and the 
evidence that is actually found in the diaries. Even if Bartov’s notations of regime-inflicted 
experiences are discarded, leaving just Klemperer’s notes of encounters with non-Jewish 
people, the negative impression proportionately outweighs the positive impression. Figure 
12 shows just how much Bartov’s sample of Klemperer’s negative and positive 
experiences is proportionately different from Klemperer’s actual record.  
67%
13%
20%
Positive experiences (302)
Negative experiences (60)
Neutral experiences (91)
 
Figure 11: Experiential values based on actual incident count in Klemperer’s 1933-1945 diaries  
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Figure 12: Comparison: Bartov's sample of Klemperer's experiences/Klemperer’s own account 
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In an article which is chiefly focussed on Klemperer’s internal struggle to maintain his 
German identity, how incumbent upon Bartov is it to reflect accurately the balance of 
Klemperer’s positive and negative encounters with non-Jewish Germans? There is no 
disputing that life became terrible for Klemperer, as for any Jew in Germany, and the 
never-ending succession of measures taken against the Jews by the regime made for 
unmitigated misery. However, the worst of the excesses were visited upon Klemperer by 
the authorities and the aspects of his life which caused the most misery were the cruelties 
such as the brutal house searches by the Gestapo, the agony of being forced to euthanize a 
beloved pet, the loss of his home, and the restrictions on just about all aspects of life. The 
objects of Bartov’s secondary theme are the ‘ordinary Germans’ and his assertion of how 
they behaved when they encountered Jews should be considered separately from the 
legislated ruthlessness of the authorities.  
 
Nevertheless, Bartov has tied the actions of the regime to the guilt of the German people as 
a whole. The issue of whether the people behaved as bystanders, passive and indifferent, 
hence facilitating the behaviour of the regime, is not under discussion. Bartov has made an 
assertion about their active behaviour: non-Jewish Germans turned their backs on Jewish 
German Jews and excluded them from their midst.75 By implication the emotional and 
tangible effects of the regime’s behaviour are also imposed by the people. 
 
In order to persuade the reader of his thesis, Bartov quotes selectively from Klemperer. At 
one point in his chronological account, Bartov writes: 
 
In October, the reports multiply of deportations of Jews from Germany to Poland . . . .That 
the isolated Jews in Dresden knew about these deportations reveals once more that none of 
this was unknown to Germans. Indeed, Klemperer asks: “Who among the ‘Aryan’ 
Germans is really untouched by National Socialism? The contagion rages in all of them, 
perhaps it is not a contagion, but basic German nature.” In November he is abused by some 
Hitler Youth in the street.76 
 
The actual diary entries cited by Bartov read more fully:  
                                                 
75 A small but important distinction is necessary (discussed later in this chapter), which distinguishes between 
the behaviour of non-Jews and the way Jews experienced it. For example, an encounter, such as derogatory 
remarks about Jews on a tram, may involve classifiably ‘neutral’ behaviour on the part of the non-Jew 
because there was no element of intent toward the Jew, yet the Jew may find it a ‘negative’ experience 
because of the depressive effect on mood it causes. Conversely, a complaint on a tram about the regime (no 
intent towards the Jew, hence ‘neutral’ behaviour) may bring a temporary uplift or sense of hope to the Jew, 
having a positive effect. 
76 Bartov, Disputed Histories, pp. 211-212. 
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Ever more shocking reports about deportations of Jews to Poland. . . [details] . . . . A letter 
from Missy Meyerhof about it . . . [Klemperer complains about a Jewish birthday coffee 
afternoon where ladies exult over real coffee and cake while weeping over bad news] . . . 
And letters read out from Berlin, Frankfurt, Essen. – ‘This one’s aunt has hanged herself – 
her sister wanted to throw herself in front of a train – I had palpitations – the cakes …’  
 
On the same day, Klemperer reports the latest speculation circulating about the war: 
anticipated victory over the Soviets followed by a military coup with a new government 
that makes peace with England: 
 
One who is of this opinion . . . is here again, Ludwig Voss, Kätchen’s brother-in-law . . . 
He abhors Hitler, but he abhors the English just as much. ‘In 1919 they forced us off the 
pavement with their riding whips. Servitude under Churchill would perhaps be even worse 
than under Hitler.’ Herr Ludwig Voss is not entirely sound after all. It gave him pleasure to 
put together his Proof of Ancestry. I always ask myself: Who among the ‘Aryan’ Germans 
is really untouched by National Socialism? The contagion rages in all of them, perhaps it is 
not a contagion, but basic German nature.77 
 
When the text is considered in its entirety and context, it is possible to construct an 
alternate reading of Klemperer’s words. The news about these deportations was conveyed 
in private letters, written by victims’ relatives, which circulated in Jewish circles. There is 
no clear evidence that the letters were shared with the ‘Aryan’ public who did not have 
close contacts among the Jews. We can therefore question Bartov’s assertion that 
Klemperer’s comment is proof of widespread knowledge of the deportations. Klemperer’s 
distress over ‘contagion’ is prompted by the fact that Herr Voss enjoyed complying with 
Nazi demands to prove his ancestry and failed to discriminate accurately the difference 
between rule under Hitler or the English. For this Klemperer despises him and he transfers 
this scorn to all Germans. Voss was an ‘Aryan’ who openly visited a Jewish relative in the 
Judenhaus. He was clearly not participating in persecution of the Jews nor even turning his 
back on them. Rather, he had foolishly succumbed to elements of National Socialist 
ideology. Nonetheless, Bartov’s implication is that here is proof of deliberate anti-Semitic 
attitudes amongst the people.78 
 
Klemperer’s experience with Hitler Youth, albeit distressing for him, takes on the 
appearance of childish taunting when examined in its entirety:  
 
                                                 
77 25 October 1941. Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, p. 421. 
78 Curiously, Friedländer uses the same passage to make the same point while contrasting public sympathy 
for star wearers with Klemperer’s ostensible detection of anti-Semitic attitudes.  Friedländer, Years of 
Extermination, p. 253. 
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Was for the first time subjected to some abuse the day before yesterday. At Chemnitzer 
Platz a section of Hitler Youth cubs. ‘A yid, a yid!’ Yelling they run towards the dairy I am 
just entering. I can still hear them shouting and laughing outside. When I come out, they 
are lined up. I look calmly at their commander, not a word is spoken. Once I am past, 
behind me, but not called out loudly, one, two voices: ‘A yid!’79 
 
He then describes another incident two hours later where a shop employee kindly 
encourages him: ‘It doesn’t matter about the star, we’re all human beings, and I know such 
good Jews.’ Klemperer mournfully records this consolation has not cheered him much and 
once again, ponders which of the two incidents is the true vox populi. But the significant 
element to note is that, almost ten years into the regime, for the first time he experiences 
abuse because he is Jewish.80 This remark is made after many years of official abuse. 
Without perhaps fully realising it, Klemperer is drawing a distinction between the Nazi 
regime and its subjects.  
 
It is evident that even direct quotes can be used to convey a different impression from that 
conveyed in the original text if they are removed from their context or arranged in a 
particular order. The key point is not that Bartov is necessarily wrong to assert that there 
was widespread anti-Semitism among ‘ordinary’ Germans. It is not the purpose of this 
dissertation to assess the degree to which Jewish Germans were shunned by non-Jewish 
Germans. The key point is simply that, even if Bartov’s overall conclusion is correct, the 
manner in which he uses the evidence from Klemperer’s diaries is problematic. Bartov 
takes quotes out of context and creates an overall impression through selective referencing 
that is not representative of Klemperer’s entire text.  
 
Heim’s Klemperer  
Another historian who has written at length on Victor Klemperer is Susanne Heim.81  In 
contrast to Bartov, who saw Klemperer as the ‘perfect insider’, Heim refers to him as an 
‘outsider’ neither fully anchored in his German identity or in Judaism. Nevertheless, the 
two historians do find common ground in their suspicion that the immense public interest 
                                                 
79 1 November 1941. Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, p. 423. 
80 Klemperer was undoubtedly identifiable as Jewish because of the Jew’s star, which by this date he had 
worn for about six weeks. Note that the first public labelling of him as Jewish was 20 March 1938 when 
yellow bills with the Star of David were attached to his fence.  
81 Susanne Heim, ‘The German-Jewish Relationship in the Diaries of Victor Klemperer’ in Probing the 
Depths of German Antisemitism, ed. D. Bankier (New York, 2000). 
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generated by the diaries is because readers believe they provide some sort of exoneration 
for non-Jews accused of rejecting Jews.82 Neither has found that the diaries provide such 
vindication. Heim in particular asserts that the error is located in the faulty perception of 
those vainly looking for exculpation. Throughout her essay, perception stands as a key 
reference point: not only addressing the perception of those seeking exoneration for 
German society, but also the perception of Klemperer as he bears witness and the 
perception of the Germans who lived under the regime. She identifies Klemperer’s purpose 
as being to record ‘every possible indication of an impending collapse of the Nazi 
regime’.83  
 
Heim’s own focus in examining the diaries is the relationship between Jewish and non-
Jewish Germans as she questions how much support Jews received from the Germans (by 
whom she means non-Jewish German society distinct from the Gestapo). Her conclusion is 
that Jews found few people they could rely on because the Germans were engaged in 
‘silent complicity’ with their leaders.84  She asserts that the German people, even the few 
who were prepared to help Jews, erected ‘psychic barriers’ which prevented them from 
having to fully comprehend the troubles of the Jewish population.  
 
Before we consider Heim’s analysis, it is important to identify the context within which 
she operates. In 1991 she published a controversial book, co-authored with Götz Aly, 
which laid out the thesis that the Holocaust was shaped by a programme of economic 
rationalization and modernization undertaken by young technocrats. These economists, 
demographic planners, agriculturalists and racial theorists operated within the middle and 
lower ranks of the government system.85 Aly and Heim’s theory firmly locates the impetus 
for the Holocaust away from the top-ranking Nazi ideologues to those who inhabited the 
world of bureaucracy, in other words, ‘ordinary’ people.  Heim’s underlying viewpoint 
needs to be born in mind when one considers her analysis of Klemperer’s diaries. She is 
obligated by her own hypothesis, unless she is willing to engage with the process of re-
                                                 
82 Bartov, Disputed Histories, p. 199, and Heim, pp. 312-313, 325. 
83 Heim, p. 315. 
84 Ibid., p. 321. 
85 Götz Aly and Susanne Heim, Vordenker der Vernichtung: Auschwitz und die deutschen Pläne für eine 
neue europäische Ordnung (Hamburg, 1991). Later translated and published as Architects of Annihilation: 
Auschwitz and the Logic of Destruction (London, 2002). Parts of the translated book were edited and some 
text omitted, but the original thesis remained the same. 
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assessment, to take a particular stance – one which establishes the guilt of the ordinary 
people. 
 
Heim initially validates Klemperer as a witness. She describes his ‘meticulousness’ and 
‘virtually obsessive desire to bear witness’ where his ‘painstaking attention to detail . . . 
comes to represent Klemperer’s unusual perceptiveness, a balance between proximity and 
distance from his object.’86  But she then issues a warning: Klemperer was not a neutral 
chronicler and therefore the value of his testimony as a historical source is undermined.  
This, she claims, is because two predispositions led him to overestimate any indications 
that helped to sustain his feelings.87 These predispositions were his desperate search for 
clues that the regime might be coming to an end and his need to defend his own German 
identity. In this neediness, Klemperer ‘repeatedly pinned his hopes on indications that 
Germans did not generally agree with Nazi policies.’ In this, Heim believes, he was 
disappointed: he was forced to acknowledge a general lack of interest in the fate of the 
Jews and secret support for anti-Jewish policies.88  
 
In this manner Heim establishes a hierarchy of significance which has considerable impact 
on the way she reads Klemperer’s text. Klemperer the perceptive and careful witness is 
nonetheless compromised by his overestimation of ‘positive’ experiences with non-Jews. 
While any scholarly analysis necessarily involves establishing criteria for interpretation 
and providing reference points to orient the reader, Heim in effect asks of her readers that 
they apply two different kinds of analysis. Anything that indicates the Germans did not 
support Hitler must be passed through a filter to sift out Klemperer’s faulty perception. But 
no such filter is suggested for incidents where Klemperer had a negative encounter; it 
appears these are to be taken at face value. Heim’s implication therefore is that the 
negative encounters he experienced must outweigh considerations of the positive 
encounters. Not only is Klemperer devalued as an effective witness, but Heim insists that 
criticism of Nazism or expressions of sympathy for Jews must necessarily carry less 
weight.  
 
                                                 
86 Heim, ‘Diaries’, p. 313. 
87 Heim, p. 316. Heim does not clearly establish either of these two predispositions, but it is not relevant to 
my central argument to extensively analyse this failure here. 
88 Heim, p. 320. 
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Heim does acknowledge instances of support for Klemperer but asks her readers to take 
into account a factor which changes the perspective: in view of the living conditions of the 
Jews, the majority of reactions appear as supplements to Gestapo terror and Klemperer’s 
records of friendliness and sympathy only serve to demonstrate the low expectations he 
had of non-Jews: ‘Often what he experienced as a good turn was simply the maintenance 
of normal behaviour.’89 These were Klemperer’s ‘rays of hope’ and hence less credible 
than the many behavioural patterns of ‘opportunism, tactlessness, cowardice and 
ignorance’ or even outright hatred. 
 
There are several difficulties with the position Heim has adopted. For example, her 
acknowledgment that Klemperer was a careful and thorough witness is nevertheless 
undermined. Heim presents him as someone who, in order to meet his own emotional need, 
has provided a skewed view or has distorted his data. This notion contrasts oddly with his 
stated intention to record all details in order to bear precise witness. Heim’s implication is 
that his evidence is somehow falsified. Nothing emerges from the diaries or the character 
of the central protagonist which indicates any likelihood of this possibility. While 
Klemperer had many shortcomings, he was not an unreliable witness. Furthermore Heim 
agrees that Klemperer wove the question ‘What is the true vox populi?’ like a thread 
through his notes. This was an ongoing puzzle for him and so his attention to all comments 
was part of his attempt to locate the true vox populi. This suggests he was not merely 
looking for confirmation of his own ideas, as Heim asserts. Rather than tendentiously 
locating an answer, he genuinely took care to record everything he heard in order to make 
an assessment of the mood of the people.  
 
Moreover, it is questionable how Klemperer could have incorrectly interpreted behaviours 
of people in the descriptions of numerous incidents which stand alone with no supporting 
comment. For example: 
 
Frau Reichenbach … told us a gentleman had greeted her in a shop doorway. Had he not 
mistaken her for someone else? – “No, I do not know you, but you will now be greeted 
frequently. We are a group ‘who greet the Jew’s star’.”90 
 
Tuesday and Wednesday were like early spring: thaw well under way, a greenish shimmer 
on the trees. Three hares were playing on the snow covered filed. Unfortunately, the little 
                                                 
89 Heim, p. 324. 
90 24 November 1941. Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, p. 426. 
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Hitler Youths were playing in Gorbitz and followed us, jeering and shouting. Then 
yesterday morning, snow fell again . . . .91 
 
In places where Klemperer does provide an interpretative element associated with an 
anecdote, frequently the interpretation relates to the impact on him, rather than interpreting 
the conduct of the other participant:   
 
After we were dismissed [from forced labour], I walked quickly to the tram alone, taking a 
shortcut, Hofwiesenstrasse. An older man, probably a tradesman, came toward me. “You 
must be working out here?” – “Yes, clearing snow.” – “You must be getting on a bit too.” 
– “I’m sixty.” – He, as he walked on, passionately to himself: “That rabble, that damned, 
godforsaken rabble.” It was a consolation for the little Hitler Youths. 92  
 
Here Klemperer is not interpreting the behaviour of the ‘Aryan’ German but recording his 
response to it, which makes the incident difficult to fit into Heim’s assertion that he 
attached too much significance to anti-regime comments. According to her hierarchy of 
significance, the incident of the Hitler Youths related earlier in the same diary entry carries 
more weight than the comment by the passing gentleman.  
 
Yet another problem with Heim’s argument relates to her contention about the level of fear 
Klemperer experienced when encountering ‘ordinary’ people. She discusses how ‘the Jews 
lived in fear of open aggression and curses from anonymous passersby’ and quotes an 
incident where ‘a young man, blond and brutal-looking, shouted from his car: “You 
wretch, why are you still alive?”’93 Heim fails to mention that Klemperer speculated his 
abuser might be Gestapo. Later, she reiterates her claim that Jewish people feared 
‘ordinary Germans’:  
 
[Jews] were afraid not only of house searches and arrests, but also of ordinary Germans. 
Even if they had less power than the Gestapo, one could not be sure that their hatred of 
Jews would be any milder. Klemperer hardly dared leave the Judenhaus after the 
introduction of the Yellow Star. But his fear increased with the years. In June 1942 he 
noted about a trip to the store: 
 
This waiting in front of the store … is especially horrible … the whole world 
stared at my star. Torture — I can plan a hundred times not to pay attention, it 
remains a torture. And I never know when someone goes by, drives by, whether he 
is a member of the Gestapo, whether he will curse me, spit at me, arrest me. 
 
                                                 
91 6 March, 1942. Klemperer, Diary 1942-1945, p. 23. 
92 6 March, 1942. Klemperer, Diary 1942-1945, p. 24. 
93 18 April 1942. Klemperer, Diary 1942-1945, p. 39, and Heim, p. 317. 
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Later he left the house only to go to forced labour, fearing physical attack. And even then, 
he, like other Jews, ducked into narrow sidestreets away from the main thoroughfares, in 
order to avoid attacks by non-Jews. 94 
 
In the above text, Heim frames her quote from Klemperer with text to guide our 
interpretation of his fears. On either side of the quote, her theme is terror, not just of the 
Gestapo, but of the ordinary people. This makes it difficult to understand anything else 
from the quote sandwiched between. A comparison of Heim’s text with the original quote 
in its entirety opens up possibilities for subtle differences in interpretation:  
 
Yesterday we went to Kaden the greengrocer. Eva bought, I waited and afterward hauled 
back the 30 pounds. This waiting in front of shops, which is often my lot, is particularly 
horrible. There are prams; children and dogs are playing, blathering females are coming 
and going (all kinds of shops are close together there, butcher, greengrocer, baker, dairy, 
etc., etc.), and the whole world eyes my star. Torture – I can resolve a hundred times to pay 
no attention, it remains torture. Also I never know whether someone walking or driving 
past is not in the Gestapo, whether he will not insult me, spit on me, arrest me.95 
 
The text in its entirety requires us to ask: Did Klemperer stand in front of the shop with 
fear that he would be attacked by the people around him, or did he stand there humiliated 
by the star and fearful of whether any Gestapo would appear? In order to determine 
whether Heim’s interpretation is correct, we need to establish his context, which will give 
us a broader idea of how much he feared contact with the ‘ordinary’ people. 
 
The incident quoted above, which Heim uses to demonstrate Klemperer’s fear of non-
Jewish Germans, occurred in June 1942. This was nine months after the introduction of the 
yellow star. During the period September 1941 to June 1942, Klemperer recorded fifty-
nine encounters with non-Jewish, non-Gestapo Germans. Of particular interest for 
determining general attitudes are his thirty-six encounters with strangers (61 percent) as 
these carry no consequence within ongoing relationships and are more likely to reflect 
general attitudes. If we systematically assess these incidents according to the behaviour of 
the people involved and weigh them against Klemperer’s feelings as recorded in his diary 
during this time, there are grounds for coming to a conclusion that differs substantially 
from that of Susanne Heim.  
 
                                                 
94 Heim, p. 323. 
95 9 June 1942. Klemperer, Diary 1942-1945, p. 71.  
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Klemperer’s agony over having to wear the yellow star comes across strongly in the 
diaries. On the 19 September 1941, the day of the introduction of the star, he wrote: ‘I 
reproach myself with cowardice. Yesterday Eva wore out her feet on the pavements and 
must now go shopping in town and cook afterwards. Why? Because I am ashamed.’96 The 
following day, as his wife sewed the star on his coat he confessed: ‘I had a raving fit of 
despair.’97 He later took a walk outside, waiting until it was dark. He noted how his wife 
accompanied other residents of the Judenhaus when they went out, taking their arms so 
that the star was covered. On 22 September he received a letter from a friend telling of 
sympathy for star wearers in Berlin and optimistic assurances from ‘Aryan’ friends that the 
ordeal should soon be over.98 On 23 September he braved a visit to town to go shopping 
and noted “Nowhere a hurt – but the most wretched, bitter feeling.’99 His agony of 
humiliation continued, but after an act of kindness from a street vendor, he commented: 
‘There is no doubt that the people feel the persecution of the Jews to be a sin.’100 He 
logged his birthday: ‘In normal times honours would have come to me, now I am wearing 
the Star of David.’101 He feared the star would cause him to be refused service in some 
shops.102 On 12 January 1942 he was detained by the Gestapo and left traumatised:  
 
‘Since then, I have taken only a very few steps in the open air, have not left this area and 
shall not leave it again. The business of their fabulous tyranny, brutality, mocking 
humiliation has taken hold of me far too much . . . .I think they want to intimidate people 
and drive them from the streets, perhaps also nose out shopkeepers who are friendly to 
Jews.’ 103  
 
At this point, he makes reference to official anti-Semitism, seemingly separating the 
regime and its people: ‘It appears as if anti-Semitism is going to increase even further, 
partly because of the more than critical external situation, partly because the Jew’s star did 
not meet with much approval on the part of the public.’104 And then he writes:  
 
‘Two boys, perhaps twelve and six, not working class, come toward me on a narrow 
pavement. Tussling as they pass me, the older one catapults his brother at me and shouts 
out: “Jew!” – It is ever more difficult to endure all this humiliation. And always the fear of 
the Gestapo . . . .’105 
                                                 
96 19 September 1941. Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, p. 415. 
97 20 September 1941. Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, p. 415. 
98 22 September 1941. Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, p. 416. 
99 23 September 1941. Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, p. 416. 
100 4 October 1941. Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, p. 419. 
101 9 October 1941. Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, p. 420. 
102 25 October 1941. Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, p. 421.  
103 12 January 1942. Klemperer, Diary 1942-1945, p. 5. 
104 17 January 1942. Klemperer, Diary 1942-1945, p. 7. 
105 11 May 1942. Klemperer, Diary 1942-1945, p. 51. 
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During this period, Klemperer had developed a justifiably overwhelming fear of the 
Gestapo as the news of brutal house searches, soon to be experienced personally, reached 
him.106  The overall impression from the diary entries is that he experienced great 
humiliation in wearing the star, worried about the effect it would have on his ability to 
access provisions for his life, and suffered enormous anxiety about encounters with the 
Gestapo. If diary entries over the previous months are to be taken as indicative of his state 
of mind, the ‘torture’ he refers to in Heim’s exemplar relates to the humiliation he felt 
when people stared at his yellow star. He was deprived of status that would allow him to 
enter the store with his wife, loss of status being something which he felt keenly during the 
Nazi years.107 His dread of being insulted, spat at, and arrested stemmed from terror of the 
Gestapo, not the people walking past him. There is no indication that he feared the 
ordinary people in the way he feared the Gestapo. On the contrary, during the period 
September 1941 to June 1942 he recorded numerous positive encounters with non-Jewish 
Germans (Figure 13). The underlying methodological problem here is that Heim makes no 
distinction between his fear of the Gestapo and his fear of ‘ordinary’ Germans. That 
Klemperer was frightened of the Gestapo is beyond question. His emotions with regard to 
the ‘ordinary’ Germans around him seem to have been more influenced by his feelings of 
humiliation and loss of status.   
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Figure 13: Klemperer: Encounters with non-Jews September 1941-June 1942 
 
Another problematic aspect of Heim’s analysis is that she qualifies gestures of help and 
solidarity by claiming they were disproportionate to the real situation for the Jews. She 
believes Klemperer ascribed such gestures more significance than was warranted and 
                                                 
106 For example, 5 February, 8 February, 6 March, 18 April, 11 May, 23 May 1942. Klemperer, Diary 1942-
1945, pp. 11, 12, 24, 39, 49, 56-59. 
107 For example: “I stood at the lectern over there [Dresden Technical University] . . . and now I’m shoveling 
snow here.’ 22 February 1942. Klemperer, Diary 1942-1945, p. 19. 
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designates the support as ‘pitiful’.108  In Heim’s view, only a few longstanding 
acquaintances provided support: ‘The few who actually helped the Klemperers, offering 
more than friendly words or handshakes, were almost exclusively (if sometimes only 
fleeting) acquaintances with whom they had had personal contact for years.’109 In 
attempting to answer the question “Who would the Jews really rely on to help them?” 
Heim finds no more than ‘two or three such individuals in the aproximately [sic] 1,500 
pages of Klemperer’s diary.’110 In reaching this gloomy conclusion Heim bolsters her 
argument by referencing David Bankier, who also claims that descriptions of multiple 
incidents of support for Jews were nothing more than ‘German exiles’ apologetics’ and 
that personal testimonies declaring support was given to Jews must be taken with a grain of 
salt.111 
 
Systematic analysis of the diaries undermines Heim’s claim that only two or three 
individuals, who were exclusively long-term acquaintances, provided reliable support to 
the Klemperers. Between 1933 and 1945 Klemperer describes 121 instances where he was 
helped with provisions by non-Jews, often clandestinely and in defiance of laws against 
supplying Jews (See Figure 14).112  Aside from the two specifically named by Heim, 
Annemarie Köhler and Richter the property agent, many other names occur in multiple 
diary entries.113 Vogel the grocer was not only a rich source of political gossip for 
Klemperer, but generously supplied him provisions, illegally and often without charge.114 
Loyal friend and frequent visitor Trude Öhlmann helped Klemperer raise money by selling 
books for him.115 Former Dresden Technical University colleague Fetscher, even after 
being fined for helping Jews, continued to medically treat Klemperer and repeatedly 
                                                 
108 Heim, p. 325. 
109 Heim, p. 317.  
110 Ibid., p. 325. 
111 Ibid., footnote 14, p. 317. The footnote refers to Bankier’s German language edition: Die öffentliche 
Meinung im Hitler-Staat. Die “Endlösung” und die Deutschen, Eine Berichtigung (Berlin, 1995), p. 164, 
which corresponds to the English edition used in this thesis: David Bankier, The Germans and the Final 
Solution: Public Opinion under Nazism (Oxford, 1992), p. 120, also see pp. 118 and 119. See the extended 
discussion of these statements by Bankier in Chapter One of this dissertation. 
112 9 December 1939. Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, p. 307. A circular allocating ‘special food shops’ for Jews 
dated back to 13 September 1939; Klemperer was informed here that he could only be provisioned by one 
specified place in the city from 1 January 1940. 
113 Heim erroneously identifies Annemarie Köhler as ‘Annemarie Kroeger’ and Richter’s profession as 
‘lawyer’ instead of property agent, p. 318.  Note also that of the diary entries quoted by Heim in the 
footnotes, five dates are listed incorrectly: 10 May 1936, 13 February 1942, 3 December 1942, 27 April 
1943, 28 May 1945, see footnotes 10, 13, 16, 19, 44 on pp. 316, 317, 318, 324.  
114 For examples: 2 September 1938, 16 December 1939, 24 December 1939, 26 November 1940, 26 
December 1940, 21 July 1941. Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, pp. 255, 308, 310, 346, 349, 404. 
115 24 November 1936. Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, p.191. 
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offered to hide Klemperer’s papers for him.116 Frau Winde, a frequent bearer of many gifts, 
also brought Klemperer a bicycle so that, in the event of trouble, he could flee.117 
Hochgemuth, the cigar dealer, continued to supply Klemperer after the ban on smoking for 
Jews.118 The only character in Klemperer’s diaries for whom he mystifyingly, and 
inconsistently, appears to have used a pseudonym, Frau Ahrens (“Gertrude Schmidt”) was 
a friend of Eva Klemperer’s who often supplied food.119 Maria Haeselbarth, a former 
student, continued to provide food and clothing, even after she suffered her own tragedy in 
losing her husband to the war.120 Of these supporters, only Annemarie Köhler, Trude 
Öhlmann and Maria Haeselbarth were acquaintances from pre-Nazi days. Klemperer 
frequently identifies numerous other characters in his diaries who, in defiance of official 
laws, provided various types of tangible support, along with unnamed workmates, 
anonymous shopkeepers and strangers. 
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Figure 14: Instances of provision vs. refusal in Klemperer’s diaries 1933-1945 
 
The twenty-seven incidents shown in Figure 14 which involved ‘refusal of provision’ 
included eighteen times when Klemperer faced withdrawal of a previous personal or 
professional relationship and nine times where he was refused provisions in a shop. In 
most cases of withdrawal of relationship, Klemperer identified the reason as fear of regime 
measures if the relationship was maintained. The 121 instances of provision were all 
tangible: the necessities of life and practical assistance. Figure 15 shows the rate through 
                                                 
116 16 March 1942, 17 August 1943. Klemperer, Diary 1942-1945, pp. 28, 253. 
117 For examples of Frau Winde: 11 July 1943, 21 July 1943, 31 August 1943, 14 September 1943, 28 
September 1943, 14 November 1943, 25 December 1943, 12 February 1944, 12 March 1944. Klemperer, 
Diary 1942-1945, pp. 243, 246, 256, 258, 263, 273, 281, 295, 302. 
118 10 August 1941, 15 September 1941, 8 March 1942. Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, pp. 407, 411, and 
Klemperer, Diary 1942-1945, p. 25. 
119 20 February 1943, 29 March 1943, 16 April 1943, 14 November 1943, 8 October 1944. Klemperer, Diary 
1942-1945, pp. 202, 211, 214, 273, 366-367. 
120 24 December 1939, 17 March 1940, 7 July 1940, 26 December 1940. Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, pp. 
309, 315, 331, 349. 
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the years of practical support contrasted with refusal or withdrawal of support. The rate of 
support increased markedly from the beginning of the war years, simultaneously with 
Klemperer’s increasing need. One theoretical reason why support may have dropped off in 
the final two years of the war may be related to the deprivation experienced by all Germans 
by this time. Incidental remarks in the diaries indicate there were many other times, not 
specifically noted by Klemperer and hence not countable, where help was proffered. For 
example, he wrote: ‘Not a day without visitors and gifts’ during his wife’s protracted 
illness.121  Clearly, Heim’s claim of limited support is a significant underestimation. 
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Figure 15: Provision and refusal throughout the years 1933-1945  
 
We have seen in the previous chapters that scholars sometimes make claims about the 
German population as a whole based on their analyses of small – and not necessarily 
representative – groups of people. Heim, too, makes claims that are based on extrapolation. 
Until 1935 Victor Klemperer held the post of professor at the Dresden Technical 
University. This was a small institution which in 1928 had just 3,000 students.122 She 
discusses at length the responses of Klemperer’s professional colleagues when he faced 
dismissal from his post. According to Heim, ‘Aryan’ staff members at the university were 
quick to distance themselves from their Jewish colleagues. This response, she goes on to 
argue, was typical of how non-Jewish Germans co-operated with the regime:  
 
This sixth sense — regardless of whether it arose from inner conviction and identification 
with the new powers, or from a lack of the courage of one’s convictions — would become 
an important element of the dictatorship over the years. It made written orders or threats 
unnecessary, even when the issue was neither university positions nor publication 
opportunities, but murder and other crimes. This sixth sense, perhaps more than any 
                                                 
121 14 November 1943. Klemperer, Diary 1942-1945, p. 273. 
122 The Dresden Technical University archive lists the total number of students at around 3000 in 1928; the 
Romance Languages section was one of the smallest departments. http://tu-
dresden.de/die_tu_dresden/portrait/geschichte?set_language=en&cl=en 
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consciously articulated opinions, is an indication of the unspoken consensus between the 
people and their leaders – a silent complicity.123 
 
Heim’s claim hinges on the ‘sixth sense’ and the ‘unspoken consensus’. By this she means 
that his non-Jewish colleagues anticipated the discrimination against the Jews even before 
such measures were enacted. Prior to the ‘sixth sense’ claims, she remarks:  
 
In April 1936, a year after his dismissal from the university, Klemperer mentioned a 
directive for civil servants forbidding them to associate with “Jews, even so-called Jews, 
and disreputable elements.” But long before this contact prohibition was enacted, most of 
his colleagues had turned their backs on him.124  
 
The problem with Heim’s argument is that she completely overlooks the Law for the 
Restoration of the Professional Civil Service of 7 April 1933.125 There was no ‘sixth sense’ 
in action here. The decree was official.  University staff knew what was coming for Jews 
and they were powerless to alter it in any way, although some university officials opposed 
or attempted to thwart the ruling.126 Klemperer received his final dismissal notice from the 
district Gauleiter on 30 April 1935. In subsequent diary entries he bitterly condemns his 
colleagues for their lack of contact and commiseration with his plight, seemingly failing to 
realise how much contact he did have with a number of them over the next few years and 
the fact that nearly all of them lost their own posts as well.127  After an offer from Dr. 
Rainer Fetscher to hide his papers, Klemperer commented that this was ‘The first and only 
sign of decent feelings among my colleagues at the TU.’ Klemperer’s remark is, in fact, 
inaccurate and so is Heim’s generalisation about the behaviour of most of his 
colleagues.128  
 
                                                 
123 Heim, p. 321. 
124 Heim, p. 320. 
125 Klemperer actually had a measure of protection from this law for a short time because of his service in 
WW1, but the amendments followed in short order. Heim’s failure to take into account this decree and other 
laws pertinent to her argument amounts to suppression of inconvenient evidence. 
126 15 May 1933, 17 June 1933, 13 January 1934.  Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, pp. 16, 17, 47-48. In these 
diary entries, Klemperer mentions the bitterness of the (Zentrum-supporting) dean, who stands up for 
Klemperer, colleague Delekat who gives church sermons where he can ‘say more’ than in lectures, describes 
the anti-Nazi maneuverings of a university committee as tyranny is ‘checked and undermined from the 
inside’ and describes hierarchy measures to keep Klemperer in his post. 
127 For a list of examples of contact with colleagues see footnote 166 of this chapter. Note that Klemperer 
himself did not seem to feel the need to contact or commiserate with colleagues when they lost their own 
jobs. 
128 16 March 1942. Klemperer, Diary 1942-1945, p. 28. As already noted, because pages were smuggled into 
safe-keeping at regular intervals, Klemperer did not have opportunities to refer back to his past experiences 
by re-reading diary entries. As readers of his text, we have advantages over the author himself because we are 
not beholden to the difficulties of his faulty memory recall.  
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The sixth methodological problem with Heim’s argument is her insistence that Klemperer 
over-estimated actions which were merely the maintenance of normal behaviour.129 In such 
extraordinary times, given the pervasive fear of denunciation and the risks non-Jews took 
when having any contact with Jews, no interaction could be construed to be maintenance 
of normality. From 24 November 1941 it became a crime for Jews and non-Jews to appear 
in public together.130 This means that any kind of contact had potential to be regarded as an 
act of opposition or even resistance. Wolfgang Mieder notes Heidrun Kämper’s 
speculation that ‘such harmless humanitarian signals must have had life-saving value for 
those persecuted under National Socialism.’131 It is also quite conceivable that, under 
normal non-Nazi circumstances, Klemperer would have no expectation of ever being 
greeted publicly by complete strangers, as he repeatedly was. Such an interaction was one 
unusual and positive by-product of the Nazi regime. 
 
It is not within the scope of this dissertation to speculate about whether the errors of Bartov 
and Heim are the result of carelessness in reading and understanding Klemperer’s text or 
manipulation of evidence in the diaries to fit their pre-conceived theories. Nor is it 
appropriate to comment here on the overall validity of Bartov’s and Heim’s theories with 
regard to the behaviour of non-Jewish Germans as a whole. But what we can say, with 
some degree of confidence, is that there are significant methodological problems with the 
manner in which both Bartov and Heim make use the diaries of Victor Klemperer. The 
portrait of Klemperer’s diary that one finds in their work is not an accurate representation 
of the original. 
 
There are other corollaries to the poor historical practices demonstrated by Bartov and 
Heim. In Bartov’s case, because his essay appears in The New Republic, it means that his 
assertions are perpetuated in the public arena with the capacity to shape public opinion. In 
Heim’s case, it raises questions of the editor’s responsibilities to ensure published material 
                                                 
129 Heim, p. 324. 
130 Robert Gellately, ‘The Gestapo and German Society: Political Denunciation in the Gestapo Case Files’, 
Journal of Modern History, 60:4 (1988), p. 677.  
131 Wolfgang Mieder, ‘“In lingua veritas”: Proverbial Rhetoric in Victor Klemperer's Diaries of the Nazi 
Years (1933-1945)’, Western Folklore, 59:1 (2000), p. 23, and Heidrun Kämper, ‘Zeitgeschichte–
Sprachgeschichte: Gedanken bei der Lektüre des Tagebuchs eines Philologen. Über die Ausgaben von Victor 
Klemperers Tagebuch 1933-1945’, Zeitschrift für Germanistische Linguistik, 24 (1996), pp. 328-341, esp. p. 
330. 
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is a reflection of good historical practice, and how much poor practice taints other essays in 
the same volume of works.132  
 
What Klemperer’s Diaries Tell 
Heim’s belief is that it is difficult to estimate how widespread attitudes of sympathy, 
indifference or hostility toward Jews were. It is, however, possible to develop ideas about 
frequency or locate patterns in the behaviours encountered by Klemperer by simply 
counting the incidents recorded in his diaries. Daniel Goldhagen would not agree. He 
dismisses in-depth analysis of Klemperer as ‘methodologically unsound distillation of the 
testimony of one idiosyncratic man’.133 Nonetheless, even if a general sense of ‘mood’ 
appears to be conveyed throughout his diaries, it is logical to apply a different type of 
assessment in order to ascertain if impressions of overall tone and demeanour are in fact 
accurate. The results of systematically analysing the data in Klemperer’s diaries might 
have surprised even the diarist himself.  
 
To assess what is recorded in Klemperer’s diaries, I counted every incident in Klemperer’s 
diaries where an encounter took place between a Jewish German and a non-Jewish German 
before sorting the information into categories (see Appendix). My primary question was: 
What do Klemperer’s diaries tell us about what happened when an ‘ordinary German’ 
encountered one of the people cast out from society by the Nazi regime? I made no attempt 
to decipher whether people agreed with or actively supported the legislated rejection of the 
Jews. Rather, the only concern was how they behaved when they knowingly encountered a 
Jew. Participants in any encounter had to be certain of each other’s identity and status in 
the regime. This excluded incidents after the fire-bombing of Dresden when Klemperer 
met people who did not realise he was Jewish because his star had been ripped off. The last 
incident included in this count occurred mid-May 1945; all figures for 1945 are therefore 
lower. 
 
The analysis does not include incidents where one of the participants (in nearly all cases, 
the ‘Aryan’) was in authority over the other or engaging actively in a role as a 
                                                 
132 However, as has been evident throughout this thesis, other essays from the same volume of works have 
their own issues with poor historical practice. This indicates that there may be wider implications for the 
historical profession as a whole to consider.  
133 Daniel Goldhagen, ‘Pride and Prejudice’, The New Republic, 220:13 (1999), p. 40. 
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representative of the regime, for example, a policeman undertaking official business. Most 
incidents involved adult-to-adult interaction; only ten involved contact between Klemperer 
and children. This is not surprising because he was personally and professional situated in 
the adult world and had very little contact with children at any time in his life, although at 
one point he did express interest in gathering information about the treatment of Jewish 
children in schools.134 All contacts with children occurred in the years 1941-1944 and in 
four of them Klemperer specifically notes they were Hitler Youth. All except one involved 
children shouting at him in the street. He usually attempts to identify the age of the 
children he encounters; most are recorded as being twelve years old or younger. He does 
hint that this type of incident occurred more frequently than he specifically notes in his 
diary: in discussion with a workmate who had been spat at, he noted: ‘For myself, children 
often shout after me.’135 It is not germane to this discussion to account for the behaviour of 
children. But there is a good case to be made that they were often the products of Nazi 
socialisation techniques, regardless of the attitudes of their parents.136  
 
In Klemperer’s 1933-1945 diaries, he recorded 453 encounters between Jewish-Germans 
and non-Jewish Germans. The majority (91 percent) were first-person accounts directly 
involving Klemperer. The remaining 9 percent were third-party accounts told to him by 
others and reported in his diaries. Of the forty-two third-party accounts, thirty-nine were 
recorded during the war years, as Klemperer came into closer contact with the dwindling 
Jewish community and heard other people’s stories.  
 
The location of incidents is significant because of the relative risks involved. Each location 
was sorted into one of three categories: private, semi-public or public (Figure 16). A public 
environment was deemed to be a location observable by any number of onlookers and in 
which interactions might be outside of the control of the participants, for example, in the 
street, on trams, in cafes, the workplace, or in shops. This sort of environment carried a 
                                                 
134 19 October 1935. Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, p. 131. In the diaries there was no recorded incident 
involving child-to-child contact; these would not have been included in the count anyhow because of the 
possibility of incidents being provoked by simple childish bullying. 
135 20 May 1943. Klemperer, Diary 1942-1945, p. 230. 
136 For just one example, see Helmut Ziefle’s account of his mother’s struggle another son’s involvement 
with Hitler Youth. Helmut Ziefle, One Woman Against the Reich (Grand Rapids, Mich., 2003). No historian 
could legitimately allow examples of children’s behaviours to carry weight in the argument for people’s 
attitudes towards Jews, unless they are verifiably indicative of overt provocation on the part of their parents. 
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high risk factor because of the perceived danger of denunciation amongst the German 
people. The semi-public environment carried less risk because the number of onlookers 
was reduced and under a degree of control by the participants, for example, a doctor’s 
waiting rooms or the hallway of a residence. A private environment, such as a home or an 
office with closed doors, was the safest because there was little chance of onlookers. 
Klemperer mentioned receiving letters from ‘Aryans’ just twice in the early years of the 
regime, both times containing unhappy news. These were classified private as they did not 
appear to have been affected by government interception. His phone was cut off in 1936, 
but he does not specifically record instances of telephone calls from ‘Aryans’ before then.  
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Figure 16: Locations of encounters with trendlines 
 
The trendlines in Figure 16 reflect the changing patterns of Klemperer’s lifestyle as he was 
increasingly exposed to a public environment. In the early years of the regime, aside from 
his professional life which was gradually strangled by the Nazis, Klemperer most 
frequently operated within the private sphere. He received visitors to his house or visited 
friends in their homes, and went on shopping trips, cinema outings, or driving excursions 
to districts surrounding Dresden. On the few occasions he interacted with strangers, the 
most common meeting place was in government offices. His lifestyle patterns were 
disrupted from May 1940 when he was forced to move away from his Dölzschen home 
 120
into the Judenhaus in Dresden.137 He had to buy food from designated shops and 
eventually was forced into labouring work, firstly shovelling snow then working in 
factories. 138 From September 1941 the yellow star made him easily identifiable. As he was 
forced into a more public existence, the number of times he encountered strangers 
increased substantially (Figure 17). 
 
1414
2 4
3 3
19
4
19
22
43
1
3
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945
 
Figure 17: Klemperer’s encounters with strangers (with trendline) 
 
We can assess Klemperer’s interactions with strangers by assigning each incident to one of 
three categories which are defined by the type of relationship (Figure 18). Strangers were 
those Klemperer had not encountered before and did not know their identity. Casual 
acquaintances were those with whom Klemperer had passing acquaintance. In casual 
encounters, he had no need to invest significant trust in the other participant beyond what 
was happening within the interaction. He usually knew the names of these casual 
acquaintances but did not have an ongoing personal relationship with them, for example, 
employees at Paschky’s, the fishmonger. The ‘familiar relationship’ category includes 
people whom Klemperer knew well, either on a personal or professional basis, and in 
whom he invested some sort of trust. In addition to friends, these people included his 
colleagues at the Dresden Technical University, and other professionals he was in close 
and regular contact with, for example, the property agent, Richter. Some incidents 
contained factors which ruled them inadmissible. For example, Natscheff the librarian is 
frequently mentioned in the diaries but encounters with him were excluded because he was 
Bulgarian, not German.  
 
                                                 
137 26 May 1940. Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, p. 324. 
138 See 2 June 1942 for Klemperer’s list of restrictions to that date. Klemperer, Diary 1942-1945, pp. 65-66.  
On 12 January 1942 he had been detained by the Gestapo who expressly forbade him to shop in his usual 
places. 
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Figure 18: Types of relationships with trendlines 
 
 
Klemperer became disconnected from a number of relationships as the regime wore on. 
His often-expressed feelings of being cut off from previous relationships are somewhat 
confirmed by the downwards moving trendline for his familiar relationships, although as 
we have already seen, his sense of complete isolation: ‘Our terrible abandonment by all 
friends’ and ‘terrible isolation . . . when all become unfaithful . . .’ is not borne out by 
counting the number of actual incidents. 139  Aside from his misapprehensions, which were 
discussed earlier in this chapter, the reasons for these disconnections might not have been 
considered by Klemperer. They could possibly, but not necessarily, be due to avoidance or 
withdrawal on the part of non-Jewish contacts. But other factors to take into account are 
his physical removal from contacts due to the loss of his job and the move from his home 
in Dölzschen into the Judenhaus in Dresden. As well, his period of forced labour meant he 
was not available for social interactions. 
 
The way that Jewish Germans were treated by strangers has been the subject of frequent 
comment by historians. Marion Kaplan states that absolute strangers became steadily more 
hostile in public toward Jews long before they were forced to wear the yellow star, 
                                                 
139 14 September 1936, 14 October 1940. Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, pp. 182, 343. 
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targeting those who merely looked Jewish.140 Susanne Heim also contends: ‘In the last 
years of the war, Klemperer more and more frequently met Germans who not only 
supported the policies toward the Jews, but felt a need to express their hatred of the Jews 
personally by openly attacking them.’141 The actual count of Klemperer’s interactions 
contradicts these claims. He notes that the first time he experienced abuse (from non-
Nazis) was 1 November 1941. From the introduction of the yellow star (19 September 
1941) to the end of the Nazi regime, he records encounters with strangers ninety-seven 
times. In twenty-nine (30 percent) of these, the strangers behaved with verbal or physical 
aggression towards the Jew. Significantly, in ten of these twenty-nine incidents (34 
percent), the abuse came from children. Klemperer himself experienced no physical assault 
on his person but did report three instances he heard of from others. When the three 
instances of passive rejection (two refusals of service in a shop and one refusal of shelter) 
are included, this brings the total of ‘rejection incidents’ to thirty-two in the years he had to 
wear a star (Figure 19).142 Over the same period, however, fifty-eight times (60 percent) he 
recorded acts of verbal encouragement or kindness from strangers.  
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Figure 19: Klemperer: The behaviour of strangers after the yellow star was introduced 
 
If we widen this enquiry to examine the entire twelve years of the regime, results reveal 
that the kindnesses to Klemperer from strangers still substantially outweigh the detrimental 
behaviours (Figure 20). 
                                                 
140 Marion Kaplan, ‘Keeping Calm and Weathering the Storm: Jewish Women’s Responses to Daily Life in 
Nazi Germany, 1933-1939’ in Women in the Holocaust, eds. Dalia Ofer and Lenore J. Weitzman (New 
Haven, 1998), p. 40. 
141 Heim, p. 324. 
142 6 January 1943, 16 August 1944, 6 April 1945 (diary entry 15 April). Klemperer, Diary 1942-1945, pp. 
186, 345, 447. 
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Figure 20: The behaviour of strangers towards Klemperer during the entire Nazi period  
 
In contrast to Heim’s claim that ‘ordinary’ Germans increasingly harassed Jewish Germans 
as the end of the regime approached, Figure 21 clearly shows that, for Klemperer at least, 
the pattern was different. Not only did his negative experiences remain fewer than positive 
experiences, they actually declined after the peak in 1942.  
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Figure 21: Klemperer’s experiences of encounters with strangers  
 
The peak of ‘neutral’ experiences in 1939 suggests how much discussion occurred among 
Germans as the war began. In the forty-six diary entries for 1939, Klemperer specifically 
commented on nineteen conversations in which political gossip was the chief focus. Eleven 
of these conversations occurred between Klemperer and strangers. Numerous other times 
he made general references to the high level of political chitchat. In each of these, the 
‘Aryan’ German was aware he was talking to a Jew and engaged the conversation with no 
intent other than to chat. This indicates a level of willingness to engage freely with Jews, 
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although some historians interpret this as being a signal that Jewish people were 
considered ‘safe’ to gossip with because of the reduced risk of denunciation.143 But notably 
during this time Klemperer experienced a peak in positive responses from strangers, often 
taking the form of commiseration or acknowledgement of Klemperer’s previous status.144  
 
It is clear from Klemperer’s diaries that his encounters with non-Jews had varying types of 
emotional impact on him. By assigning two types of value judgments to each incident, we 
can analyse better how he was affected by these experiences. The first type – ‘Effect 
Assessment’ – focuses on the Jewish response to the behaviour of a non-Jew. In other 
words, it is the effect on Klemperer produced by the encounters he reported. Each incident 
was allocated a value of ‘positive’, ‘negative’, or ‘neutral’, according to the emotional 
impression Klemperer was left with after the encounter (Figure 22). Encounters which had 
a favourable emotional or physical effect on him were those which cheered his mood and 
encouraged him to feel hopeful or otherwise lifted up. These were designated ‘positive’. 
‘Negative’ encounters had the opposite effect because they contributed to emotions such as 
depression, anger, or sense of loss. Neutral encounters were those which made no 
emotional impression on Klemperer. These incidents were mostly exchanges of political 
gossip that he merely recorded in his diary; no effect on his mood is suggested. For 
example, ‘A cigarette dealer said to me recently, he was pessimistic, he no longer 
understood the German policy,’145 or:  ‘Vox populi Master Haubold, who is supposed to 
replace the rusty stove pipe. Frequent employment of ‘shitty’ to describe the situation.’146 
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Figure 22: ‘Effect Assessment’: Klemperer's responses to encounters with ‘ordinary’ Germans  
(See also Figure 11) 
 
                                                 
143 Bankier, Germans, p. 119, and Heim, p. 321. 
144 For example, 1 January 1939, 7 April 1939. Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, p. 285 
145 1 November 1939. Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, p. 305. 
146 14 September 1939. Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, p. 298. 
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Sometimes, Klemperer was not specific in his descriptions of incidents. For example, he 
often noted he had received a visitor socially, but did not record what happened during the 
visit or what sort of experience it was for him. This type of instance was recorded as a 
positive experience because clearly he benefited from the encouragement of social contact 
and the willingness of the participants to risk being seen entering his house. Occasionally, 
however, he recorded visits which had a negative effect on him. Frau Lehmann had the 
courage to visit only under the cover of darkness, and Klemperer noted how much it 
depressed him.147  His visit from Johannes Köhler after his mother died was recorded as a 
negative encounter because of the effect on Klemperer as he faced the loss of a 
friendship.148  
 
The second type of value – ‘Behaviour Assessment’ – concerns the actual behaviour of the 
non-Jewish participants and can be sorted into three categories (Figure 23). Firstly, 
behaviour which provided some sort of emotional or practical support, such as comforting 
words or provision of food, was designated ‘beneficial’. Secondly, behaviour emotionally 
or physically injurious, such as anti-Semitic abuse or spitting, was designated 
‘detrimental’. Thirdly, ‘neutral’ behaviours, for example, exchanges of political gossip, 
were those which exhibited neither beneficial nor detrimental intent towards the Jewish 
participant in the encounter. The 104 neutral encounters exclusively consisted of verbal 
interactions such as discussions of the political situation, casual expressions of support for 
or discontent with regime policies, and passing on of gossip or general comments. Political 
gossip, occurring most intensively around the beginning of the war, occupied sixty-three of 
the total 453 encounters (14 percent). Klemperer mostly noted them without comment. 
However, a few affected him emotionally by provoking hope or despair, so they were 
classified positive or negative in the ‘Effect Assessment’ category. These same encounters 
attracted a neutral classification in the ‘Behaviour Assessment’ category because of the 
lack of intent towards the Jewish participant.  
 
Another type of distinction can be made between active or passive behaviours of the non-
Jewish Germans who interacted with Klemperer. For example, verbal aggression such as 
abuse shouted at Klemperer in the street is an example of active behaviour. Withdrawal or 
avoidance of previous contact usually took the form of cessation of visits to Klemperer’s 
                                                 
147 10 August 1938. Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, p. 252. 
148 9 June 1936. Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, p. 161. 
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house; this type of behaviour is counted as passive.  Figure 23 shows how active or passive 
behaviours were classified for the analysis, with the actual number of incidents in brackets.  
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Figure 23: Classification of behaviours toward Jews in Klemperer’s diaries 
 
In the main, most encounters produced effects in Klemperer concomitant with the intent of 
the non-Jewish participant (Figure 24). For example, those who yelled abuse at him in the 
street produced the desired negative effect: fear and intimidation. Those who were kind to 
him usually succeeded in assisting Klemperer temporarily to feel some emotional relief 
from his situation. There were occasions when behaviour did not match effect. For 
example, a tram driver and a passenger were overhead by a Jewish neighbour of 
Klemperer’s as they exchanged political gossip detrimental to the regime. Because she was 
unnoticed by the gossipers, this incident qualified to be counted as neutral behaviour 
towards the Jew but it was counted as having a positive effect on her.149 This particular 
incident qualified to be included in the count because of the subsequent friendly exchange 
between the gossipers and the Jewish woman when they realised they had been overheard. 
                                                 
149 30 December 1941. Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, p. 435.  
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Other instances of comments overheard were not counted if they did not involve direct 
interaction between the Jewish person and the non-Jewish person. 
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Figure 24: Comparison between Behaviour and Effect assessments 
 
In this context, whether we examine the behaviour of non-Jewish Germans or the effect on 
Klemperer, we can see that affirmative interactions significantly outnumbered hurtful 
interactions. If we combine the two value assessments, of behaviours towards the Jews and 
the effects on them, we can see that the results (Figure 25) create a substantially different 
picture than that presented by the historians examined in this dissertation.  
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Figure 25: Averages obtained by combining Effect Assessments and Behaviour Assessments 
 
More subjectively, we can attempt to discern the motives of non-Jewish participants in 
their encounters with Jewish people (Figure 26). It is almost an impossible task to 
determine what is in someone’s mind, but behaviour can be a good indicator of thinking or 
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intent.150 Historians generally tend to avoid this sort of analysis because it fails the test of 
‘objectivity’. Nevertheless, their sometimes non-verified assertions, such as ‘tacit consent’ 
and ‘silent complicity’, do in fact make statements about frame of mind, thereby justifying 
the exercise in this present context.151 Historians have also made claims of motivations 
born of self-interest and material gain so we need to account for these here also.152 The 
process of allocating such values is very subjective and motivations may not even be fully 
understood by the protagonists themselves. Nonetheless, it is useful provided we do not 
base our hypotheses solely on such information. The chief interest here is to see if patterns 
can emerge.  
 
We can divide incidents into four categories which describe certain types of motivation. By 
being sure to take into account the circumstances, context, relationship and type of each 
encounter, motivations become more clear-cut and easier to assign to a category. The 
‘conviction’ category contains responses motivated by beliefs: anti-Semitism, religious or 
political belief, or any other kind of personal belief. The ‘sentiment’ category concerns the 
behaviour of people who responded in particular ways because of perceivably ‘negative’ or 
‘positive’ emotions, such as love, pity, fear, or loyalty. ‘Mercenary’ responses were 
assigned where it appeared the non-Jewish participant responded in a particular way 
because they had something tangible to gain, such as money or a house. For example, 
Berger, the shopkeeper, moved into Klemperer’s house when it was confiscated but 
Klemperer suspected his kindness was due to him wanting the house.153 If there was a 
lesser degree of certainty in categorising a motive, it was listed as ‘unknown’. For 
example, an elderly lady selling vegetables in the street undercharged Klemperer and gave 
him ‘forbidden’ tomatoes and rare onions, while making the comment that she knew how 
things were for him. It is not clear what motivated her kindness, although a response based 
on sentiments such as pity could have been considered.154 Likewise, although Fräulein 
Zwiener refused to sell Klemperer tobacco stating that she would only sell to ‘registered’ 
customers, her motivation is allocated ‘unknown’ because it is unknown whether she acted 
                                                 
150 John Searle, Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge, 1983), pp. 79-100, especially 
pp. 80, 94. One advantage we have with Klemperer’s text is, because of his comprehensiveness and 
communicative ability, it is easier to deduce from people’s actions how they might have been motivated.  
151 The examples most relevant to this discussion are Bankier, Germans, p. 77; Heim, p. 321; and Saul 
Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews, Volume 1: The Years of Persecution 1933-1939 (New York, 1997), 
p. 324. 
152 For example, Ian Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent in the Third Reich: Bavaria 1933-1945 
(Oxford, 1983), p. 363, and see Chapter One for discussion on historians’ assessments of motivations.  
153 16 December 1939. Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, p. 309.  
154 4 October 1941. Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, p. 419. 
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from belief that Jews should not be served (conviction), or whether she was afraid of 
consequences (sentiment).155 Even though 50 percent of incidents were assessed as motive 
‘unknown’, the survey does reveal interesting data, particularly when we are looking for 
information about how often people behaved in a certain way because they had something 
to gain. None of those allocated ‘unknown’ has potential to be transferred to the 
‘mercenary’ category because in each incident it is clear the participants had nothing to 
gain.156 
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Figure 26: Apparent motives of non-Jews interacting with Klemperer  
 
Figure 26 shows that where the description of an incident allows identification of motives, 
reasons of sentiment were the most common motivator for people’s responses. Mercenary 
motives were clearly a factor in only a very small number of incidents. This brings us to 
the allegations made by historians about other aspects of the relationships between Jews 
and non-Jews, which have already been discussed in this dissertation. What do 
Klemperer’s diaries have to tell us about indifference toward Jews, about issues of 
relationships in the workplace or in general, or about what happened over time? We can 
begin with how often Klemperer experienced mercenary or opportunistic behaviour. 
Certainly Klemperer did come into contact with people who sought to gain some 
advantage. He recorded a total of nine incidents which were spread evenly over the twelve 
years of the regime, with no indication of a peak period. However, a close look at the 
incidents shows that while some people behaved in a way to advantage themselves, this did 
not mean Klemperer was necessarily disadvantaged.  For example, one acquaintance 
                                                 
155 21 July 1941. Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, p. 404. 
156 Note however that this exercise concerns only Klemperer’s experiences. Due to his ‘Aryan’ wife he was 
not as vulnerable to exploitation as were others. It is conceivable that under other circumstances Jews were 
more exposed to mercenary-type behaviour. 
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greeted him on the street with a warning Klemperer should expect to see him dressed in 
Stahlhelm uniform with a swastika armband.157 From the acquaintance’s comments about 
having to join and his justification of the choice of organisation over the SA, it appears 
there were elements of self-interest in his behaviour without any intent towards Klemperer. 
Shopkeepers complained to Klemperer about shortages and price rises because of goods 
going to Berlin. Self-interest again was involved, but not to Klemperer’s cost.158 A lawyer 
who had been imprisoned by the Nazis visited Klemperer in his new role as a car polish 
salesman, seeking to make a sale. Klemperer bought nothing, gave him a cigarette and 
noted his satisfaction over interaction with a fellow intellectual. This encounter was 
classified ‘neutral’ because of the lack of effect on Klemperer. But it was allocated a 
‘mercenary’ motive because the man had no other intent for the visit other than hoping to 
make some income.159 Of the nine incidents, three had a classifiably neutral effect on 
Klemperer, four provided some (positive) benefit and two had a detrimental (negative) 
effect. The benefits related to obtaining special food provisions, negotiating satisfactory 
rental conditions for his house and selling his car for a fair price, even though all 
circumstances occurred as the result of deprivation instigated by the regime.160 In each 
case the non-Jewish party also stood to gain in some way. The two detrimental/negative 
incidents were, firstly, Klemperer’s receipt of a letter from a publisher asking him not to 
insist on publication of his latest work, ostensibly because the publisher wanted to protect 
his journal from Nazi interference, and, secondly, Berger’s eventual attempt to 
permanently appropriate Klemperer’s house in violation of their previous agreement.161  
 
While Klemperer cannot be held to be representative of the experiences of all Jews, the 
data certainly shows that he was not a victim of mercenary behaviour. In fact, he gained 
from apparently self-interested behaviour on the part of ‘Aryans’ more often than he found 
himself at a disadvantage. This kind of information is useful to consider when we compare 
the assertions of widespread mercenary behaviour alleged by historians when they discuss 
attitudes toward the Jewish people.  
 
                                                 
157 10 August 1933. Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, p. 27. 
158 13 August 1936. Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, p. 175. 
159 27 September 1936. Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, p. 184. Note however, that the man was simply trying to 
make a living so the category ‘mercenary’ should not be regarded as necessarily pejorative.   
160 16 December 1939, 24 December 1939, 8 May 1940, 20 February 1941. Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, pp. 
308, 309, 321, 358. 
161 30 June 1933, 24 March 1942. Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, p. 20, and Diary 1942-1945, p. 32. 
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We can now to turn to examining whether Klemperer’s diaries support the assertion that 
non-Jewish Germans were generally indifferent in their attitudes and behaviours toward 
Jewish Germans.  As we saw in Figures 23 and 24, Victor Klemperer recorded a total of 
289 incidents where non-Jewish Germans behaved in ways that provided some emotional 
or practical benefit to him. We can further analyse these incidents by classifying them 
according to Klemperer’s relationship with each person (Figure 27).162 Of the 289 
beneficial encounters, 270 can be described as active behaviours and nineteen as passive 
behaviours. Active behaviours were demonstrated by non-Jewish Germans when they 
provided practical or emotional support, for example, food or other provisions, 
encouraging comments, or other activities which afforded him cheer. It is clear that when 
the incidents are separated into three categories the larger proportion of supportive acts (38 
percent) came from those whom Klemperer knew well. But a total of 62 percent of acts of 
kindness were from people who either did not know or barely knew Klemperer.163 For the 
most part, the people with whom he had no significant prior relationship had nothing to 
gain from the interaction with Klemperer, and were clearly not motivated by personal 
loyalty towards someone whom they did not know. The significance of these 270 active 
behaviours is that they cannot indicate indifferent attitudes, although the remaining 
nineteen passive behaviours do allow for this possibility.  
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Figure 27: Active beneficial behaviours noted by Klemperer, according to level of relationship 
 
                                                 
162 To reiterate: strangers were those he had not met before and did not know their identity. Casual 
acquaintances were those he might have known the names of but had no deeper relationship than experienced 
within passing encounters. Familiar relationships involved a trusting, ongoing relationship at a certain level 
of intimacy, whether personal or professional. 
163 The argument that Klemperer’s privileged status in being married to an ‘Aryan’ afforded him greater 
protection is irrelevant in his encounters with strangers as they would have had no knowledge of this status. 
Arguably Jews not similarly privileged were deported sooner which means they were not exposed to 
encounters with strangers as often as Klemperer.  
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By contrast, he recorded just sixty incidents of behaviours that were detrimental to him in 
some way (Figure 28). Twenty-seven were passive behaviours such as avoidance of 
contact – these could possibly (although not necessarily) indicate indifferent attitudes. 
Thirty-three incidents involved active behaviours such as yelling abuse or spitting. These 
active behaviours consisted of twenty-eight incidents of verbal abuse, the remaining five 
were acts of physical aggression – two of spitting and three of Jews jostled, chased or 
abused. The five incidents of physical abuse were reported to Klemperer by others. 
Klemperer himself was never the recipient of physical aggression at the hands of 
‘ordinary’ civilians, although he and his wife suffered frequent abuse from the Gestapo.  
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Figure 28: Comparison of beneficial and detrimental behaviours in Klemperer 
 
In summary, Klemperer recorded a total of 349 incidents where a non-Jew behaved 
towards him in a way that was either to his benefit or his detriment.164 Because 270 of 
these were active beneficial behaviours we can say that in at least 77 percent of these, 
indifference was clearly not a factor. Klemperer’s diary is the record of just one man and 
we cannot use his experiences as proof of how non-Jews behaved toward Jews. But here 
we do have hundreds of sample behaviours that have the potential to contribute to 
resolving the problem of typicality. In showing us how people behaved towards 
Klemperer, the diaries reveal information hitherto untapped. Perhaps deeper, systematic 
                                                 
164 Note from earlier in this chapter that the total of 453 encounters recorded by Klemperer included 104 
‘neutral’ encounters that had neither beneficial nor detrimental effect. 
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investigation into similar literature might give us a clearer picture.  Historians cannot 
simply overlook such information.  
 
At this point we can compare what historians have said about breakdown in relationships 
and a worsening situation over time, with the information from the preliminary analysis of 
memoirs in Chapter Two, and with Klemperer’s record. The first area we can examine 
concerns loyalties to existing relationships in the workplace and in everyday life. 
Klemperer’s place of work was Dresden Technical University and, as pointed out by some 
secondary sources, Klemperer bemoaned the unfaithfulness of his colleagues from this 
institution.165 Nevertheless, if we take into account the number of contacts he did have, 
something he himself did not do, we can see his belief in his total isolation and 
abandonment was not totally justified.166 In fact, he had reasonably frequent, friendly 
contact with a number of colleagues after he was dismissed from his position. Furthermore, 
his diaries unwittingly suggest that there are other factors, seemingly unnoticed by him, 
which must be weighed up when considering the responses of his colleagues.  
 
When Fräulein Mey, the ‘Aryan’ secretary in Klemperer’s university department came to 
dinner, she told the Klemperers of the ‘discontent, fear everywhere’ among the university’s 
employees and professors as everyone wondered: ‘Who will they topple, what next?’167 
Here we have a glimpse of a bigger picture. Mey’s comment indicates the possibility that 
the focus of the academics was not ridding themselves of Jews in their departments for 
their own benefit. It appears they felt rather vulnerable themselves and wondered if they 
were about to suffer a fate similar to the Jews. In the end, their anxieties were confirmed. 
Klemperer’s entire department was first reorganised then closed completely. It was not just 
Jews who lost their posts.168  
                                                 
165 14 October 1940. Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, p. 343. 
166 For examples (not exhaustive) of visits or other expressions of support from ‘Aryan’ former colleagues 
see 15 May 1933, 17 June 1933, 28 July 1933, 24 April 1934, 20 November 1934, 21 July 1935, 16 
September 1935, 6 October 1935, 8 July 1936, 13 August 1936, 20 June 1937, 17 September 1941, 16 March 
1942, 17 August 1943. Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, pp. 15, 18, 25, 61, 95, 123, 127, 129, 167, 175, 217-218, 
411-413, and Klemperer, Diary 1942-1945, pp. 28, 253. 
167 28 July 1933. Victor Klemperer, Ich will Zeugnis ablegen bis zum letzten: Tagebücher 1933-1941 (Berlin, 
1995), p. 44. The text is omitted from the English translation, which highlights the problems of sources being 
contaminated by the editorial process: ‘Wir hattern Fräulein Mey zum Abendbrot bei uns, die ganz 
deutschnationale, die unter den kleinen Angestellten der TH und bei den Professoren gleichermaßen 
Bescheid weiß: Unzufriedenheit, Angst überall. Nur überall die Frage: Wer wird sie stürzen, was kommt 
dann?’ 
168 13 January 1934, 2 December 1935, 11 June 1936, 8 July 1936. Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, pp. 47-48, 
134, 162, 166-167. 
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By consulting another type of source, we locate a further perspective as Edward 
Hartshorne alerts us to the dimensions of an academic career in Germany. He notes that a 
principal consequence of the German University system was that members of a faculty 
tended to know only a relatively small number of their colleagues.169 This factor is 
reinforced by Klemperer’s failure to recollect former colleague Rainer Fetscher, who 
eventually proved loyal to Klemperer and other Jews at great cost to himself.170 Putting all 
this information together indicates that Klemperer inhabited a small world professionally 
and when dismissed from his post on racial grounds, left behind him colleagues who were 
conceivably more anxious about their own positions.171  We must also consider the 
colleagues specifically named as objects of Klemperer’s wrath. He does not indicate that 
he felt rejected by any of them because of his Jewishness or that their self-serving 
behaviour afforded him personal cost other than his perceived abandonment. He expressed 
disgust with them for other reasons even as he continued social exchanges with them: 
Johannes Kühn’s approval for Nazi ideology, Adolf Spamer’s benign acceptance of 
promotion within the system, and the Russian Fjodor Stepun’s presumed spying.172  There 
may well have been colleagues who discontinued relationships with Klemperer or 
personally benefited from his dismissal. No specific entry in the diaries notes this. 
Although Klemperer cannot be held representative of all Jewish university academics, 
neither can his testimony be dismissed as non-representative unless a systematic analysis 
of all similar testimonies proves it. From Klemperer’s diaries, a picture emerges of a small 
university department with anxious employees. Some compromise, adapt or buy into the 
new system, but, it appears, many more attempt to find ways to survive or even undermine 
the programme being imposed on them.173 There is enough information in Klemperer’s 
diaries to suggest there is more to learn about just what Jews in the universities 
                                                 
169 Edward Hartshorne, The German Universities and National Socialism (London, 1937), p. 126. 
170 17 August 1943, 19 April 1942. Klemperer, Diary 1942-1945, pp. 253, 41. See also Klemperer’s comment 
about the suicide of another professor whom he did not know. 13 June 1934. Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, p. 
68. For details of Rainier Fetscher see Michael Kater, Doctors under Hitler (Chapel Hill, 1989), p. 78. 
171 Note also that Klemperer’s department was a very small department in a small university: in 1928 there 
were only about 3,000 students enrolled at Dresden TU, most of whom were enrolled in technology studies. 
http://tu-dresden.de/die_tu_dresden/portrait/geschichte?set_language=en&cl=en 
 (5 Sept. 2008). 
172 7 May 1935, Postscript 1935, 16 August 1936. Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, pp. 117, 137, 176. Note that 
Klemperer later describes Kühn as ‘neither a Nazi nor a bad man’. 7 October 1946. Klemperer, Diaries 1945-
59, p. 152. 
173 13 January 1934. Klemperer, Diaries 1933-41, pp. 47-48. 
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experienced in their encounters with their non-Jewish colleagues.174 A comparison with 
documents from other university academics would put this to the test. Whatever the final 
outcome of a proper survey of the attitudes among academics in universities, we cannot 
justifiably claim that Victor Klemperer, a victim of the Nazi regime, was also a victim of 
rejection or self-seeking behaviour by his colleagues  
 
When we analysed the descriptions of existing relationships in the Limberg memoirs, the 
instances of loyalty (forty-seven) outweighed the instances of disloyalty (twenty-three). 
These can now be compared to Victor Klemperer’s experiences.175 The data from his 
diaries which most closely correlates with the loyalty count from Limberg comes from the 
count of positive or negative effects Klemperer experienced when he encountered people 
with whom he was ‘familiar’. In other words, he had ongoing personal or professional 
trust-based relationships with the people in his ‘familiar’ relationships. Klemperer recorded 
a significantly larger number of positive experiences than negative experiences for these 
relationships (Figure 29).  
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Figure 29: Comparison of experiences in ‘familiar' relationships (Klemperer) 
 
What does a comparison between the Klemperer figures and Limberg figures (Figures 2 
and 3) tell us? In both measures, positive experiences (or experiences of loyalty) 
outweighed negative (or experiences of disloyalty). Klemperer had proportionately more 
                                                 
174 The evidence located by historians so far indicates that support for the regime was widespread within the 
student body. Edward Hartshorne comments on the divide between students and their professors, stating that 
a ‘student, until he was ready to do his doctoral work, had little or no opportunity to become personally 
acquainted with his professor.’ Hartshorne, p. 126. For this reason it seems logical that relationships between 
Jewish and non-Jewish students be explored separately from relationships between Jewish and non-Jewish 
university employees. 
175 Note however the differences between Klemperer and the ‘My Life in Germany’ respondents; the essay 
writers had left Germany, were self-consciously addressing an American audience and were at a greater 
psychological distance from German society than Klemperer. See Liebersohn, p. 26  
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positive experiences than those of the Limberg narrators who functioned in wider or 
different contexts. Klemperer’s accounts are advantaged by his determination to record 
every detail as accurately as possible, but disadvantaged by his limited range of contacts. 
The Limberg essays operate within a wider context but are more likely prone to selectivity 
than Klemperer. Even though there are several factors to take into account, we see here the 
mere suggestion of a pattern: two different types of source reveal similar information. A 
diarist scrupulously recording events on a daily basis presents a picture that bears 
resemblances to a group of other people recalling their experiences from a distance. 
 
The second point of comparison between the historians’ assessments and the personal 
narratives concerns changes over time. When we compare the oral history and memoir 
samples (Figures 6 and 7) with Klemperer’s records of his encounters with non-Jews over 
the entire period of the Nazi regime, we see a slightly different pattern (Figure 30). Figures 
6 and 7 reveal that Jewish survivors told stories that indicated decreases in both positive 
and negative experiences over time, a trend that differs from Klemperer’s records. 
Nonetheless, incidents that had a positive effect on him still consistently outnumbered 
those that had a negative effect. We have a lot more detail about the specifics of 
Klemperer’s experiences than we have for the oral histories of memoirs. This means we 
can account for some of the factors that influenced his encounters. Clear peaks in both 
positive and negative experiences coincide with his period of forced labour (1942). At this 
time he was in the public eye and exposed to contact with strangers as never before. While 
his record shows an increase in negative encounters, at the same time he also experienced a 
large jump in the number of sympathetic comments or the amount of kindness directed his 
way. The trendlines show an increase in both positive and negative experiences as time 
progressed, with negative experiences increasing at a lesser rate. The most obvious 
explanation is that he was increasingly exposed to multiple contacts as he was forced into 
the streets shovelling snow and later into factories. In spite of his own gloom over broken 
relationships and feelings of isolation, it appears that Klemperer did not experience 
increasing indifference or hostility in his encounters with non-Jews.  
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Figure 30: Positive and negative encounters over time with trendlines (Klemperer)  
 
Three categories of distortion emerge when we compare the scholars’ arguments with 
systematic analysis of Klemperer’s diaries. The first category involves faithfully reporting 
Klemperer’s perceptions but not accounting for the fact that his perceptions may have been 
inaccurate or misguided. The second category involves distorting what he actually says by 
quoting him out of context. The third category is where, even if they have accurately 
represented what he says, historians over-generalize to unjustifiably make a point.  
 
But what of Klemperer — are his diaries nevertheless useful as a source? Clearly he must 
not be held as representative of the Jews’ experiences in general. But historians have found 
individual case studies, for example, Ian Kershaw’s substantial work on Bavaria, useful to 
help provide a snapshot of life under the Third Reich, which is precisely what Klemperer 
does. For the sorts of questions asked in this chapter about attitudes of ‘ordinary’ Germans, 
Klemperer has provided a large amount of data which reveals clear patterns and trends.176 
What emerges is that, in spite of his oft-expressed disgust with the German population, 
overall he was well-treated and even protected by those he encountered.  He was fully 
                                                 
176 What these diaries have to offer, in terms of information useful for historians, has certainly not been 
exhausted in this analysis. To my knowledge, no-one has yet attempted to explore the diaries with any degree 
of comprehensiveness. They have much more to offer for our understanding of life in the Third Reich. 
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justified in his terror and misery at the hands of the Nazis but clearly knew he was not at 
risk from those ‘Aryans’ who surrounded him in his everyday life. His theme of searching 
for the vox populi throughout the twelve years of the regime brought him to no firm 
conclusions. He vacillated from one extreme to another and most of the time 
acknowledged he really could not tell what most ‘ordinary’ Germans felt about Hitler and 
his henchmen. For the most part, the diaries reveal no striking instances of overt or 
determined resistance to the Nazis but along with the evidence of frequent conformities 
appears the multiple small disobediences which provide clues to the secret disapproval of 
the people. What is certain however, is that there is no justification for Robert Gellately’s 
analysis: ‘A sense of how the Germans responded positively to various waves of 
persecution and even to the spirit of Nazi ‘justice’, is conveyed on almost every page of 
Professor Victor Klemperer’s recently published diary.’177  
                                                 
177 Gellately, Backing Hitler, p. 8. 
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Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this dissertation was to examine how, and how well, historians use 
evidence. To this end, I chose a specific case study, namely, the historiography of relations 
between Jewish and non-Jewish Germans during the Nazi era. Few topics in history have 
generated more interest than the Third Reich and, in particular, the Holocaust.  Those 
historians who specialise in this field are amongst the best known, and best selling, in the 
entire historical profession. They have access to a range of primary sources, both published 
and unpublished, that is extraordinarily rich. It is therefore logical to expect that it is in this 
field that we should see history being done at its best. 
 
Unhappily, as we have seen, the methodology of a some prominent historians can be 
indicted on three counts: Firstly, they have not always made wise decisions in terms of 
which evidence to look at; Secondly, they have frequently misused evidence; Thirdly, they 
have failed to look properly at a whole range of evidence that is to be found both in the 
historical record and in the work of other disciplines.  
 
These methodological errors are the result of several shortcomings: the failure 
conscientiously to adhere to rigorous methodology, the imposition of pre-conceived ideas 
on their handling of evidence, or perhaps even the result of lack of ability to maintain good 
historical practice. Furthermore, these problems are compounded by the fact that historians 
quote each other and transfer the errors from one generation of commentary to the next.1 
These problems give rise to questions of how and why this can happen. My conclusion is 
that there are two key areas that should be addressed by historians who tackle the social 
history of the Third Reich. However, the recognition of these areas also raises the question 
of how they are related to the history profession in general and whether there are lessons 
for all historians, no matter which field they work in.  
 
The first area is that the historians examined in this study are not rigorously holding 
themselves to standards in terms of their use of evidence. This is occurring in spite of the 
reminders that come from peers within the profession. We are reminded that we must be 
painstaking and include extensive quality source material, rigorous analysis, and 
                                                 
1 See Chapter One, Footnote 132 of this dissertation. 
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persuasive argument based on verifiable professional standards.2 We are reminded that 
even though we face accusations of pedantry or find the work tedious and demanding, we 
are still expected to pursue truthfulness.3  We are also called to ‘jettison dearly-held 
interpretations in the face of the recalcitrance of the evidence.’4 Yet, as we have seen, too 
many historians still fail to follow such sage advice. Raul Hilberg describes the Holocaust 
as a ‘novel event and a new marker in history.’5 One consequence of this uniqueness is 
that, unlike any other field in the study of the past, historians, perhaps unavoidably, tend to 
apply moral weight to their conclusions. But Hilberg implies more than that. His 
implication is that history should be done differently when it comes to this particular 
subject. My argument is that because the issues and mistakes we have observed here are 
for the most part methodological, they do not contaminate the sanctity of remembering, but 
they do contaminate the effectiveness of historical enquiry. 
 
In this dissertation I have argued that historical evidence should be evaluated and utilised 
in the light of six key methodological principles. These are that historians must always take 
a critical approach to their sources, they must refrain from imposing their pre-existing 
theories on the evidence, they should draw on the knowledge that other disciplines offer, 
the evidence from the group under scrutiny is just as valuable as the evidence generated by 
groups not under scrutiny, sources and evidence must be approached with an open mind, 
and historians must approach their material as systematically as possible. None of these 
principles are innovative, nor are they unfamiliar. For historians they should be practised 
as a matter of common sense and be part of orthodox historical practice. Unfortunately, it 
would seem that many prominent scholars of the Third Reich do not always adhere to these 
principles.  
 
The factors that potentially contribute to the problems comprise a long inventory. Listed 
here in no particular order, these factors are probably not exhaustive. Firstly, as new 
sources become available (as does from time-to-time even today), the excitement of 
working with new material overwhelms considerations of ensuring that sources are 
                                                 
2 Ulrich Herbert, ‘Extermination Policy: New Answers and Questions about the History of the “Holocaust” in 
German Historiography’, in National Socialist Extermination Policies: Contemporary German Perspectives 
and Controversies, ed. U. Herbert (New York, 2000), pp. 43-44. 
3 Geoff Eley, ‘Hitler’s Silent Majority? Conformity and Resistance under the Third Reich’, Michigan 
Quarterly Review (Part Two), 42:3 (2003), p. 563. 
4 Richard Evans, In Defence of History (London, 2000), p. 120. 
5 Raul Hilberg, ‘I Was Not There’, in Writing and the Holocaust, ed. Berel Lang (New York, 1988), p.17. 
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qualitatively and quantitatively assessed and balanced against the sources that are already 
known. Secondly, it appears that historians have a tendency to quote other historians 
without checking their claims, which means they are not adequately policing the standards 
of fellow professionals. Thirdly, it is possible that historiographical fashion plays a role. 
Often an attitude that older work or methodology is out-of-date and no longer relevant can 
develop, which encourages historians to jump into new (and sometimes untested) ways of 
doing history. Fourthly, it is possible that insufficient attention is given to training 
historians in historical methodology; sometimes this can be observed in the published work 
of professional historians. The finer issues of strategy and method are not given as much 
attention as they deserve. Fifthly, there are pressures on historians to make their mark by 
suggesting new theories. It is the new theories or the controversial claims which will draw 
the attention of academics or the reading public. Sixthly, there are commercial pressures to 
produce something that will be read, either by other academics or by the public. Works that 
pay close attention to methodology and discuss at length its finer details can make for dull 
reading. Historians can have an instinctive desire to produce work that suits the fancies of 
the consumers.  
 
There are two further factors which are possibly a particular feature of Third Reich and 
Holocaust historiography. The subject matter is highly emotive and contentious; a non-
emotional response must surely be almost impossible. Although all manner of historians 
study all manner of horrific elements in human history, the sheer scale and monstrosity of 
the crimes committed by the Nazis inevitably take a toll on those who study them. It would 
be a rare historian who would not feel a sense of how the topic can ‘plunge us without life 
preservers into the maelstrom of the disaster’.6 But this does not permit the historian to 
disengage from the professional standards required for good practice. But many of the 
historians of the Third Reich have personal connections to the topic in some way, either 
being survivors themselves or by having close connections to those who did not survive. It 
is almost too much to ask them to remain ‘detached and analytical’ under these 
circumstances.7  The requirement in this case is for historians to be transparent and honest. 
If it is relevant in some way, there should be no excuse for historians to conceal their own 
(ideological, political or personal) positions or circumstances. It is not unprofessional for a 
                                                 
6 Lawrence Langer, Admitting the Holocaust: Collected Essays (New York, 1995), p. 13. 
7 See David Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution: Public Opinion under Nazism (Oxford, 1992), p. 
118.  
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historian to admit to an emotional response to the material or to be operating from a 
position that has been influenced by personal circumstances. But it is unhelpful if this 
information is concealed from the reader. It is also not acceptable if they act on emotional 
responses by refusing to confront uncongenial facts, by avoiding sources that conflict with 
their preferred viewpoint, or by accepting uncritically evidence that suits their argument 
while trying to discredit or explain away evidence that contradicts it. Historians must be 
prepared to follow the wisdom of John Maynard Keynes: ‘When the facts change, I change 
my mind. What do you do sir?’8  If new evidence emerges, or if the status of old evidence 
has to be revised, a conscientious historian should not be afraid to re-evaluate his or her 
previous conclusions. There is no honour in rigidly adhering to a position in the face of 
evidence to the contrary.  
 
The second area for historians to address concerns their competence in social history and 
whether they are equipping themselves to do the job properly. The nineteenth century 
founders of the modern discipline of history were preoccupied with the decisions and 
decision-making processes of political and religious elites.  The methodological procedures 
that they developed were suited to the study of the ideas, intentions and situations of 
individuals and small groups, but not to the views that prevailed in whole social classes or 
amongst the general public.  They did not need sophisticated sampling techniques, nor did 
they need to confront the difficulties that beset historians who try to reconstruct the largely 
undocumented views of history’s silent majorities.  The growth of social history and 
‘history from below’ from the 1960s exposed the limitations of traditional methodologies.  
Historians were often ill-equipped to deal with the problems of sampling, of 
representativeness, and of inference from scattered and fragmentary sources that they now 
confronted.  All too often they failed to elaborate and apply methodological procedures 
that were required if they were to test their preconceptions and preferences with 
appropriate rigour.9  
 
It is possible that, with the advent of social history and the new ‘bottom up’ focus, training 
has not always been adjusted accordingly and historians have employed casual strategies in 
                                                 
8 Keynes, quoted in Malabre, Alfred L., Lost Prophets: An Insider's History of the Modern Economists 
(Boston, Mass., 1994), p.20. 
9 See Miles Fairburn, Social History: Problems, Strategies and Methods (New York, 1999), p. 8, and Lee 
Benson, ‘An Approach to the Scientific Study of Past Public Opinion’, The Public Opinion Quarterly, 31:4 
(1967-1968), pp. 527-529. 
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analysing information. A prerequisite for doing social history is to recognise that 
typologies, categories, definitions or certainties are more elusive to locate and more easily 
blurred when it comes to the study of ‘ordinary’ people: ‘Black and white becomes grey on 
grey.’10  Methods such as ‘number crunching’ which have been long accepted by other 
social sciences are viewed with trepidation or disdain by historians who are suspicious of 
quantitative approaches.11 But historians must be prepared consciously and systematically 
to develop valid and reliable procedures to extract quality information from their sources.12 
Furthermore, they must not only be prepared to put them to the test, but to do so in such a 
transparent manner that other historians can put their conclusions to the test as well.  
 
The problem of source selection has emerged as a key trap for historians. Traditional 
historical practice has involved near-exclusive use of ‘top-down’ sources, with special 
emphasis on archival research.  This perhaps helps to explain the over-riding importance 
that some historians of the Nazi era have placed on official sources such as Gestapo 
reports. But in social history this approach is inadequate. It is vitally important that the 
voices of the people who are being studied are heard and that historians use sources that 
are not driven by the needs, perspectives, and biases of official information-gatherers. 
Personal narratives such as diaries, memoirs, oral histories, interviews or surveys are 
essential elements, in spite of the problems that many historians perceive them to have. 
Particularly in the study of the Nazi era, these testimonies help us step away from the 
‘perpetrators’ interpretive monopoly’ derived from the official records and remain attuned 
to the responses of their victims.13 Personal narratives such as diaries cannot convey all 
dimensions of people’s experiences but they can shed light on their efforts to find meaning 
and understanding in their experiences.14 This type of information is not available from the 
official documentation, but if the archived records are used to complement personal 
narratives we can achieve a balance of viewpoints. Where we have concerns about 
typicality or the representative nature of our evidence, we have enough accumulated 
evidence to permit the comparative study of testimonies.15 Moreover, the record of just one 
                                                 
10 Detlev Peukert, Inside Nazi Germany: Conformity, Opposition and Racism in Everyday Life (London, 
1993), pp.14-15. 
11 Fairburn, Social History, pp. 148-149. 
12 Benson, ‘Past Public Opinion’, p. 567. 
13 Herbert, ‘New Answers’, p. 17. 
14 Alexandra Garbarini, Numbered Days: Diaries and the Holocaust (New Haven, 2006), p. xiii. 
15 See Rita Horváth, ‘On Comparing Jewish Survivors’ Testimonies taken by the National Relief Committee 
for Deportees in Hungary and Other Large-Scale Historical-Memorial Projects of She’erit Hapletah in the 
Immediate Aftermath of the Holocaust (1945-1948)’, Yad Vashem (2004), 
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individual, such as Victor Klemperer, is also the record of the hundreds of individuals 
whom he encountered throughout the twelve Nazi years. More than just glimpsing the lives 
of individuals, we also gain a view of communities through the personal testimonies of 
those who were eyewitnesses. Richard Evans assures us that a document can be made to 
reveal more than its author thought.16 In this we can be assisted by other social sciences 
which have long experience of studying how human behaviour works, whether it is 
ordinary behaviour under extraordinary circumstances or the extraordinary behaviours that 
can result from succumbing to the pressures of oppressive dictatorship. Most importantly, 
historians need to be methodologically rigorous in order to avoid attributing their own 
perspectives to people in the past, and in order to avoid misrepresenting the past in ways 
that reflect their own prejudices and political agendas.17 
 
The two areas discussed above bring us to the question of their relevance to the history 
profession in general. Are the problems raised in this dissertation specific to the study of 
the Third Reich or are they generic to the history profession as a whole?  
 
We have uncovered a long list of sins committed by historians: uneven treatment of 
sources, accepting material at face value, over-generalisation from the available evidence, 
failing to identify alternative explanations, tendentiousness, and (most disgracefully) 
occasional misuse of evidence. But there is no reason to believe any of these transgressions 
are confined solely to Holocaust and Third Reich studies. They could just as easily apply in 
general to any field of historical enquiry.  Likewise, the six methodological principles 
advocated are either universally valid or not valid at all. None of the six points is specific 
to the issue of relations between Jews and non-Jews in the Third Reich. It is entirely 
possible that lack of methodological rigour is, if not universal, at least endemic within the 
profession. Only a similar investigation of another field of historical enquiry could cast 
light on this suggestion. 
 
Joshua Abraham was a resident of Sonderburg who, for many years, had met twice-weekly 
with his friends to play cards. Within days of Hitler’s ascension to power, Abraham’s life 
                                                                                                                                                    
http://www1.yadvashem.org/about_yad/departments/institute/Dr_Ritahtml.html. 
16 Evans, In Defence, pp. 91-92. 
17 Ian Kershaw, ‘Beware the Moral High Ground’ in H-Soz-u-Kult, 24 Feb.2004, 
http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/forum/id=418&type=diskussionen. See also Fairburn, Social History, 
pp. 159-160. 
 145
changed. ‘“As soon as the Nazis came to power,” he recalled, “I was no longer told when 
they were playing cards. Everything stopped. I would see them on the street and we 
pretended we didn’t see each other. Not one of them spoke to me.”’18 Similar stories are 
told over and over again by Jewish survivors from different towns, different circumstances 
and with different outcomes. On the other hand, many survivors tell stories that present a 
different picture. Abraham’s story may be typical of the Jewish experience, it may not be. 
If we accumulate a large enough number of anecdotes, particularly from personal 
narratives, the probability of a representative picture emerging increases in proportion to 
the size of the body of evidence.19 Only systematic collection and analysis of the data will 
permit valid conclusions. Our goal is to obtain the best explanation.20 Until historians are 
prepared to admit all of the available evidence for consideration, to sift that evidence 
systematically, to analyse it using all the appropriate methodological tools, and to draw 
conclusions without prejudice, we cannot claim that we have located the best explanation. 
Contrary to those who assert there is no more to be gained by continuing to search for such 
explanations, we indeed have many paths to tread before we gain a clearer understanding 
of the true social history of the Third Reich. Personal narratives have an important, even 
vital part to play in this process. They are unjustifiably prevented from contributing 
meaningfully to our understanding of the Third Reich by historians who have not carefully 
considered how best they can be used. Because they do have weaknesses, only a rigorous 
methodological approach will minimise their shortcomings and maximise their value. In 
this the problems lie with the historians, not the sources. It is premature to claim that we 
have extracted all there is to know about Third Reich history from the extant sources. 
There is always room to grow in our understanding and in our practice of history. 
 
                                                 
18 Victoria Barnett, Bystanders: Conscience and Complicity during the Holocaust (Westport, Conn., 1999),  
p. 3. 
19 Fairburn, Social History, p. 61. 
20 Ibid., p. 235. 
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Appendix 
Methodology: Data analysis 
 
This appendix provides details of the processes I used to assemble data from the diaries of 
Victor Klemperer. The data I obtained from other primary sources was based on similar 
methods, with some variations which were due to the differences in the type of material.  
 
To collect data from Klemperer’s diaries, I used a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet containing 
sixteen worksheets, one for each year of the Nazi regime, two to collate and sort results for 
graphing and one to collate Klemperer’s vox populi comments. The end result was a 
spreadsheet containing so much data it took a full five seconds to save each time I clicked 
the ‘save’ tab! 
 
Each time Klemperer recorded an encounter between a Jew and a non-Jew (either 
individual or group encounter) detailed information was entered into the spreadsheet: 
 
1. Technical data   
? Incident number/date 
? Page number 
? Incident description (brief  overview) 
? Geographical location (e.g. Dresden, Dölzschen ) 
? Physical context (e.g. home, street, tram, shop, restaurant/cafe, office, 
workplace) 
? Participants  
? Adult  
? Child (13+) 
? Report integrity  
? Eye witness 
? Third party report 
 
2. Incident Assessment   
a) Behaviour Analysis (Non-Jew’s behaviour towards outcast) 
 
? Active Neutral: No intent towards outcast 
? Discontent with regime policies 
? Support for regime policies 
? Active: Benefit to the outcast 
? Record only of incident:  no dialogue or activity recorded e.g. social 
contact recorded  
? Verbal sympathy for outcast  
? Practical support for outcast  
? Both verbal & practical support 
? Active: Detriment to the outcast 
? Record only of incident:  no dialogue or activity recorded e.g. social 
contact recorded 
? Verbal aggression 
? Physical aggression 
? Both verbal & physical aggression 
? Passive: Benefit to outcast 
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? eg sympathetic glances, failure to denounce, politeness 
? Passive: Detriment to  outcast 
? e.g. withdrawal of contact or practical support, avoidance 
? Passive Neutral: Contact, no clear intent 
? e.g. passing on of gossip, general comments 
 
b) Effect Analysis (Outcast’s emotive response) 
? Positive response  
? Negative response  
? Neutral response 
? Location of incident  
? Public  
? Semi-Public  
? Private 
? Relationship  
? Stranger  
? Casual Acquaintance  
? Familiar Relationship 
? Professional  
? Personal  
? Family 
? Motivation of the non-Jewish participant 
? Conviction (political or personal belief)  
? Sentiment (personal/emotional reasons)  
? Mercenary/opportunistic  
? Unknown 
 
3. Other information/quotes 
 
 
Although a great deal of information was extracted from each incident, the use of the 
spreadsheet meant that information could be sorted, tallied, and cross-checked without 
difficulty (see Figure 1). 
 
The trendlines displayed in some graphs are, fortunately for me, automated features of 
Microsoft Excel. I would expect, naturally, that a larger and more extensive study based on 
the same principles of systematic analysis, would also employ more sophisticated and 
formal methods of calculating trends and statistical information. 
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Figure 1: Worksheet sample (partial) 
 
 
Vox Populi 
Another type of analysis from Klemperer’s diaries, which provided the basis for 
understanding his comments about the vox populi, consisted of sorting his comments into 
categories. Although I did not discuss this type of analysis in the body of the thesis, I found 
the data useful to consider as a background when I checked the claims of the historians 
who discussed Klemperer’s opinions.  Because the information was subjective and non-
specific, I did not consider it appropriate for inclusion in my systematic analysis. In a 
larger study it would be a useful tool for comparison with other types of analysis.  
 
I divided Klemperer’s vox populi comments or impressions into six categories. 
Interestingly, in spite of all the support he received, he noted very few instances of ‘Aryan’ 
reactions against anti-Semitism (see Figure 2).  
 
? Support for the regime and/or Hitler e.g.  
o [Resentment against local party policies coupled with support for 
Hitler] 
? Unhappiness with the regime, awareness of problems e.g.  
o ‘So many people come to see [the Aryan director of the library]. 
First with their arm stretched out, Hitler salute. Then they feel 
their way into the conversation. Then, when they’ve become 
certain, the mask falls.’ 
? Changing attitudes (moving from pro- towards anti-Nazi) e.g. 
o [Visitor tells Klemperer of attitudes in his area] ‘The year before 
he had still reported a passable degree of contentment. Now he 
talks of widespread resentment, partly of an economic, partly of a 
religious nature.’  
? Evidence of behaviour not conforming to Nazi system e.g.  
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o ‘Every Jew has his Aryan angel.’ 
o [Publicly announced instruction to fly flags at half-mast] ‘I see 
with pleasure that in our neighbourhood a good half of the houses 
are without flags.’  
? Fear, suspicion, unease, shame about the situation e.g.  
o ‘The people obviously anti-Nazi, but infinitely timid and 
reserved. The general political mood: a dull yielding, a 
despondent waiting without hope.’ 
? Reactions against anti-Semitism 
 
As can be seen in the above list, all regime-supportive comments are lumped into one 
category, but I attempted to divide the attitudes of discontent with the regime into five 
categories so that it was easier to discern what might have precipitated the discontent. 
 
Support for regime
and/or Hitler
Unhappiness w ith
regime,aw areness of
problems
Changing attitudes
(tow ards anti-Nazi)
Evidence of behaviour
not conforming to Nazi
strictures
Fear, suspicion,
unease, shame
(negative emotions)
Reaction against anti-
semitism
 
Figure 2: Klemperer’s notes on his received impressions of the vox populi, sorted according to type of 
comment (representative sample only) 
 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Pro-Regime
Anti-regime
 
Figure 3: Klemperer and the vox populi: pro- vs. anti-regime comments recorded (representative 
sample only) 
  
 
Vox Populi in other memoirs/oral histories: 
 
Comments equivalent to Klemperer’s vox populi in memoirs or oral histories were general 
statements made by the narrators which were not related to specific incidents. I sorted 
these by the type of behaviour expressed or experienced:  
 
? Loyalty, sympathy or support for Jews e.g.  
o ‘If the colleagues were not Party members but were Aryans, they 
demonstrated a pronounced friendliness to us Jewish colleagues.’ 
o ‘It should not be forgotten that the attitude of a large part of the Christian 
population, perhaps the majority, toward the Jews was basically friendly, 
often kind and sympathetic. We frequently heard expressions of profound 
disapproval, even strong rejection of the measures taken by the authorities 
and the Party against us and our friends.’ 
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? Withdrawal from relationship with Jews e.g. 
o ‘Within the company itself the Aryan employees behaved decently and in 
an orderly manner toward the new ‘non-Aryans,’ but they increasingly 
avoided being seen with them on the street or associating with them 
privately. Personal relations with ‘Aryans,’ even when it was a matter of 
saying hello on the street and in public, dwindled more and more.’ 
 
? Rejection of Jews e.g. 
o ‘Father was turned away from shops because of his Jewish appearance.’  
o ‘[Passersby during the boycott] now wore smiles on their faces and could 
scarcely conceal their satisfaction.’  
 
? Jews experiencing freedom from harassment e.g. 
o ‘With satisfaction I can note that the often expressed concerns of frightened 
souls . . . never proved justified. Neither the field trips nor the hikes [of 
groups of Jewish children around Berlin] were ever disturbed by 
harassment, let alone worse things. 
 
? Feelings about the regime on the part of non-Jews e.g. 
o ‘I saw plenty of evidence of virulent hatred on the part of the Aryan 
population toward the current brown regime.’ 
 
 
Sorting information in this way served several useful purposes. The systematic, 
quantitative analysis done for this thesis was experimental and limited, but I compared the 
general comments with the counted data to ensure that I was at least building a data picture 
that was representative of the source I was using. In other words, narrators would make 
general comments and provide anecdotes to tell their stories, but it was important to check 
that the two ways of conveying information were consistent with each other. I also needed 
to build a general picture of whether the general comments made were reflective of the 
historians’ representations.  
 
Furthermore, categorising in the way shown above not only gave an overall idea of what 
narrators most often commented on but also paved the way for thinking about differences 
in categories of source and the way stories were told, for example between essays written 
while the regime was still in power and oral histories provided decades after the end of the 
Nazi era. 
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